Deferred decode for HELLO to prevent HELLOcalypse under high load of new peers.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2015-11-05 12:22:58 -08:00
parent a95ff21aaf
commit 8ef4edebbf
12 changed files with 463 additions and 73 deletions

View file

@ -46,21 +46,31 @@
#include "Cluster.hpp"
#include "Node.hpp"
#include "AntiRecursion.hpp"
#include "DeferredPackets.hpp"
namespace ZeroTier {
bool IncomingPacket::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR)
bool IncomingPacket::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,bool deferred)
{
const Address sourceAddress(source());
try {
if ((cipher() == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_NONE)&&(verb() == Packet::VERB_HELLO)) {
// Unencrypted HELLOs are handled here since they are used to
// populate our identity cache in the first place. _doHELLO() is special
// in that it contains its own authentication logic.
return _doHELLO(RR);
// Unencrypted HELLOs require some potentially expensive verification, so
// do this in the background if background processing is enabled.
DeferredPackets *const dp = RR->dp; // read volatile pointer
if ((dp)&&(!deferred)) {
dp->enqueue(this);
return true; // 'handled' via deferring to background thread(s)
} else {
// A null pointer for peer to _doHELLO() tells it to run its own
// special internal authentication logic. This is done for unencrypted
// HELLOs to learn new identities, etc.
SharedPtr<Peer> tmp;
return _doHELLO(RR,tmp);
}
}
SharedPtr<Peer> peer = RR->topology->getPeer(sourceAddress);
SharedPtr<Peer> peer(RR->topology->getPeer(sourceAddress));
if (peer) {
if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), MAC authentication failed (size: %u)",peer->address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),size());
@ -79,7 +89,8 @@ bool IncomingPacket::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR)
default: // ignore unknown verbs, but if they pass auth check they are "received"
peer->received(RR,_localAddress,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),v,0,Packet::VERB_NOP);
return true;
case Packet::VERB_HELLO: return _doHELLO(RR);
case Packet::VERB_HELLO: return _doHELLO(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_ERROR: return _doERROR(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_OK: return _doOK(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_WHOIS: return _doWHOIS(RR,peer);
@ -185,7 +196,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
return true;
}
bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR)
bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,SharedPtr<Peer> &peer)
{
/* Note: this is the only packet ever sent in the clear, and it's also
* the only packet that we authenticate via a different path. Authentication
@ -226,63 +237,65 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR)
return true;
}
SharedPtr<Peer> peer(RR->topology->getPeer(id.address()));
if (peer) {
// We already have an identity with this address -- check for collisions
if (!peer) {
peer = RR->topology->getPeer(id.address());
if (peer) {
// We already have an identity with this address -- check for collisions
if (peer->identity() != id) {
// Identity is different from the one we already have -- address collision
if (peer->identity() != id) {
// Identity is different from the one we already have -- address collision
unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
if (RR->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) {
if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
Packet outp(id.address(),RR->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
outp.append((uint64_t)pid);
outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
outp.armor(key,true);
RR->node->putPacket(_localAddress,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size());
unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
if (RR->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) {
if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
Packet outp(id.address(),RR->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
outp.append((uint64_t)pid);
outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
outp.armor(key,true);
RR->node->putPacket(_localAddress,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size());
} else {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
}
} else {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
}
return true;
} else {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
// Identity is the same as the one we already have -- check packet integrity
if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
// Continue at // VALID
}
return true;
} else {
// Identity is the same as the one we already have -- check packet integrity
// We don't already have an identity with this address -- validate and learn it
if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
// Check identity proof of work
if (!id.locallyValidate()) {
TRACE("dropped HELLO from %s(%s): identity invalid",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
// Check packet integrity and authentication
SharedPtr<Peer> newPeer(new Peer(RR->identity,id));
if (!dearmor(newPeer->key())) {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
peer = RR->topology->addPeer(newPeer);
// Continue at // VALID
}
} else {
// We don't already have an identity with this address -- validate and learn it
// Check identity proof of work
if (!id.locallyValidate()) {
TRACE("dropped HELLO from %s(%s): identity invalid",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
// Check packet integrity and authentication
SharedPtr<Peer> newPeer(new Peer(RR->identity,id));
if (!dearmor(newPeer->key())) {
TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",id.address().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
peer = RR->topology->addPeer(newPeer);
// Continue at // VALID
// VALID -- if we made it here, packet passed identity and authenticity checks!
}
// VALID -- if we made it here, packet passed identity and authenticity checks!
if (externalSurfaceAddress)
RR->sa->iam(id.address(),_remoteAddress,externalSurfaceAddress,RR->topology->isRoot(id),RR->node->now());