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SRT: Build SRT from source by SRS. 4.0.115
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hondaxiao
winlin
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262f0fc8c8
commit
90f1b482ab
115 changed files with 44513 additions and 19 deletions
199
trunk/3rdparty/srt-1-fit/haicrypt/hcrypt_ctx_rx.c
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199
trunk/3rdparty/srt-1-fit/haicrypt/hcrypt_ctx_rx.c
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/*
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* SRT - Secure, Reliable, Transport
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* Copyright (c) 2018 Haivision Systems Inc.
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*
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* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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*
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*/
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/*****************************************************************************
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written by
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Haivision Systems Inc.
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2011-06-23 (jdube)
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HaiCrypt initial implementation.
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2014-03-11 (jdube)
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Adaptation for SRT.
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*****************************************************************************/
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#include <string.h> /* memcpy */
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#include "hcrypt.h"
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int hcryptCtx_Rx_Init(hcrypt_Session *crypto, hcrypt_Ctx *ctx, const HaiCrypt_Cfg *cfg)
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{
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ctx->mode = HCRYPT_CTX_MODE_AESCTR;
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ctx->status = HCRYPT_CTX_S_INIT;
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ctx->msg_info = crypto->msg_info;
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if (cfg && hcryptCtx_SetSecret(crypto, ctx, &cfg->secret)) {
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return(-1);
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}
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ctx->status = HCRYPT_CTX_S_SARDY;
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return(0);
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}
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int hcryptCtx_Rx_Rekey(hcrypt_Session *crypto, hcrypt_Ctx *ctx, unsigned char *sek, size_t sek_len)
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{
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if (crypto->cryspr->ms_setkey(crypto->cryspr_cb, ctx, sek, sek_len)) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "cryspr setkey[%d](sek) failed\n", hcryptCtx_GetKeyIndex(ctx));
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return(-1);
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}
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memcpy(ctx->sek, sek, sek_len);
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ctx->sek_len = sek_len;
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_INFO, "updated context[%d]\n", hcryptCtx_GetKeyIndex(ctx));
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HCRYPT_PRINTKEY(ctx->sek, ctx->sek_len, "sek");
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ctx->status = HCRYPT_CTX_S_KEYED;
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return(0);
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}
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/* Parse Keying Material message */
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int hcryptCtx_Rx_ParseKM(hcrypt_Session *crypto, unsigned char *km_msg, size_t msg_len)
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{
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size_t sek_len, salt_len;
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unsigned char seks[HAICRYPT_KEY_MAX_SZ * 2];
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int sek_cnt;
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size_t kek_len = 0;
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hcrypt_Ctx *ctx;
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int do_pbkdf = 0;
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if (NULL == crypto) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "Rx_ParseKM: invalid params: crypto=%p\n", crypto);
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return(-1);
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}
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/* Validate message content */
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{
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if (msg_len <= HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "KMmsg length too small (%zd)\n", msg_len);
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return(-1);
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}
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salt_len = hcryptMsg_KM_GetSaltLen(km_msg);
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sek_len = hcryptMsg_KM_GetSekLen(km_msg);
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if ((salt_len > HAICRYPT_SALT_SZ)
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|| (sek_len > HAICRYPT_KEY_MAX_SZ)) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "KMmsg unsupported salt/key length\n");
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return(-1);
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}
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if ((16 != sek_len)
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&& (24 != sek_len)
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&& (32 != sek_len)) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "KMmsg unsupported key length\n");
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return(-1);
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}
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if (hcryptMsg_KM_HasBothSek(km_msg)) {
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sek_cnt = 2;
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} else {
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sek_cnt = 1;
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}
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if (msg_len != (HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT + salt_len + (sek_cnt * sek_len) + HAICRYPT_WRAPKEY_SIGN_SZ)) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "KMmsg length inconsistent (%zd,%zd,%zd)\n",
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salt_len, sek_len, msg_len);
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return(-1);
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}
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/* Check options support */
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if ((HCRYPT_CIPHER_AES_CTR != km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_CIPHER])
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|| (HCRYPT_AUTH_NONE != km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_AUTH])) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "KMmsg unsupported option\n");
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return(-1);
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}
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if (crypto->se != km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SE]) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "KMmsg invalid SE\n");
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return(-1);
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}
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/* Check KEKI here and pick right key */
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//>>todo
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/*
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* We support no key exchange,
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* KEK is preshared or derived from a passphrase
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*/
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}
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/* Pick the context updated by this KMmsg */
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if (hcryptMsg_KM_HasBothSek(km_msg) && (NULL != crypto->ctx)) {
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ctx = crypto->ctx->alt; /* 2 SEK KM, start with inactive ctx */
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} else {
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ctx = &crypto->ctx_pair[hcryptMsg_KM_GetKeyIndex(km_msg)];
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}
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if (NULL == ctx) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "KMmsg invalid flags (no SEK)\n");
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return(-1);
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}
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/* Check Salt and get if new */
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if ((salt_len != ctx->salt_len)
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|| (0 != memcmp(ctx->salt, &km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT], salt_len))) {
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/* Salt changed (or 1st KMmsg received) */
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memcpy(ctx->salt, &km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT], salt_len);
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ctx->salt_len = salt_len;
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do_pbkdf = 1; /* Impact on password derived kek */
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}
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/* Check SEK length and get if new */
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if (sek_len != ctx->sek_len) {
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/* Key length changed or 1st KMmsg received */
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ctx->sek_len = sek_len;
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do_pbkdf = 1; /* Impact on password derived kek */
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}
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/*
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* Regenerate KEK if it is password derived
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* and Salt or SEK length changed
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*/
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if (ctx->cfg.pwd_len && do_pbkdf) {
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if (hcryptCtx_GenSecret(crypto, ctx)) {
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return(-1);
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}
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ctx->status = HCRYPT_CTX_S_SARDY;
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kek_len = sek_len; /* KEK changed */
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}
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/* Unwrap SEK(s) and set in context */
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if (0 > crypto->cryspr->km_unwrap(crypto->cryspr_cb, seks,
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&km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT + salt_len],
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(sek_cnt * sek_len) + HAICRYPT_WRAPKEY_SIGN_SZ)) {
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HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_WARNING, "%s", "unwrap key failed\n");
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return(-2); //Report unmatched shared secret
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}
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/*
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* First SEK in KMmsg is eSEK if both SEK present
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*/
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hcryptCtx_Rx_Rekey(crypto, ctx,
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((2 == sek_cnt) && (ctx->flags & HCRYPT_MSG_F_oSEK)) ? &seks[sek_len] : &seks[0],
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sek_len);
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/*
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* Refresh KMmsg cache to detect Keying Material changes
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*/
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ctx->KMmsg_len = msg_len;
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memcpy(ctx->KMmsg_cache, km_msg, msg_len);
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/* update other (alternate) context if both SEK provided */
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if (2 == sek_cnt) {
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hcrypt_Ctx *alt = ctx->alt;
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memcpy(alt->salt, &km_msg[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT], salt_len);
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alt->salt_len = salt_len;
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if (kek_len) { /* New or changed KEK */
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// memcpy(&alt->aes_kek, &ctx->aes_kek, sizeof(alt->aes_kek));
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alt->status = HCRYPT_CTX_S_SARDY;
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}
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hcryptCtx_Rx_Rekey(crypto, alt,
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((2 == sek_cnt) && (alt->flags & HCRYPT_MSG_F_oSEK)) ? &seks[sek_len] : &seks[0],
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sek_len);
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alt->KMmsg_len = msg_len;
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memcpy(alt->KMmsg_cache, km_msg, msg_len);
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}
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return(0);
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}
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