Upgrade openssl from 1.1.0e to 1.1.1b, with source code. 4.0.78

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/build.info

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+LIBS=../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+        rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
+        rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c \
+        rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
+        rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ * Override the default free and new methods,
+ * and calculate helper products for multi-prime
+ * RSA keys.
+ */
+static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                  void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)RSA_new();
+        if (*pval != NULL)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
+        *pval = NULL;
+        return 2;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+        if (((RSA *)*pval)->version != RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
+            /* not a multi-prime key, skip */
+            return 1;
+        }
+        return (rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Based on definitions in RFC 8017 appendix A.1.2 */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PRIME_INFO) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, r, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, d, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, t, CBIGNUM),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(RSA, version, INT32),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, p, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(RSA, prime_infos, RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
+
+/* Free up maskHash */
+static int rsa_pss_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                      void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = (RSA_PSS_PARAMS *)*pval;
+        X509_ALGOR_free(pss->maskHash);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, rsa_pss_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+/* Free up maskHash */
+static int rsa_oaep_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                       void *exarg)
+{
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+        RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = (RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *)*pval;
+        X509_ALGOR_free(oaep->maskHash);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, rsa_oaep_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, hashFunc, X509_ALGOR, 0),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, maskGenFunc, X509_ALGOR, 1),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, pSourceFunc, X509_ALGOR, 2),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPrivateKey, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPublicKey, RSAPublicKey)
+
+RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), rsa);
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), rsa);
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
+{
+    return RSA_check_key_ex(key, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    int ret = 1, ex_primes = 0, idx;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL
+            || key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* multi-prime? */
+    if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
+        ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos);
+        if (ex_primes <= 0
+                || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(BN_num_bits(key->n))) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    i = BN_new();
+    j = BN_new();
+    k = BN_new();
+    l = BN_new();
+    m = BN_new();
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL
+            || m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+        ret = -1;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_is_one(key->e)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    }
+    if (!BN_is_odd(key->e)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    }
+
+    /* p prime? */
+    if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
+    }
+
+    /* q prime? */
+    if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+    }
+
+    /* r_i prime? */
+    for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+        if (BN_is_prime_ex(pinfo->r, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* n = p*q * r_3...r_i? */
+    if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+        if (!BN_mul(i, i, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
+        ret = 0;
+        if (ex_primes)
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX,
+                   RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES);
+        else
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    }
+
+    /* d*e = 1  mod \lambda(n)? */
+    if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* now compute k = \lambda(n) = LCM(i, j, r_3 - 1...) */
+    if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+        if (!BN_sub(k, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mul(l, l, k, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_gcd(m, m, k, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx)) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_is_one(i)) {
+        ret = 0;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+    }
+
+    if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
+        /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
+        if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+        }
+
+        /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
+        if (!BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+        }
+
+        /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
+        /* d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)? */
+        if (!BN_sub(i, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(j, pinfo->d) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+        }
+        /* t_i = R_i ^ -1 mod r_i ? */
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, pinfo->pp, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_cmp(i, pinfo->t) != 0) {
+            ret = 0;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R);
+        }
+    }
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(i);
+    BN_free(j);
+    BN_free(k);
+    BN_free(l);
+    BN_free(m);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return BN_num_bits(r->n);
+}
+
+int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return BN_num_bytes(r->n);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+                       RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+                       RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r == NULL ? 0 : r->meth->flags;
+}
+
+void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
+    rsa->blinding = NULL;
+    rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+}
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
+        RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
+
+    rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+    if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+    rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                  const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
+
+    if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (r2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (in_ctx == NULL) {
+        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        ctx = in_ctx;
+    }
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (e == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->e == NULL) {
+        e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
+        if (e == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        e = rsa->e;
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *n = BN_new();
+
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n);
+        /* We MUST free n before any further use of rsa->n */
+        BN_free(n);
+    }
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(ret);
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    if (ctx != in_ctx)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    if (e != rsa->e)
+        BN_free(e);
+
+    return ret;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: This file contains deprecated functions (compatibility wrappers to the
+ * "new" versions).
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+
+#else
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
+                      void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
+{
+    int i;
+    BN_GENCB *cb = BN_GENCB_new();
+    RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+    BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
+
+    if (cb == NULL || rsa == NULL || e == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, unsigned long
+     * can be larger
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(unsigned long) * 8; i++) {
+        if (e_value & (1UL << i))
+            if (BN_set_bit(e, i) == 0)
+                goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg);
+
+    if (RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb)) {
+        BN_free(e);
+        BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+        return rsa;
+    }
+ err:
+    BN_free(e);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    BN_GENCB_free(cb);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, 0), "check_padding_md"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, 0), "encode_pkcs1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "int_rsa_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0),
+     "old_rsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_PSS_INIT, 0), "pkey_pss_init"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, 0), "pkey_rsa_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_rsa_ctrl_str"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, 0), "pkey_rsa_sign"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "pkey_rsa_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER, 0),
+     "pkey_rsa_verifyrecover"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, 0), "rsa_algor_to_md"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, 0), "rsa_builtin_keygen"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, 0), "RSA_check_key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, 0), "RSA_check_key_ex"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, 0), "rsa_cms_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CMS_VERIFY, 0), "rsa_cms_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, 0), "rsa_item_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP, 0), "RSA_meth_dup"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW, 0), "RSA_meth_new"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME, 0), "RSA_meth_set1_name"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_MULTIP_INFO_NEW, 0),
+     "rsa_multip_info_new"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, 0), "RSA_new_method"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, 0), ""},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, 0),
+     "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, 0),
+     "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, 0),
+     "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, 0),
+     "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_none"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_none"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, 0),
+     "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PARAM_DECODE, 0), "rsa_param_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRINT, 0), "RSA_print"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, 0), "RSA_print_fp"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0), "rsa_priv_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, 0), "rsa_priv_encode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, 0), "rsa_pss_get_param"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, 0), "rsa_pss_to_ctx"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, 0), "rsa_pub_decode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, 0), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "RSA_sign"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+     "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "RSA_verify"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+     "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, 0),
+     "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_SETUP_TBUF, 0), "setup_tbuf"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),
+    "bad fixed header decrypt"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01),
+    "block type is not 01"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02),
+    "block type is not 02"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
+    "data greater than mod len"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+    "data too large for key size"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),
+    "data too large for modulus"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+    "data too small for key size"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH),
+    "digest does not match"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED), "digest not allowed"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),
+    "digest too big for rsa key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
+    "dmp1 not congruent to d"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
+    "dmq1 not congruent to d"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1),
+    "d e not congruent to 1"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID),
+    "first octet invalid"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
+    "illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH),
+    "invalid digest length"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),
+    "invalid message length"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY),
+    "invalid multi prime key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS),
+    "invalid oaep parameters"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE),
+    "invalid padding mode"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS),
+    "invalid pss parameters"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN),
+    "invalid pss saltlen"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH),
+    "invalid salt length"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST),
+    "invalid x931 digest"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q),
+    "iqmp not inverse of q"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID),
+    "key prime num invalid"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
+    "mgf1 digest not allowed"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R),
+    "mp coefficient not inverse of r"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
+    "mp exponent not congruent to d"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME), "mp r not prime"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
+    "null before block missing"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES),
+    "n does not equal product of primes"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q),
+    "n does not equal p q"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR),
+    "oaep decoding error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
+    "operation not supported for this keytype"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED),
+    "padding check failed"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR),
+    "pkcs decoding error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL),
+    "pss saltlen too small"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+    "rsa operations not supported"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED),
+    "salt length check failed"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED),
+    "salt length recovery failed"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK),
+    "sslv3 rollback attack"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
+    "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE),
+    "unknown algorithm type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST),
+    "unknown mask digest"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE),
+    "unknown padding type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE),
+    "unsupported encryption type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE),
+    "unsupported label source"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),
+    "unsupported mask algorithm"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),
+    "unsupported mask parameter"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
+    "unsupported signature type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),
+    "wrong signature length"},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings_const(RSA_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings_const(RSA_str_reasons);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
+ * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
+ * Geoff
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+/*
+ * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
+ * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
+ * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
+ * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
+ * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
+ */
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL)
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+
+    return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM,
+                                        e_value, cb);
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+                                 BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) {
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes,
+                                                 e_value, cb);
+    } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we
+         * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't
+         * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin
+         * subroutine...
+         */
+        if (primes == 2)
+            return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
+                              BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
+    int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
+    int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
+    unsigned long error = 0;
+
+    if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (r2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */
+    quo = bits / primes;
+    rmd = bits % primes;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < primes; i++)
+        bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo;
+
+    /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+    if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* initialize multi-prime components */
+    if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
+        rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
+        prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2);
+        if (prime_infos == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) {
+            /* could this happen? */
+            sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+        }
+        rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+        /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
+        for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+            pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+            if (pinfo == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */
+    for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) {
+        adj = 0;
+        retries = 0;
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            prime = rsa->p;
+        } else if (i == 1) {
+            prime = rsa->q;
+        } else {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+            prime = pinfo->r;
+        }
+        BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        for (;;) {
+ redo:
+            if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+                goto err;
+            /*
+             * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3...
+             * (those primes prior to this one)
+             */
+            {
+                int j;
+
+                for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+                    BIGNUM *prev_prime;
+
+                    if (j == 0)
+                        prev_prime = rsa->p;
+                    else if (j == 1)
+                        prev_prime = rsa->q;
+                    else
+                        prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos,
+                                                             j - 2)->r;
+
+                    if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) {
+                        goto redo;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one()))
+                goto err;
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+            if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+               /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
+                break;
+            }
+            error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+            if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+                && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+                /* GCD != 1 */
+                ERR_pop_to_mark();
+            } else {
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        bitse += bitsr[i];
+
+        /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */
+        if (i == 1) {
+            /* we get at least 2 primes */
+            if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else if (i != 0) {
+            /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */
+            if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* i == 0, do nothing */
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
+                goto err;
+            continue;
+        }
+        /*
+         * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
+         * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
+         * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime.
+         *
+         * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of
+         * the way factors are generated.
+         *
+         * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the
+         * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at
+         * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private
+         * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered
+         * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9.
+         */
+        if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4))
+            goto err;
+        bitst = BN_get_word(r2);
+
+        if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) {
+            /*
+             * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to
+             * meet length requirement.
+             *
+             * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length.
+             *
+             * This strategy has the following goals:
+             *
+             * 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
+             * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
+             */
+            bitse -= bitsr[i];
+            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+                goto err;
+            if (primes > 4) {
+                if (bitst < 0x9)
+                    adj++;
+                else
+                    adj--;
+            } else if (retries == 4) {
+                /*
+                 * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used
+                 * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times
+                 * is set to 4.
+                 */
+                i = -1;
+                bitse = 0;
+                continue;
+            }
+            retries++;
+            goto redo;
+        }
+        /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */
+        if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+        tmp = rsa->p;
+        rsa->p = rsa->q;
+        rsa->q = tmp;
+    }
+
+    /* calculate d */
+
+    /* p - 1 */
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    /* q - 1 */
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;
+    /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    /* multi-prime */
+    for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+        /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */
+        if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one()))
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
+
+        if (pr0 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(pr0);
+            goto err;               /* d */
+        }
+        /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
+        BN_free(pr0);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+
+        if (d == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
+        if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
+            || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* calculate CRT exponents */
+        for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+            /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
+            if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+
+        if (p == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+        if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(p);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
+        for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+            BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+            if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(p);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
+        BN_free(p);
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ok == -1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
+        ok = 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ok;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c

@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void)
+{
+    return RSA_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return rsa->meth;
+}
+
+int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    /*
+     * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+     * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+     */
+    const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+    mtmp = rsa->meth;
+    if (mtmp->finish)
+        mtmp->finish(rsa);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
+    rsa->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+    rsa->meth = meth;
+    if (meth->init)
+        meth->init(rsa);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+    RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+    if (engine) {
+        if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ret->engine = engine;
+    } else {
+        ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
+    }
+    if (ret->engine) {
+        ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
+        if (ret->meth == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+
+ err:
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
+        r->meth->finish(r);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+#endif
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+
+    BN_free(r->n);
+    BN_free(r->e);
+    BN_clear_free(r->d);
+    BN_clear_free(r->p);
+    BN_clear_free(r->q);
+    BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
+    BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
+    BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
+    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+    BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
+    BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
+    OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
+    OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+
+    if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
+        /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
+        int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
+
+        if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return BN_security_bits(bits, -1);
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
+ * and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
+ */
+int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
+                                BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
+{
+    STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+    int i;
+
+    if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
+    if (prime_infos == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
+        old = r->prime_infos;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+        pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+        if (pinfo == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
+            BN_free(pinfo->r);
+            BN_free(pinfo->d);
+            BN_free(pinfo->t);
+            pinfo->r = primes[i];
+            pinfo->d = exps[i];
+            pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
+        } else {
+            rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+    }
+
+    r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+    if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+        r->prime_infos = old;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (old != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
+         * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
+         * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
+         * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
+         */
+        sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
+    }
+
+    r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    /* r, d, t should not be freed */
+    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                  const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
+{
+    int pnum;
+
+    pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
+    if (pnum <= 0)
+        pnum = 0;
+    return pnum;
+}
+
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
+{
+    int pnum, i;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * return other primes
+     * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+        primes[i] = pinfo->r;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                         const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
+                                    const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
+{
+    int pnum;
+
+    if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* return other primes */
+    if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
+        RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+        int i;
+
+        /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
+        for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+            if (exps != NULL)
+                exps[i] = pinfo->d;
+            if (coeffs != NULL)
+                coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->n;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->e;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->d;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->p;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->q;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->dmp1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->dmq1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->iqmp;
+}
+
+void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    r->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    return r->flags & flags;
+}
+
+void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
+{
+    r->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
+{
+    /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
+    return r->version;
+}
+
+ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
+{
+    return r->engine;
+}
+
+int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+    if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
+        && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+        && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+        return -1;
+     return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+
+#define RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM       5
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS    512
+
+typedef struct rsa_prime_info_st {
+    BIGNUM *r;
+    BIGNUM *d;
+    BIGNUM *t;
+    /* save product of primes prior to this one */
+    BIGNUM *pp;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *m;
+} RSA_PRIME_INFO;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
+
+struct rsa_st {
+    /*
+     * The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed
+     * instead of an EVP_PKEY, it is set to 0
+     */
+    int pad;
+    int32_t version;
+    const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+    /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
+    ENGINE *engine;
+    BIGNUM *n;
+    BIGNUM *e;
+    BIGNUM *d;
+    BIGNUM *p;
+    BIGNUM *q;
+    BIGNUM *dmp1;
+    BIGNUM *dmq1;
+    BIGNUM *iqmp;
+    /* for multi-prime RSA, defined in RFC 8017 */
+    STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos;
+    /* If a PSS only key this contains the parameter restrictions */
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+    /* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+    CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
+    int flags;
+    /* Used to cache montgomery values */
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_p;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_q;
+    /*
+     * all BIGNUM values are actually in the following data, if it is not
+     * NULL
+     */
+    char *bignum_data;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding;
+    BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
+struct rsa_meth_st {
+    char *name;
+    int (*rsa_pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    int (*rsa_priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*rsa_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+    /* Can be null */
+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+    /* called at new */
+    int (*init) (RSA *rsa);
+    /* called at free */
+    int (*finish) (RSA *rsa);
+    /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */
+    int flags;
+    /* may be needed! */
+    char *app_data;
+    /*
+     * New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary
+     * data to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for
+     * this to work the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should
+     * *NOT* be used RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead.
+     */
+    int (*rsa_sign) (int type,
+                     const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+                     unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                     const RSA *rsa);
+    int (*rsa_verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                       unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                       unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+    /*
+     * If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be
+     * used. This is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets
+     * rewired, but one day it would be nice to assume there are no such
+     * things as "builtin software" implementations.
+     */
+    int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+    int (*rsa_multi_prime_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+                                   BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+};
+
+extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                          unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
+                          size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                          size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
+/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
+#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
+                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
+int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                      const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
+/* internal function to clear and free multi-prime parameters */
+void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void);
+int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa);
+int rsa_multip_cap(int bits);

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags)
+{
+    RSA_METHOD *meth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*meth));
+
+    if (meth != NULL) {
+        meth->flags = flags;
+
+        meth->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+        if (meth->name != NULL)
+            return meth;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+    }
+
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    if (meth != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(meth->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(meth);
+    }
+}
+
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    RSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth));
+
+        ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name);
+        if (ret->name != NULL)
+            return ret;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    }
+
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->name;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
+{
+    char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+
+    if (tmpname == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(meth->name);
+    meth->name = tmpname;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_get_flags(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->flags;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags)
+{
+    meth->flags = flags;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    return meth->app_data;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data)
+{
+    meth->app_data = app_data;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_pub_enc = pub_enc;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                         int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_pub_dec = pub_dec;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_priv_enc;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_priv_dec;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                          int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                           unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
+                                           int padding))
+{
+    meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* Can be null */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                         int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    meth->rsa_mod_exp = mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* Can be null */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+     const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+    return meth->bn_mod_exp;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                            int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r,
+                                               const BIGNUM *a,
+                                               const BIGNUM *p,
+                                               const BIGNUM *m,
+                                               BN_CTX *ctx,
+                                               BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx))
+{
+    meth->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* called at new */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->init;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*init) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->init = init;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+    /* called at free */
+int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->finish;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->finish = finish;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int type,
+     const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+     unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+     const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_sign;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                      int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m,
+                                   unsigned int m_length,
+                                   unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                                   const RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->rsa_sign = sign;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+     unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+     unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_verify;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                        int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                                       unsigned int m_length,
+                                       const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                       unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa))
+{
+    meth->rsa_verify = verify;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_keygen;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                        int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                       BN_GENCB *cb))
+{
+    meth->rsa_keygen = keygen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int (*RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
+    (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    return meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen;
+}
+
+int RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
+                                    int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits,
+                                                   int primes, BIGNUM *e,
+                                                   BN_GENCB *cb))
+{
+    meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen = keygen;
+    return 1;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+{
+    /* free pp and pinfo only */
+    BN_clear_free(pinfo->pp);
+    OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+}
+
+void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+{
+    /* free a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
+    BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
+    BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
+    BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
+    rsa_multip_info_free_ex(pinfo);
+}
+
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void)
+{
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    /* create a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
+    if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA_PRIME_INFO))) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MULTIP_INFO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if ((pinfo->r = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((pinfo->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((pinfo->t = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    return pinfo;
+
+ err:
+    BN_free(pinfo->r);
+    BN_free(pinfo->d);
+    BN_free(pinfo->t);
+    BN_free(pinfo->pp);
+    OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Refill products of primes */
+int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+    BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int i, rv = 0, ex_primes;
+
+    if ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0) {
+        /* invalid */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate pinfo->pp = p * q for first 'extra' prime */
+    p1 = rsa->p;
+    p2 = rsa->q;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+        if (pinfo->pp == NULL) {
+            pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new();
+            if (pinfo->pp == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if (!BN_mul(pinfo->pp, p1, p2, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /* save previous one */
+        p1 = pinfo->pp;
+        p2 = pinfo->r;
+    }
+
+    rv = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int rsa_multip_cap(int bits)
+{
+    int cap = 5;
+
+    if (bits < 1024)
+        cap = 2;
+    else if (bits < 4096)
+        cap = 3;
+    else if (bits < 8192)
+        cap = 4;
+
+    if (cap > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM)
+        cap = RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM;
+
+    return cap;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                         const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    if (flen > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (flen < tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(to, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+
+    if (flen > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memset(to, 0, tlen - flen);
+    memcpy(to + tlen - flen, from, flen);
+    return tlen;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
+
+/*
+ * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security
+ * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new
+ * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,
+ * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements
+ * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of
+ * one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                               const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                               const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
+                                           param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
+    int rv = 0;
+    int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+    unsigned char *db, *seed;
+    unsigned char *dbmask = NULL;
+    unsigned char seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen, dbmask_len = 0;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+    if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    to[0] = 0;
+    seed = to + 1;
+    db = to + mdlen + 1;
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
+    db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    dbmask_len = emlen - mdlen;
+    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(dbmask_len);
+    if (dbmask == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, dbmask_len, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < dbmask_len; i++)
+        db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, dbmask_len, mgf1md) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
+        seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
+    rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(seedmask, sizeof(seedmask));
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(dbmask, dbmask_len);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+                                 const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,
+                                             param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,
+                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
+    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
+    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
+    /*
+     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
+     * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB
+     */
+    unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
+        phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
+     * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
+     * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
+     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
+     * This does not leak any side-channel information.
+     */
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
+    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
+    if (db == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }
+    from = em;
+
+    /*
+     * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
+     * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
+     * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
+     */
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+
+    maskedseed = from + 1;
+    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
+        goto cleanup;
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
+        seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
+
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
+        goto cleanup;
+    for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
+        db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
+
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
+
+    found_one_byte = 0;
+    for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
+        /*
+         * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
+         */
+        unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
+        one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
+                                             i, one_index);
+        found_one_byte |= equals1;
+        good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
+    }
+
+    good &= found_one_byte;
+
+    /*
+     * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
+     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
+     * concern.
+     */
+    msg_index = one_index + 1;
+    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
+    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+    for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
+     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
+     */
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+ cleanup:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+}
+
+int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+               const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
+    long i, outlen = 0;
+    unsigned char cnt[4];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+    int rv = -1;
+
+    if (c == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+    if (mdlen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
+        cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
+        cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
+        cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
+        cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, dgst, NULL)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, seed, seedlen)
+            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, cnt, 4))
+            goto err;
+        if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, mask + outlen, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            outlen += mdlen;
+        } else {
+            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
+            outlen = len;
+        }
+    }
+    rv = 0;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md, sizeof(md));
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
+    return rv;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,970 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
+    "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA",
+    rsa_ossl_public_encrypt,
+    rsa_ossl_public_decrypt,     /* signature verification */
+    rsa_ossl_private_encrypt,    /* signing */
+    rsa_ossl_private_decrypt,
+    rsa_ossl_mod_exp,
+    BN_mod_exp_mont,            /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
+                                 * if e == 3 */
+    rsa_ossl_init,
+    rsa_ossl_finish,
+    RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,       /* flags */
+    NULL,
+    0,                          /* rsa_sign */
+    0,                          /* rsa_verify */
+    NULL,                       /* rsa_keygen */
+    NULL                        /* rsa_multi_prime_keygen */
+};
+
+static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+
+void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    default_RSA_meth = meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+    return default_RSA_meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+    return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+     * the length of the modulus.
+     */
+    r = BN_bn2binpad(ret, to, num);
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BN_BLINDING *ret;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock);
+
+    if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
+        rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+    }
+
+    ret = rsa->blinding;
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) {
+        /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+        *local = 1;
+    } else {
+        /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+        /*
+         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
+         * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
+         * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+         */
+        *local = 0;
+
+        if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
+            rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+        }
+        ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+                                BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (unblind == NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
+         */
+        return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
+         */
+        int ret;
+
+        BN_BLINDING_lock(b);
+        ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+        BN_BLINDING_unlock(b);
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+                               BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /*
+     * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+     * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
+     * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+     * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
+     * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
+     * to access the blinding without a lock.
+     */
+    return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+}
+
+/* signing */
+static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int local_blinding = 0;
+    /*
+     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+        if (blinding == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blinding != NULL) {
+        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+        (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
+        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+        if (d == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    if (blinding)
+        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+        if (!BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
+            res = f;
+        else
+            res = ret;
+    } else {
+        res = ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+     * the length of the modulus.
+     */
+    r = BN_bn2binpad(res, to, num);
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int local_blinding = 0;
+    /*
+     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+     */
+    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+     * top '0' bytes
+     */
+    if (flen > num) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* make data into a big number */
+    if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+        if (blinding == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blinding != NULL) {
+        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* do the decrypt */
+    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+        (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
+        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+        if (d == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+                                        rsa->n, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+            BN_free(d);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+        BN_free(d);
+    }
+
+    if (blinding)
+        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+        break;
+    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(r >= 0);
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* signature verification */
+static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+     * top '0' bytes
+     */
+    if (flen > num) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+        if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
+            goto err;
+
+    i = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+
+    switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+        r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+        memcpy(to, buf, (r = i));
+        break;
+    default:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (r < 0)
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy, *r2, *m[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2];
+    int ret = 0, i, ex_primes = 0, smooth = 0;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (vrfy == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
+        && ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0
+             || ex_primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+        BIGNUM *factor = BN_new();
+
+        if (factor == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        /*
+         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
+         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
+         */
+        if (!(BN_with_flags(factor, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME),
+              BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock,
+                                     factor, ctx))
+            || !(BN_with_flags(factor, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME),
+                 BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, rsa->lock,
+                                        factor, ctx))) {
+            BN_free(factor);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+            BN_with_flags(factor, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&pinfo->m, rsa->lock, factor, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(factor);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        /*
+         * We MUST free |factor| before any further use of the prime factors
+         */
+        BN_free(factor);
+
+        smooth = (ex_primes == 0)
+                 && (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont)
+                 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->q) == BN_num_bits(rsa->p));
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (smooth) {
+        /*
+         * Conversion from Montgomery domain, a.k.a. Montgomery reduction,
+         * accepts values in [0-m*2^w) range. w is m's bit width rounded up
+         * to limb width. So that at the very least if |I| is fully reduced,
+         * i.e. less than p*q, we can count on from-to round to perform
+         * below modulo operations on |I|. Unlike BN_mod it's constant time.
+         */
+        if (/* m1 = I moq q */
+            !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(m1, I, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(m1, m1, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            /* m1 = m1^dmq1 mod q */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, m1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_q)
+            /* r1 = I mod p */
+            || !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(r1, I, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            /* r1 = r1^dmp1 mod p */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r1, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_p)
+            /* r1 = (r1 - m1) mod p */
+            /*
+             * bn_mod_sub_fixed_top is not regular modular subtraction,
+             * it can tolerate subtrahend to be larger than modulus, but
+             * not bit-wise wider. This makes up for uncommon q>p case,
+             * when |m1| can be larger than |rsa->p|.
+             */
+            || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p)
+
+            /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p,
+                                      ctx)
+            /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */
+            || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx)
+            || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n))
+            goto err;
+
+        goto tail;
+    }
+
+    /* compute I mod q */
+    {
+        BIGNUM *c = BN_new();
+        if (c == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(c);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        {
+            BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new();
+            if (dmq1 == NULL) {
+                BN_free(c);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
+                BN_free(c);
+                BN_free(dmq1);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
+            BN_free(dmq1);
+        }
+
+        /* compute I mod p */
+        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(c);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */
+        BN_free(c);
+    }
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new();
+        if (dmp1 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                   rsa->_method_mod_p)) {
+            BN_free(dmp1);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
+        BN_free(dmp1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * calculate m_i in multi-prime case
+     *
+     * TODO:
+     * 1. squash the following two loops and calculate |m_i| there.
+     * 2. remove cc and reuse |c|.
+     * 3. remove |dmq1| and |dmp1| in previous block and use |di|.
+     *
+     * If these things are done, the code will be more readable.
+     */
+    if (ex_primes > 0) {
+        BIGNUM *di = BN_new(), *cc = BN_new();
+
+        if (cc == NULL || di == NULL) {
+            BN_free(cc);
+            BN_free(di);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+            /* prepare m_i */
+            if ((m[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) {
+                BN_free(cc);
+                BN_free(di);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+
+            /* prepare c and d_i */
+            BN_with_flags(cc, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+            BN_with_flags(di, pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            if (!BN_mod(r1, cc, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(cc);
+                BN_free(di);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* compute r1 ^ d_i mod r_i */
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m[i], r1, di, pinfo->r, ctx, pinfo->m)) {
+                BN_free(cc);
+                BN_free(di);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        BN_free(cc);
+        BN_free(di);
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
+     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+     */
+    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    {
+        BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new();
+        if (pr1 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+        if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+            BN_free(pr1);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */
+        BN_free(pr1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
+     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
+     * break the private key operations: the following second correction
+     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
+     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
+     */
+    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+            goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* add m_i to m in multi-prime case */
+    if (ex_primes > 0) {
+        BIGNUM *pr2 = BN_new();
+
+        if (pr2 == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+            pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+            if (!BN_sub(r1, m[i], r0)) {
+                BN_free(pr2);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!BN_mul(r2, r1, pinfo->t, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(pr2);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            BN_with_flags(pr2, r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            if (!BN_mod(r1, pr2, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(pr2);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (BN_is_negative(r1))
+                if (!BN_add(r1, r1, pinfo->r)) {
+                    BN_free(pr2);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, pinfo->pp, ctx)) {
+                BN_free(pr2);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!BN_add(r0, r0, r1)) {
+                BN_free(pr2);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        BN_free(pr2);
+    }
+
+ tail:
+    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+        if (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) {
+            if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                 rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
+         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
+         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
+         * absolute equality, just congruency.
+         */
+        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;   /* not actually error */
+        }
+        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
+                goto err;
+        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+            /*
+             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
+             * return that instead.
+             */
+
+            BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+            if (d == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
+                BN_free(d);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+            BN_free(d);
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * It's unfortunate that we have to bn_correct_top(r0). What hopefully
+     * saves the day is that correction is highly unlike, and private key
+     * operations are customarily performed on blinded message. Which means
+     * that attacker won't observe correlation with chosen plaintext.
+     * Secondly, remaining code would still handle it in same computational
+     * time and even conceal memory access pattern around corrected top.
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(r0);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int i;
+    RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); i++) {
+        pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(pinfo->m);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 1;                 /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with 0xff data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+    memset(p, 0xff, j);
+    p += j;
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                   int num)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = from;
+
+    /*
+     * The format is
+     * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D
+     * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF
+     * D  - data.
+     */
+
+    if (num < 11)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
+    if (num == flen) {
+        if ((*p++) != 0x00) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+                   RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        flen--;
+    }
+
+    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
+    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type. */
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p != 0xff) {       /* should decrypt to 0xff */
+            if (*p == 0) {
+                p++;
+                break;
+            } else {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+                       RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    if (i == j) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (i < 8) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+               RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
+    j -= i;
+    if (j > tlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+    return j;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            do {
+                if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            } while (*p == '\0');
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                   int num)
+{
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    /*
+     * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
+     * section 7.2.2.
+     */
+
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }
+    from = em;
+
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c

@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* RSA pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* Key gen parameters */
+    int nbits;
+    BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+    int primes;
+    /* Keygen callback info */
+    int gentmp[2];
+    /* RSA padding mode */
+    int pad_mode;
+    /* message digest */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    /* message digest for MGF1 */
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+    /* PSS salt length */
+    int saltlen;
+    /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
+    int min_saltlen;
+    /* Temp buffer */
+    unsigned char *tbuf;
+    /* OAEP label */
+    unsigned char *oaep_label;
+    size_t oaep_labellen;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
+static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
+
+    if (rctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    rctx->nbits = 1024;
+    rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
+    if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+        rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+    else
+        rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+    /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+    rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+    rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
+    ctx->data = rctx;
+    ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+    ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+
+    if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
+        return 0;
+    sctx = src->data;
+    dctx = dst->data;
+    dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+    if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+        dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+        if (!dctx->pub_exp)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+    dctx->md = sctx->md;
+    dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+    if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+        OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+        dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+        if (!dctx->oaep_label)
+            return 0;
+        dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
+{
+    if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_SETUP_TBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    if (rctx) {
+        BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                         size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                         size_t tbslen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+            unsigned int sltmp;
+            if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0,
+                                             tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
+                                      sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+            unsigned int sltmp;
+            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                           tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
+                                                rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                                rctx->saltlen))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
+                                      sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+        } else {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                  rctx->pad_mode);
+    }
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *siglen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                  unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+                                  const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
+                                     rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                     RSA_X931_PADDING);
+            if (ret < 1)
+                return 0;
+            ret--;
+            if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+                       RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+                       RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (rout)
+                memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+            size_t sltmp;
+            ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                                 NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+                                 sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ret = sltmp;
+        } else {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                 rctx->pad_mode);
+    }
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *routlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+                           const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    size_t rslen;
+
+    if (rctx->md) {
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+                              sig, siglen, rsa);
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+            if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+                return 0;
+        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            int ret;
+            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+                return -1;
+            ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+                                     rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
+                                            rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                            rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return 0;
+            return 1;
+        } else {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+                                   rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
+        if (rslen == 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
+                                             in, inlen,
+                                             rctx->oaep_label,
+                                             rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                             rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
+            return -1;
+        ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
+                                 ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+    } else {
+        ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                 rctx->pad_mode);
+    }
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *outlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                            unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                            const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+    int ret;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+            return -1;
+        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
+                                  ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return ret;
+        ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
+                                                ret, ret,
+                                                rctx->oaep_label,
+                                                rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+    } else {
+        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+                                  rctx->pad_mode);
+    }
+    if (ret < 0)
+        return ret;
+    *outlen = ret;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
+{
+    int mdnid;
+
+    if (!md)
+        return 1;
+
+    mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+
+    if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+        if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        switch(mdnid) {
+        /* List of all supported RSA digests */
+        case NID_sha1:
+        case NID_sha224:
+        case NID_sha256:
+        case NID_sha384:
+        case NID_sha512:
+        case NID_md5:
+        case NID_md5_sha1:
+        case NID_md2:
+        case NID_md4:
+        case NID_mdc2:
+        case NID_ripemd160:
+        case NID_sha3_224:
+        case NID_sha3_256:
+        case NID_sha3_384:
+        case NID_sha3_512:
+            return 1;
+
+        default:
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+            return 0;
+
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+        if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
+            if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
+                return 0;
+            if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+                if (!(ctx->operation &
+                      (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
+                    goto bad_pad;
+                if (!rctx->md)
+                    rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+            } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
+                goto bad_pad;
+            }
+            if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+                if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
+                    goto bad_pad;
+                if (!rctx->md)
+                    rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+            }
+            rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+            return 1;
+        }
+ bad_pad:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+               RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+        return -2;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+        *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
+            *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+        } else {
+            if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
+                return -2;
+            if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+                if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
+                    && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+                    RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+                    return -2;
+                }
+                if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
+                     && rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
+                    || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
+                    RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+            rctx->saltlen = p1;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+        if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        rctx->nbits = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+        if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+        rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
+        if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        rctx->primes = p1;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
+            *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        else
+            rctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+        if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
+            return 0;
+        if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+            if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
+                return 1;
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        rctx->md = p2;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
+            && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+            if (rctx->mgf1md)
+                *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+            else
+                *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        } else {
+            if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+                if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
+                    return 1;
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+        if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
+            rctx->oaep_label = p2;
+            rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
+        } else {
+            rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
+            rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+        return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+#endif
+    return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
+#endif
+    if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+        return 1;
+    /* fall through */
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+               RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+        return -2;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+
+    }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
+        int pm;
+
+        if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+        } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
+            pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+        } else {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+            return -2;
+        }
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
+        int saltlen;
+
+        if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
+            saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
+        else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
+            saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+        else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
+            saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+        else
+            saltlen = atoi(value);
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
+        int nbits = atoi(value);
+
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
+        int ret;
+
+        BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
+        if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
+            return 0;
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            BN_free(pubexp);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
+        int nprimes = atoi(value);
+
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
+                               EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                               EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
+
+    if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
+
+        if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
+            return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+                                   EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
+
+        if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
+            return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+                                   EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
+
+        if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
+            int saltlen = atoi(value);
+
+            return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
+        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                               EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
+        unsigned char *lab;
+        long lablen;
+        int ret;
+
+        lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
+        if (!lab)
+            return 0;
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            OPENSSL_free(lab);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
+static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+    if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+        return 1;
+    /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
+    if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
+        return 1;
+    rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                     rctx->saltlen == -2 ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
+    if (rsa->pss == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    BN_GENCB *pcb;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
+        rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+        if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    rsa = RSA_new();
+    if (rsa == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+        pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+        if (pcb == NULL) {
+            RSA_free(rsa);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+    } else {
+        pcb = NULL;
+    }
+    ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
+                                       rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
+    BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+    if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ret > 0)
+        EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
+    else
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+    pkey_rsa_init,
+    pkey_rsa_copy,
+    pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};
+
+/*
+ * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
+ * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    RSA *rsa;
+    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+    int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
+
+    /* Should never happen */
+    if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+        return 0;
+    rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    /* If no restrictions just return */
+    if (rsa->pss == NULL)
+        return 1;
+    /* Get and check parameters */
+    if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
+    max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
+    if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+        max_saltlen--;
+    if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_PSS_INIT, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+    /*
+     * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
+     * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
+     */
+
+    rctx->md = md;
+    rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
+    rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
+    EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+    pkey_rsa_init,
+    pkey_rsa_copy,
+    pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+    0, 0,
+
+    0,
+    pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+    pkey_pss_init,
+    pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+    pkey_pss_init,
+    pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *x, int off)
+{
+    BIO *b;
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    ret = RSA_print(b, x, off);
+    BIO_free(b);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pk;
+    int ret;
+    pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, (RSA *)x))
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    return ret;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
+# pragma optimize("g", off)
+#endif
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                         const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
+                         int sLen)
+{
+    return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+                              const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                              const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+    const unsigned char *H;
+    unsigned char *DB = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+        mgf1Hash = Hash;
+
+    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+    if (hLen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
+     *      -3      salt length is maximized
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */
+    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+        sLen = hLen;
+    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (MSBits == 0) {
+        EM++;
+        emLen--;
+    }
+    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
+    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+    DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
+    if (DB == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
+        goto err;
+    for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
+        DB[i] ^= EM[i];
+    if (MSBits)
+        DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+    for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ;
+    if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (maskedDBLen - i) {
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(DB);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                              const unsigned char *mHash,
+                              const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
+{
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+                                   const unsigned char *mHash,
+                                   const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+                                   int sLen)
+{
+    int i;
+    int ret = 0;
+    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+    unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+        mgf1Hash = Hash;
+
+    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+    if (hLen < 0)
+        goto err;
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is maximized
+     *      -3      same as above (on signing)
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */
+    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+        sLen = hLen;
+    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
+        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (MSBits == 0) {
+        *EM++ = 0;
+        emLen--;
+    }
+    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
+    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (sLen > 0) {
+        salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
+        if (salt == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
+        goto err;
+
+    p = EM;
+
+    /*
+     * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
+     * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
+     */
+    p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
+    *p++ ^= 0x1;
+    if (sLen > 0) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
+            *p++ ^= salt[i];
+    }
+    if (MSBits)
+        EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+
+    /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
+
+    EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(salt, (size_t)sLen); /* salt != NULL implies sLen > 0 */
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma optimize("",on)
+#endif

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
+                               const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                               unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+                               RSA *rsa)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING sig;
+    int i, j, ret = 1;
+    unsigned char *p, *s;
+
+    sig.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    sig.length = m_len;
+    sig.data = (unsigned char *)m;
+
+    i = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, NULL);
+    j = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+               RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = s;
+    i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, &p);
+    i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (i <= 0)
+        ret = 0;
+    else
+        *siglen = i;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)j + 1);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
+                                 const unsigned char *m,
+                                 unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf,
+                                 unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int i, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = NULL;
+
+    if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+               RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
+    if (s == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+    if (i <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = s;
+    sig = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, (long)i);
+    if (sig == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) ||
+        (memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    } else {
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
+    return ret;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH  36
+
+/*
+ * encode_pkcs1 encodes a DigestInfo prefix of hash |type| and digest |m|, as
+ * described in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE, RFC 3447 section 9.2 step 2. This
+ * encodes the DigestInfo (T and tLen) but does not add the padding.
+ *
+ * On success, it returns one and sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer
+ * containing the result and |*out_len| to its length. The caller must free
+ * |*out| with |OPENSSL_free|. Otherwise, it returns zero.
