Upgrade openssl from 1.1.0e to 1.1.1b, with source code. 4.0.78

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                 const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
+    /*
+     * This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic
+     * prime method was observed to deliver better performance even
+     * for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15%
+     * improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25%
+     * in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2...
+     * Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most
+     * intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521-
+     * bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is
+     * arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient
+     * from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while
+     * 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's
+     * generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes
+     * "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop
+     * with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the
+     * latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be
+     * implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for
+     * small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic
+     * prime method...
+     *                                              <appro>
+     */
+    meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#else
+    if (BN_nist_mod_func(p))
+        meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();
+    else
+        meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#endif
+
+    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    EC_GROUP *ret;
+
+    meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();
+
+    ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
+        EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif