external/srs
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/ossrs/srs.git synced 2025-03-09 15:49:59 +00:00
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Upgrade openssl from 1.1.0e to 1.1.1b, with source code. 4.0.78

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
winlin 2021-03-01 20:47:57 +08:00
parent 8f1c992379
commit 96dbd7bced
1476 changed files with 616554 additions and 4 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

505
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/bio_ssl.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "internal/bio.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, size_t size, size_t *written);
static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *buf, size_t size, size_t *readbytes);
static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
typedef struct bio_ssl_st {
SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */
/* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
int num_renegotiates;
unsigned long renegotiate_count;
size_t byte_count;
unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
unsigned long last_time;
} BIO_SSL;
static const BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = {
BIO_TYPE_SSL,
"ssl",
ssl_write,
NULL, /* ssl_write_old, */
ssl_read,
NULL, /* ssl_read_old, */
ssl_puts,
NULL, /* ssl_gets, */
ssl_ctrl,
ssl_new,
ssl_free,
ssl_callback_ctrl,
};
const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
{
return &methods_sslp;
}
static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
{
BIO_SSL *bs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bs));
if (bs == NULL) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_init(bi, 0);
BIO_set_data(bi, bs);
/* Clear all flags */
BIO_clear_flags(bi, ~0);
return 1;
}
static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
{
BIO_SSL *bs;
if (a == NULL)
return 0;
bs = BIO_get_data(a);
if (bs->ssl != NULL)
SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
if (BIO_get_shutdown(a)) {
if (BIO_get_init(a))
SSL_free(bs->ssl);
/* Clear all flags */
BIO_clear_flags(a, ~0);
BIO_set_init(a, 0);
}
OPENSSL_free(bs);
return 1;
}
static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *buf, size_t size, size_t *readbytes)
{
int ret = 1;
BIO_SSL *sb;
SSL *ssl;
int retry_reason = 0;
int r = 0;
if (buf == NULL)
return 0;
sb = BIO_get_data(b);
ssl = sb->ssl;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
ret = ssl_read_internal(ssl, buf, size, readbytes);
switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) {
sb->byte_count += *readbytes;
if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) {
sb->byte_count = 0;
sb->num_renegotiates++;
SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
r = 1;
}
}
if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
unsigned long tm;
tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) {
sb->last_time = tm;
sb->num_renegotiates++;
SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
}
}
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
BIO_set_retry_read(b);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
BIO_set_retry_write(b);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
default:
break;
}
BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason);
return ret;
}
static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *buf, size_t size, size_t *written)
{
int ret, r = 0;
int retry_reason = 0;
SSL *ssl;
BIO_SSL *bs;
if (buf == NULL)
return 0;
bs = BIO_get_data(b);
ssl = bs->ssl;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
ret = ssl_write_internal(ssl, buf, size, written);
switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) {
bs->byte_count += *written;
if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) {
bs->byte_count = 0;
bs->num_renegotiates++;
SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
r = 1;
}
}
if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
unsigned long tm;
tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) {
bs->last_time = tm;
bs->num_renegotiates++;
SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
}
}
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
BIO_set_retry_write(b);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
BIO_set_retry_read(b);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
default:
break;
}
BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason);
return ret;
}
static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
SSL **sslp, *ssl;
BIO_SSL *bs, *dbs;
BIO *dbio, *bio;
long ret = 1;
BIO *next;
bs = BIO_get_data(b);
next = BIO_next(b);
ssl = bs->ssl;
if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
return 0;
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
if (!SSL_clear(ssl)) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
if (next != NULL)
ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
else
ret = 1;
break;
case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
ret = 0;
break;
case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
if (num) /* client mode */
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
else
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
break;
case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
if (num < 60)
num = 5;
bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num;
bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
break;
case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
ret = bs->renegotiate_count;
if ((long)num >= 512)
bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num;
break;
case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
ret = bs->num_renegotiates;
break;
case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
if (ssl != NULL) {
ssl_free(b);
if (!ssl_new(b))
return 0;
}
BIO_set_shutdown(b, num);
ssl = (SSL *)ptr;
bs->ssl = ssl;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
if (bio != NULL) {
if (next != NULL)
BIO_push(bio, next);
BIO_set_next(b, bio);
BIO_up_ref(bio);
}
BIO_set_init(b, 1);
break;
case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
if (ptr != NULL) {
sslp = (SSL **)ptr;
*sslp = ssl;
} else
ret = 0;
break;
case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
ret = BIO_get_shutdown(b);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
BIO_set_shutdown(b, (int)num);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
ret = SSL_pending(ssl);
if (ret == 0)
ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
if ((next != NULL) && (next != ssl->rbio)) {
/*
* We are going to pass ownership of next to the SSL object...but
* we don't own a reference to pass yet - so up ref
*/
BIO_up_ref(next);
SSL_set_bio(ssl, next, next);
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_POP:
/* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
if (b == ptr) {
/* This will clear the reference we obtained during push */
SSL_set_bio(ssl, NULL, NULL);
}
break;
case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
BIO_set_retry_reason(b, 0);
ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_get_retry_reason(next));
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
dbs = BIO_get_data(dbio);
SSL_free(dbs->ssl);
dbs->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl);
dbs->num_renegotiates = bs->num_renegotiates;
dbs->renegotiate_count = bs->renegotiate_count;
dbs->byte_count = bs->byte_count;
dbs->renegotiate_timeout = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
dbs->last_time = bs->last_time;
ret = (dbs->ssl != NULL);
break;
case BIO_C_GET_FD:
ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
ret = 0; /* use callback ctrl */
break;
default:
ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
{
SSL *ssl;
BIO_SSL *bs;
long ret = 1;
bs = BIO_get_data(b);
ssl = bs->ssl;
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp);
break;
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
{
int n, ret;
n = strlen(str);
ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n);
return ret;
}
BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
BIO_free(buf);
BIO_free(ssl);
#endif
return NULL;
}
BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
BIO_free(con);
#endif
return NULL;
}
BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
{
BIO *ret;
SSL *ssl;
if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
BIO_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (client)
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
else
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
return ret;
}
int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
{
BIO_SSL *tdata, *fdata;
t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
return 0;
tdata = BIO_get_data(t);
fdata = BIO_get_data(f);
if ((tdata->ssl == NULL) || (fdata->ssl == NULL))
return 0;
if (!SSL_copy_session_id(tdata->ssl, (fdata->ssl)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
{
BIO_SSL *bdata;
for (; b != NULL; b = BIO_next(b)) {
if (BIO_method_type(b) != BIO_TYPE_SSL)
continue;
bdata = BIO_get_data(b);
if (bdata != NULL && bdata->ssl != NULL)
SSL_shutdown(bdata->ssl);
}
}

