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Remove ASM Salsa20 since it will not be the default in 2.x any more... reduce build complexity.

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This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2019-08-16 14:26:25 -07:00
parent 2b681c37ac
commit 51a25fdec9
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GPG key ID: 1657198823E52A61
5 changed files with 284 additions and 230 deletions
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111
node/Packet.cpp
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@ -32,13 +32,6 @@
#include "Packet.hpp"
#ifdef ZT_USE_X64_ASM_SALSA2012
#include "../ext/x64-salsa2012-asm/salsa2012.h"
#endif
#ifdef ZT_USE_ARM32_NEON_ASM_SALSA2012
#include "../ext/arm32-neon-salsa2012-asm/salsa2012.h"
#endif
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#define FORCE_INLINE static __forceinline
#include <intrin.h>
@ -50,37 +43,6 @@
namespace ZeroTier {
/************************************************************************** */
/* Set up macros for fast single-pass ASM Salsa20/12 crypto, if we have it */
// x64 SSE crypto
#ifdef ZT_USE_X64_ASM_SALSA2012
#define ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO() (true)
#define ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(b,l,n,k) zt_salsa2012_amd64_xmm6(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(b),(l),reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(n),reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(k))
#endif
// ARM (32-bit) NEON crypto (must be detected)
#ifdef ZT_USE_ARM32_NEON_ASM_SALSA2012
class _FastCryptoChecker
{
public:
_FastCryptoChecker() : canHas(zt_arm_has_neon()) {}
bool canHas;
};
static const _FastCryptoChecker _ZT_FAST_CRYPTO_CHECK;
#define ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO() (_ZT_FAST_CRYPTO_CHECK.canHas)
#define ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(b,l,n,k) zt_salsa2012_armneon3_xor(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(b),(const unsigned char *)0,(l),reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(n),reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(k))
#endif
// No fast crypto available
#ifndef ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO
#define ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO() (false)
#define ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(b,l,n,k) {}
#endif
/************************************************************************** */
/* LZ4 is shipped encapsulated into Packet in an anonymous namespace.
*
* We're doing this as a deliberate workaround for various Linux distribution
@ -899,30 +861,16 @@ void Packet::armor(const void *key,bool encryptPayload)
_salsa20MangleKey((const unsigned char *)key,mangledKey);
if (ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO()) {
const unsigned int encryptLen = (encryptPayload) ? (size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB) : 0;
uint64_t keyStream[(ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH + 64 + 8) / 8];
ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(keyStream,encryptLen + 64,(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV),mangledKey);
Salsa20::memxor(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(keyStream + 8),encryptLen);
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,keyStream);
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
memcpy(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,mac,8);
#else
(*reinterpret_cast<uint64_t *>(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC)) = mac[0];
#endif
} else {
Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
uint64_t macKey[4];
s20.crypt12(ZERO_KEY,macKey,sizeof(macKey));
uint8_t *const payload = data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
const unsigned int payloadLen = size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
if (encryptPayload)
s20.crypt12(payload,payload,payloadLen);
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,payload,payloadLen,macKey);
memcpy(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,mac,8);
}
Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
uint64_t macKey[4];
s20.crypt12(ZERO_KEY,macKey,sizeof(macKey));
uint8_t *const payload = data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
const unsigned int payloadLen = size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
if (encryptPayload)
s20.crypt12(payload,payload,payloadLen);
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,payload,payloadLen,macKey);
memcpy(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,mac,8);
}
bool Packet::dearmor(const void *key)
@ -935,37 +883,20 @@ bool Packet::dearmor(const void *key)
if ((cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_NONE)||(cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_SALSA2012)) {
_salsa20MangleKey((const unsigned char *)key,mangledKey);
if (ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO()) {
uint64_t keyStream[(ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH + 64 + 8) / 8];
ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(keyStream,((cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_SALSA2012) ? (payloadLen + 64) : 64),(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV),mangledKey);
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,payload,payloadLen,keyStream);
Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
uint64_t macKey[4];
s20.crypt12(ZERO_KEY,macKey,sizeof(macKey));
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,payload,payloadLen,macKey);
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
if (!Utils::secureEq(mac,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,8))
return false;
if (!Utils::secureEq(mac,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,8))
return false;
#else
if ((*reinterpret_cast<const uint64_t *>(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC)) != mac[0]) // also secure, constant time
return false;
if ((*reinterpret_cast<const uint64_t *>(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC)) != mac[0]) // also secure, constant time
return false;
#endif
if (cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_SALSA2012)
Salsa20::memxor(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(keyStream + 8),payloadLen);
} else {
Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
uint64_t macKey[4];
s20.crypt12(ZERO_KEY,macKey,sizeof(macKey));
uint64_t mac[2];
poly1305(mac,payload,payloadLen,macKey);
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
if (!Utils::secureEq(mac,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,8))
return false;
#else
if ((*reinterpret_cast<const uint64_t *>(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC)) != mac[0]) // also secure, constant time
return false;
#endif
if (cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_SALSA2012)
s20.crypt12(payload,payload,payloadLen);
}
if (cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__POLY1305_SALSA2012)
s20.crypt12(payload,payload,payloadLen);
return true;
} else {
return false; // unrecognized cipher suite