Upgrade openssl from 1.1.0e to 1.1.1b, with source code. 4.0.78

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c

@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+/*
+ * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
+ */
+
+static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned char c;
+    unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
+        c = *p;
+        c++;
+        *p = c;
+        if (c != 0) {
+            /* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    size_t i, n;
+
+    if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
+     * are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
+     */
+    n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
+    if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
+        return;
+
+    n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
+    if (n > 16) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        n = 16;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
+ */
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
+                                const unsigned char *in)
+{
+    int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+        out[i] ^= in[i];
+
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
+ */
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
+{
+    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in)
+        || !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in))
+        return 0;
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16 && !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
+ * see 10.3.1 stage 7.
+ */
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+    memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
+    memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
+    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp))
+        return 0;
+    ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
+    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp))
+        return 0;
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+        ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
+        if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
+ */
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+                                 const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* If we have partial block handle it first */
+    if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+        size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
+
+        /* If we now have a complete block process it */
+        if (inlen >= left) {
+            memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
+            if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp))
+                return 0;
+            ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
+            inlen -= left;
+            in += left;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Process zero or more complete blocks */
+    for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
+        if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
+    if (inlen > 0) {
+        memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
+        ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
+{
+    if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+        memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
+        if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
+                         const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
+                         const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
+                         const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
+{
+    static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
+    size_t inlen;
+    unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
+    int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    if (!ctr_BCC_init(ctr))
+        return 0;
+    if (in1 == NULL)
+        in1len = 0;
+    if (in2 == NULL)
+        in2len = 0;
+    if (in3 == NULL)
+        in3len = 0;
+    inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len;
+    /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */
+    *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff;
+    *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff;
+    *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+    *p++ = inlen & 0xff;
+
+    /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
+    ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
+    if (!ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len)
+        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len)
+        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len)
+        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1)
+        || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr))
+        return 0;
+    /* Set up key K */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, 1))
+        return 0;
+    /* X follows key K */
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
+                          AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
+                          AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16)
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, ctr->KX + 16,
+                              AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
+ * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
+ * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
+ * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
+ */
+__owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                             const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
+                             const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
+                             const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    /* correct key is already set up. */
+    inc_128(ctr);
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+        inc_128(ctr);
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K+16, &outlen, ctr->V,
+                              AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    inc_128(ctr);
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->V, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
+    if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
+        memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
+        memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
+    }
+
+    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
+        /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
+        if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
+            if (!ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len))
+                return 0;
+        /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
+        if (in1len)
+            ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
+    } else {
+        ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
+        ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
+    }
+
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                                       const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                                       const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
+                                       const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+
+    if (entropy == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
+    memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
+        return 0;
+    if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                                  const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
+                                  const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+    if (entropy == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                                    unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+
+    if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
+        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
+            return 0;
+        /* This means we reuse derived value */
+        if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
+            adin = NULL;
+            adinlen = 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        adinlen = 0;
+    }
+
+    for ( ; ; ) {
+        int outl = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+        inc_128(ctr);
+        if (outlen < 16) {
+            /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
+            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outl, ctr->V,
+                                  AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                return 0;
+            memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
+            break;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, out, &outl, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+            return 0;
+        out += 16;
+        outlen -= 16;
+        if (outlen == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_ctr_meth = {
+    drbg_ctr_instantiate,
+    drbg_ctr_reseed,
+    drbg_ctr_generate,
+    drbg_ctr_uninstantiate
+};
+
+int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    size_t keylen;
+
+    switch (drbg->type) {
+    default:
+        /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
+        return 0;
+    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+        keylen = 16;
+        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+        keylen = 24;
+        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+        break;
+    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+        keylen = 32;
+        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+        break;
+    }
+
+    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
+
+    ctr->keylen = keylen;
+    if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
+        ctr->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
+    drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
+
+    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
+        /* df initialisation */
+        static const unsigned char df_key[32] = {
+            0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+            0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+            0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+            0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
+        };
+
+        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
+            ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        /* Set key schedule for df_key */
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, ctr->cipher, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
+            return 0;
+
+        drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
+        drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
+        drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+        drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+    } else {
+        drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
+        drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
+        /* Nonce not used */
+        drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
+        drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
+        drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
+        drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
+    }
+
+    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+
+    return 1;
+}