Cleanup, Linux build fix.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2019-08-26 12:17:23 -07:00
parent b6d7a95028
commit a0fd4ad23f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: C8877CF2D7A5D7F3
4 changed files with 75 additions and 45 deletions

View file

@ -53,9 +53,11 @@ public:
inline AES() {}
inline AES(const uint8_t key[32]) { this->init(key); }
inline ~AES() { Utils::burn(&_k,sizeof(_k)); }
/**
* Set (or re-set) this AES256 cipher's key
*/
inline void init(const uint8_t key[32])
{
#ifdef ZT_AES_AESNI
@ -68,6 +70,12 @@ public:
_initSW(key);
}
/**
* Encrypt a single AES block (ECB mode)
*
* @param in Input block
* @param out Output block (can be same as input)
*/
inline void encrypt(const uint8_t in[16],uint8_t out[16]) const
{
#ifdef ZT_AES_AESNI
@ -80,6 +88,14 @@ public:
_encryptSW(in,out);
}
/**
* Compute GMAC-AES256 (GCM without ciphertext)
*
* @param iv 96-bit IV
* @param in Input data
* @param len Length of input
* @param out 128-bit authorization tag from GMAC
*/
inline void gmac(const uint8_t iv[12],const void *in,const unsigned int len,uint8_t out[16]) const
{
#ifdef ZT_AES_AESNI
@ -90,6 +106,18 @@ public:
#endif
}
/**
* Encrypt or decrypt (they're the same) using AES256-CTR
*
* The counter here is a 128-bit big-endian that starts at the IV. The code only
* increments the least significant 64 bits, making it only safe to use for a
* maximum of 2^64-1 bytes (much larger than we ever do).
*
* @param iv 128-bit CTR IV
* @param in Input plaintext or ciphertext
* @param len Length of input
* @param out Output plaintext or ciphertext
*/
inline void ctr(const uint8_t iv[16],const void *in,unsigned int len,void *out) const
{
#ifdef ZT_AES_AESNI
@ -133,11 +161,11 @@ public:
* @param out Output buffer to receive ciphertext
* @param tag Output buffer to receive 64-bit authentication tag
*/
inline void ztGmacCtrEncrypt(const uint8_t iv[8],const void *in,unsigned int len,void *out,uint8_t tag[8])
inline void ztGmacCtrEncrypt(const uint8_t iv[8],const void *in,unsigned int len,void *out,uint8_t tag[8]) const
{
uint8_t ctrIv[16],gmacIv[12];
// (1) Compute AES256-GMAC(in) using a 96-bit IV constructed from
// Compute AES256-GMAC(in) using a 96-bit IV constructed from
// the 64-bit supplied IV and the message size.
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) gmacIv[i] = iv[i];
@ -151,9 +179,13 @@ public:
#endif
gmac(gmacIv,in,len,ctrIv);
// (2) The first 64 bits of GMAC output are the auth tag. Create
// a secret synthetic AES256-CTR IV by encrypting these and the
// original supplied IV.
// Encrypt GMAC output because GMAC alone is not a PRF.
encrypt(ctrIv,ctrIv);
// Auth tag is the first 64 bits of AES(GMAC tag). CTR IV is this
// followed by the original 64-bit IV and then encrypted. This
// produces a secret, random, and one-time-use synthetic IV for
// CTR that is dependent on message content (via GMAC).
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) tag[i] = ctrIv[i];
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) ctrIv[i+8] = iv[i];
@ -163,7 +195,7 @@ public:
#endif
encrypt(ctrIv,ctrIv);
// (3) Encrypt input using AES256-CTR
// Encrypt input using AES256-CTR
ctr(ctrIv,in,len,out);
}
@ -177,11 +209,11 @@ public:
* @param tag Authentication tag supplied with message
* @return True if authentication tags match and message appears authentic
*/
inline bool ztGmacCtrDecrypt(const uint8_t iv[8],const void *in,unsigned int len,void *out,const uint8_t tag[8])
inline bool ztGmacCtrDecrypt(const uint8_t iv[8],const void *in,unsigned int len,void *out,const uint8_t tag[8]) const
{
uint8_t ctrIv[16],gmacOut[16],gmacIv[12];
// (1) Re-create the original secret synthetic AES256-CTR IV.
// Re-create the original secret synthetic AES256-CTR IV.
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) ctrIv[i] = tag[i];
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) ctrIv[i+8] = iv[i];
@ -191,10 +223,10 @@ public:
#endif
encrypt(ctrIv,ctrIv);
// (2) Decrypt input using AES256-CTR
// Decrypt input using AES256-CTR and this synthetic IV.
ctr(ctrIv,in,len,out);
// (3) Compute AES256-GMAC(out) using the re-created 96-bit
// Compute AES256-GMAC(out) using the re-created 96-bit
// GMAC IV built from the message IV and the message size.
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
for(unsigned int i=0;i<8;++i) gmacIv[i] = iv[i];
@ -208,7 +240,11 @@ public:
#endif
gmac(gmacIv,out,len,gmacOut);
// (4) Compare first 64 bits of GMAC output with tag.
// Encrypt GMAC results to get the tag that would have
// resulted from this message plaintext.
encrypt(gmacOut,gmacOut);
// Compare authentication tags.
#ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
return Utils::secureEq(gmacOut,tag,8);
#else
@ -444,9 +480,9 @@ private:
while (len >= 64) {
__m128i c0 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton(ctr),iv0),k0);
__m128i c1 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton(ctr+1ULL),iv0),k0);
__m128i c2 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton(ctr+2ULL),iv0),k0);
__m128i c3 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton(ctr+3ULL),iv0),k0);
__m128i c1 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton((uint64_t)(ctr+1ULL)),iv0),k0);
__m128i c2 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton((uint64_t)(ctr+2ULL)),iv0),k0);
__m128i c3 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_set_epi64((__m64)Utils::hton((uint64_t)(ctr+3ULL)),iv0),k0);
ctr += 4;
c0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(c0,k1);
c1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(c1,k1);