More refactoring to clean up code, and add a gate function to make sure we do not handle OK packets we did not expect. This hardens up a few potential edge cases around security, since such messages might be used to e.g. pollute a cache and DOS under certain conditions.
This commit is contained in:
parent
16df2c3363
commit
0d4109a9f1
13 changed files with 170 additions and 83 deletions
|
@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ void Peer::sendHELLO(const InetAddress &localAddr,const InetAddress &atAddress,u
|
|||
atAddress.serialize(outp);
|
||||
outp.append((uint64_t)RR->topology->worldId());
|
||||
outp.append((uint64_t)RR->topology->worldTimestamp());
|
||||
RR->node->expectReplyTo(outp.packetId());
|
||||
outp.armor(_key,false); // HELLO is sent in the clear
|
||||
RR->node->putPacket(localAddr,atAddress,outp.data(),outp.size());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -274,6 +275,7 @@ void Peer::attemptToContactAt(const InetAddress &localAddr,const InetAddress &at
|
|||
{
|
||||
if ( (_vProto >= 5) && ( !((_vMajor == 1)&&(_vMinor == 1)&&(_vRevision == 0)) ) ) {
|
||||
Packet outp(_id.address(),RR->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ECHO);
|
||||
RR->node->expectReplyTo(outp.packetId());
|
||||
outp.armor(_key,true);
|
||||
RR->node->putPacket(localAddr,atAddress,outp.data(),outp.size());
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue