mirror of
https://github.com/ossrs/srs.git
synced 2025-03-09 15:49:59 +00:00
Upgrade openssl from 1.1.0e to 1.1.1b, with source code. 4.0.78
This commit is contained in:
winlin
parent
8f1c992379
commit
96dbd7bced
1476 changed files with 616554 additions and 4 deletions
414
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
vendored
Normal file
414
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
vendored
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
|
|||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/pem.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/cms.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/aes.h>
|
||||
#include "cms_lcl.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
|
||||
X509_ALGOR **palg,
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
|
||||
CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (palg)
|
||||
*palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
|
||||
if (pukm)
|
||||
*pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
|
||||
|
||||
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
|
||||
*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
|
||||
CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
|
||||
X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
|
||||
ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
|
||||
X509_NAME **issuer,
|
||||
ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
|
||||
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
|
||||
CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
|
||||
if (issuer)
|
||||
*issuer = NULL;
|
||||
if (sno)
|
||||
*sno = NULL;
|
||||
if (keyid)
|
||||
*keyid = NULL;
|
||||
if (pubalg)
|
||||
*pubalg = NULL;
|
||||
if (pubkey)
|
||||
*pubkey = NULL;
|
||||
if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
|
||||
if (issuer)
|
||||
*issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
|
||||
if (sno)
|
||||
*sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
|
||||
} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
|
||||
if (keyid)
|
||||
*keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
|
||||
} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
|
||||
if (pubalg)
|
||||
*pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
|
||||
if (pubkey)
|
||||
*pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
|
||||
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
|
||||
CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
|
||||
if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
|
||||
return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
|
||||
else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
|
||||
return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
|
||||
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
|
||||
CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
|
||||
X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
|
||||
if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
|
||||
if (issuer)
|
||||
*issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
|
||||
if (sno)
|
||||
*sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
|
||||
if (keyid)
|
||||
*keyid = NULL;
|
||||
if (tm)
|
||||
*tm = NULL;
|
||||
if (other)
|
||||
*other = NULL;
|
||||
} else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
|
||||
if (keyid)
|
||||
*keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
|
||||
if (tm)
|
||||
*tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
|
||||
if (other)
|
||||
*other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
|
||||
if (issuer)
|
||||
*issuer = NULL;
|
||||
if (sno)
|
||||
*sno = NULL;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
|
||||
X509 *cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
|
||||
if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
|
||||
return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
|
||||
else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
|
||||
return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
|
||||
else
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
|
||||
kari->pctx = NULL;
|
||||
if (!pk)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
||||
if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
kari->pctx = pctx;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
|
||||
return ri->d.kari->ctx;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
|
||||
* or the encrypted CEK.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Key encryption key */
|
||||
unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
|
||||
size_t keklen;
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *out = NULL;
|
||||
int outlen;
|
||||
keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
|
||||
if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Derive KEK */
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Set KEK in context */
|
||||
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* obtain output length of ciphered key */
|
||||
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
|
||||
if (out == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
*pout = out;
|
||||
*poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
|
||||
if (!rv)
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
|
||||
/* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
|
||||
kari->pctx = NULL;
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
|
||||
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
|
||||
size_t enckeylen;
|
||||
size_t ceklen;
|
||||
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
|
||||
enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
|
||||
enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
|
||||
/* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
|
||||
if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
|
||||
if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
|
||||
ec->key = cek;
|
||||
ec->keylen = ceklen;
|
||||
cek = NULL;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(cek);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
|
||||
static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
||||
if (!pctx)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
||||
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
|
||||
if (!pctx)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
kari->pctx = pctx;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (!rv)
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
|
||||
|
||||
int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
|
||||
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
|
||||
if (!ri->d.kari)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
|
||||
|
||||
kari = ri->d.kari;
|
||||
kari->version = 3;
|
||||
|
||||
rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
|
||||
if (rek == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
|
||||
M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
|
||||
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
|
||||
rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
|
||||
if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
|
||||
if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create ephemeral key */
|
||||
if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
|
||||
rek->pkey = pk;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
|
||||
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
|
||||
const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
|
||||
int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
|
||||
/* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
|
||||
kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if (kekcipher) {
|
||||
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
|
||||
* DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
|
||||
if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
|
||||
kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (keylen <= 16)
|
||||
kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
|
||||
else if (keylen <= 24)
|
||||
kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
|
||||
else
|
||||
kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
|
||||
return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
|
||||
|
||||
int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
|
||||
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
|
||||
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
|
||||
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
kari = ri->d.kari;
|
||||
reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
|
||||
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
|
||||
/* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
|
||||
if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
|
||||
* ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
|
||||
CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
|
||||
oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
|
||||
oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
|
||||
if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Initialise KDF algorithm */
|
||||
if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
|
||||
unsigned char *enckey;
|
||||
size_t enckeylen;
|
||||
rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
|
||||
kari, 1))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue