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SRT: Build SRT from source by SRS. 4.0.115

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hondaxiao 2021-05-15 19:18:39 +08:00 • committed by winlin
parent 262f0fc8c8
commit 90f1b482ab
115 changed files with 44513 additions and 19 deletions
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171
trunk/3rdparty/srt-1-fit/haicrypt/hcrypt_xpt_srt.c vendored Normal file
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/*
* SRT - Secure, Reliable, Transport
* Copyright (c) 2018 Haivision Systems Inc.
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
*
*/
/*****************************************************************************
written by
Haivision Systems Inc.
2014-03-11 (jdube)
Adaptation for SRT.
*****************************************************************************/
#include <string.h> /* memset, memcpy */
#ifdef _WIN32
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <ws2tcpip.h>
#else
#include <arpa/inet.h> /* htonl, ntohl */
#endif
#include "hcrypt.h"
/*
* HaiCrypt SRT (Secure Reliable Transport) Media Stream (MS) Msg Prefix:
* This is UDT data header with Crypto Key Flags (KF) added.
* Header is in 32bit host order words in the context of the functions of this handler.
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* 0x00 |0| Packet Sequence Number (pki) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* 0x04 |FF |o|KF | Message Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* 0x08 | Time Stamp |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* 0x0C | Destination Socket ID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Payload... |
*/
/*
* HaiCrypt Standalone Transport Keying Material (KM) Msg header kept in SRT
* Message and cache maintained in network order
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* 0x00 |0|Vers | PT | Sign | resv |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* ... .
*/
#define HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_HDR_SZ 16
#define HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_PFX_SZ 16
#define HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_OFS_PKI 0
#define HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_OFS_MSGNO 4
#define HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_SHF_KFLGS 27 //shift
static hcrypt_MsgInfo _hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo;
static unsigned hcryptMsg_SRT_GetKeyFlags(unsigned char *msg)
{
uint32_t msgno;
memcpy(&msgno, &msg[HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_OFS_MSGNO], sizeof(msgno)); //header is in host order
return((unsigned)((msgno >> HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_SHF_KFLGS) & HCRYPT_MSG_F_xSEK));
}
static hcrypt_Pki hcryptMsg_SRT_GetPki(unsigned char *msg, int nwkorder)
{
hcrypt_Pki pki;
memcpy(&pki, &msg[HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_OFS_PKI], sizeof(pki)); //header is in host order
return (nwkorder ? htonl(pki) : pki);
}
static void hcryptMsg_SRT_SetPki(unsigned char *msg, hcrypt_Pki pki)
{
memcpy(&msg[HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_OFS_PKI], &pki, sizeof(pki)); //header is in host order
}
static void hcryptMsg_SRT_ResetCache(unsigned char *pfx_cache, unsigned pkt_type, unsigned kflgs)
{
switch(pkt_type) {
case HCRYPT_MSG_PT_MS: /* Media Stream */
/* Nothing to do, header filled by protocol */
break;
case HCRYPT_MSG_PT_KM: /* Keying Material */
pfx_cache[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_VERSION] = (unsigned char)((HCRYPT_MSG_VERSION << 4) | pkt_type); // version || PT
pfx_cache[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SIGN] = (unsigned char)((HCRYPT_MSG_SIGN >> 8) & 0xFF); // Haivision PnP Mfr ID
pfx_cache[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SIGN+1] = (unsigned char)(HCRYPT_MSG_SIGN & 0xFF);
pfx_cache[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_KFLGS] = (unsigned char)kflgs; //HCRYPT_MSG_F_xxx
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static void hcryptMsg_SRT_IndexMsg(unsigned char *msg, unsigned char *pfx_cache)
{
(void)msg;
(void)pfx_cache;
return; //nothing to do, header and index maintained by SRT
}
static int hcryptMsg_SRT_ParseMsg(unsigned char *msg)
{
int rc;
if ((HCRYPT_MSG_VERSION == hcryptMsg_KM_GetVersion(msg)) /* Version 1 */
&& (HCRYPT_MSG_PT_KM == hcryptMsg_KM_GetPktType(msg)) /* Keying Material */
&& (HCRYPT_MSG_SIGN == hcryptMsg_KM_GetSign(msg))) { /* 'HAI' PnP Mfr ID */
rc = HCRYPT_MSG_PT_KM;
} else {
//Assume it's data.
//SRT does not call this for MS msg
rc = HCRYPT_MSG_PT_MS;
}
switch(rc) {
case HCRYPT_MSG_PT_MS:
if (hcryptMsg_HasNoSek(&_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo, msg)
|| hcryptMsg_HasBothSek(&_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo, msg)) {
HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "invalid MS msg flgs: %02x\n",
hcryptMsg_GetKeyIndex(&_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo, msg));
return(-1);
}
break;
case HCRYPT_MSG_PT_KM:
if (HCRYPT_SE_TSSRT != hcryptMsg_KM_GetSE(msg)) { //Check Stream Encapsulation (SE)
HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "invalid KM msg SE: %d\n",
hcryptMsg_KM_GetSE(msg));
return(-1);
}
if (hcryptMsg_KM_HasNoSek(msg)) {
HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "invalid KM msg flgs: %02x\n",
hcryptMsg_KM_GetKeyIndex(msg));
return(-1);
}
break;
default:
HCRYPT_LOG(LOG_ERR, "invalid pkt type: %d\n", rc);
rc = 0; /* unknown packet type */
break;
}
return(rc); /* -1: error, 0: unknown: >0: PT */
}
static hcrypt_MsgInfo _hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo;
hcrypt_MsgInfo *hcryptMsg_SRT_MsgInfo(void)
{
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.hdr_len = HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_HDR_SZ;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.pfx_len = HCRYPT_MSG_SRT_PFX_SZ;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.getKeyFlags = hcryptMsg_SRT_GetKeyFlags;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.getPki = hcryptMsg_SRT_GetPki;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.setPki = hcryptMsg_SRT_SetPki;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.resetCache = hcryptMsg_SRT_ResetCache;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.indexMsg = hcryptMsg_SRT_IndexMsg;
_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo.parseMsg = hcryptMsg_SRT_ParseMsg;
return(&_hcMsg_SRT_MsgInfo);
}