+ */
+static int encode_pkcs1(unsigned char **out, int *out_len, int type,
+                        const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len)
+{
+    X509_SIG sig;
+    X509_ALGOR algor;
+    ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+    uint8_t *der = NULL;
+    int len;
+
+    sig.algor = &algor;
+    sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+    if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (OBJ_length(sig.algor->algorithm) == 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1,
+               RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+    parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+    sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+    sig.digest = &digest;
+    sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+    sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+    len = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &der);
+    if (len < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    *out = der;
+    *out_len = len;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+             unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int encrypt_len, encoded_len = 0, ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *tmps = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *encoded = NULL;
+
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+    }
+
+    /* Compute the encoded digest. */
+    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        /*
+         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
+         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
+         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+         */
+        if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        encoded_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+        encoded = m;
+    } else {
+        if (!encode_pkcs1(&tmps, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
+            goto err;
+        encoded = tmps;
+    }
+
+    if (encoded_len > RSA_size(rsa) - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    encrypt_len = RSA_private_encrypt(encoded_len, encoded, sigret, rsa,
+                                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (encrypt_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    *siglen = encrypt_len;
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, (size_t)encoded_len);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * int_rsa_verify verifies an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|. It may be
+ * called in two modes. If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest
+ * |m|. Otherwise, it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest
+ * to |rm| and the length to |*prm_len|. |type| is the NID of the digest
+ * algorithm to use. It returns one on successful verification and zero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                   unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+                   const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+    int decrypt_len, ret = 0, encoded_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL;
+
+    if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Recover the encoded digest. */
+    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    decrypt_len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa,
+                                     RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+    if (decrypt_len <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+        /*
+         * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
+         * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
+         * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+         */
+        if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH);
+            *prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16
+               && decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) {
+        /*
+         * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
+         * tag and length octets.
+         */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16);
+            *prm_len = 16;
+        } else {
+            if (m_len != 16) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end
+         * of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption
+         * output as in a standard verification.
+         */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(type);
+            if (md == NULL) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            m_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+            if (m_len > (size_t)decrypt_len) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len;
+        }
+
+        /* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */
+        if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (encoded_len != decrypt_len
+            || memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Output the recovered digest. */
+        if (rm != NULL) {
+            memcpy(rm, m, m_len);
+            *prm_len = m_len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, (size_t)encoded_len);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+
+    if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+        return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+    }
+
+    return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
+               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+    /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+    j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
+
+    if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+        if (*p == '\0')
+            do {
+                if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+                    return 0;
+            } while (*p == '\0');
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    memset(p, 3, 8);
+    p += 8;
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
+int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                             const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
+
+    if (flen < 10) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }
+    from = em;
+
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    threes_in_row = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+
+        threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                         const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+    int j;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    /*
+     * Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding
+     * nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'.
+     */
+
+    j = tlen - flen - 2;
+
+    if (j < 0) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+    /* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
+    if (j == 0) {
+        *p++ = 0x6A;
+    } else {
+        *p++ = 0x6B;
+        if (j > 1) {
+            memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
+            p += j - 1;
+        }
+        *p++ = 0xBA;
+    }
+    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    p += flen;
+    *p = 0xCC;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                           const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+    int i = 0, j;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    p = from;
+    if ((num != flen) || ((*p != 0x6A) && (*p != 0x6B))) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (*p++ == 0x6B) {
+        j = flen - 3;
+        for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+            unsigned char c = *p++;
+            if (c == 0xBA)
+                break;
+            if (c != 0xBB) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+
+        j -= i;
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+    } else {
+        j = flen - 2;
+    }
+
+    if (p[j] != 0xCC) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+    return j;
+}
+
+/* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */
+
+int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid)
+{
+    switch (nid) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+        return 0x33;
+
+    case NID_sha256:
+        return 0x34;
+
+    case NID_sha384:
+        return 0x36;
+
+    case NID_sha512:
+        return 0x35;
+
+    }
+    return -1;
+}

trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* X9.31 RSA key derivation and generation */
+
+int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
+                       BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xq1, const BIGNUM *Xq2,
+                       const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!rsa)
+        goto err;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+    if (r3 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!rsa->e) {
+        rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
+        if (!rsa->e)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        e = rsa->e;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If not all parameters present only calculate what we can. This allows
+     * test programs to output selective parameters.
+     */
+
+    if (Xp && rsa->p == NULL) {
+        rsa->p = BN_new();
+        if (rsa->p == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->p, p1, p2,
+                                     Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (Xq && rsa->q == NULL) {
+        rsa->q = BN_new();
+        if (rsa->q == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->q, q1, q2,
+                                     Xq, Xq1, Xq2, e, ctx, cb))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL) {
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+        return 2;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Since both primes are set we can now calculate all remaining
+     * components.
+     */
+
+    /* calculate n */
+    rsa->n = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->n == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d */
+    if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* p-1 */
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+        goto err;               /* q-1 */
+    if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+
+    if (!BN_gcd(r3, r1, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, r0, r3, ctx))
+        goto err;               /* LCM((p-1)(q-1)) */
+
+    ctx2 = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx2 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    rsa->d = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->e, r0, ctx2); /* d */
+    if (rsa->d == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+    rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, r1, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+    rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, r2, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+    rsa->iqmp = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx2);
+    if (rsa->iqmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
+
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+int RSA_X931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e,
+                             BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    BIGNUM *Xp = NULL, *Xq = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    Xp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    Xq = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xq == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_Xpq(Xp, Xq, bits, ctx))
+        goto error;
+
+    rsa->p = BN_new();
+    rsa->q = BN_new();
+    if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL)
+        goto error;
+
+    /* Generate two primes from Xp, Xq */
+
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xp,
+                                   e, ctx, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xq,
+                                   e, ctx, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    /*
+     * Since rsa->p and rsa->q are valid this call will just derive remaining
+     * RSA components.
+     */
+
+    if (!RSA_X931_derive_ex(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, cb))
+        goto error;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ error:
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (ok)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+
+}