15
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/build.info vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
LIBS=../libssl
SOURCE[../libssl]=\
pqueue.c packet.c \
statem/statem_srvr.c statem/statem_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c record/rec_layer_s3.c \
statem/statem_lib.c statem/extensions.c statem/extensions_srvr.c \
statem/extensions_clnt.c statem/extensions_cust.c s3_cbc.c s3_msg.c \
methods.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c tls13_enc.c \
d1_lib.c record/rec_layer_d1.c d1_msg.c \
statem/statem_dtls.c d1_srtp.c \
ssl_lib.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_init.c ssl_conf.c ssl_mcnf.c \
bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c tls_srp.c t1_trce.c ssl_utst.c \
record/ssl3_buffer.c record/ssl3_record.c record/dtls1_bitmap.c \
statem/statem.c record/ssl3_record_tls13.c

972
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/d1_lib.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "e_os.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
static const size_t g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
{
/*
* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
* http, the cache would over fill
*/
return (60 * 60 * 2);
}
int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
{
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return 0;
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
ssl3_free(s);
return 0;
}
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
if (s->server) {
d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
d1->link_mtu = 0;
d1->mtu = 0;
if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
OPENSSL_free(d1);
ssl3_free(s);
return 0;
}
s->d1 = d1;
if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
{
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
}
void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
ssl3_free(s);
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
s->d1 = NULL;
}
int dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
{
pqueue *buffered_messages;
pqueue *sent_messages;
size_t mtu;
size_t link_mtu;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
if (s->d1) {
DTLS_timer_cb timer_cb = s->d1->timer_cb;
buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
/* Restore the timer callback from previous state */
s->d1->timer_cb = timer_cb;
if (s->server) {
s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
}
s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
}
if (!ssl3_clear(s))
return 0;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
#endif
else
s->version = s->method->version;
return 1;
}
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
return 0;
s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
return 1;
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
/*
* We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
* We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
*/
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
return 0;
s->d1->mtu = larg;
return larg;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
break;
}
return ret;
}
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int sec, usec;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable timer for SCTP */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
return;
}
#endif
/*
* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second or
* a user-specified value if the timer callback is installed.
*/
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
if (s->d1->timer_cb != NULL)
s->d1->timeout_duration_us = s->d1->timer_cb(s, 0);
else
s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 1000000;
}
/* Set timeout to current time */
get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Add duration to current time */
sec = s->d1->timeout_duration_us / 1000000;
usec = s->d1->timeout_duration_us - (sec * 1000000);
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += sec;
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec += usec;
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec >= 1000000) {
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec++;
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec -= 1000000;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
}
struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
{
struct timeval timenow;
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
return NULL;
}
/* Get current time */
get_current_time(&timenow);
/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
return timeleft;
}
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
timeleft->tv_sec--;
timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
}
/*
* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
* because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
*/
if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
}
return timeleft;
}
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
{
struct timeval timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout_duration_us *= 2;
if (s->d1->timeout_duration_us > 60000000)
s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 60000000;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
{
/* Reset everything */
memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 1000000;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
size_t mtu;
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
}
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,
SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
{
/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
return 0;
}
if (s->d1->timer_cb != NULL)
s->d1->timeout_duration_us = s->d1->timer_cb(s, s->d1->timeout_duration_us);
else
dtls1_double_timeout(s);
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
}
dtls1_start_timer(s);
/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
}
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
{
#if defined(_WIN32)
SYSTEMTIME st;
union {
unsigned __int64 ul;
FILETIME ft;
} now;
GetSystemTime(&st);
SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
/* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
# ifdef __MINGW32__
now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
# else
/* *INDENT-OFF* */
now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64;
/* *INDENT-ON* */
# endif
t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
#else
gettimeofday(t, NULL);
#endif
}
#define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
{
int next, n, ret = 0;
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
const unsigned char *data;
unsigned char *buf, *wbuf;
size_t fragoff, fraglen, msglen, reclen, align = 0;
unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
BIO *rbio, *wbio;
BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
}
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
if (!SSL_clear(s))
return -1;
ERR_clear_error();
rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (!rbio || !wbio) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
/*
* Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
* requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
* (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
* supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
* SSL_accept)
*/
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
/* SSLerr already called */
return -1;
}
buf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf;
wbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)[0].buf;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD)
# if SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
/*
* Using SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH here instead of DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH for
* consistency with ssl3_read_n. In practice it should make no difference
* for sensible values of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD because the difference between
* SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH and DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH is exactly 8
*/
align = (size_t)buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
# endif
#endif
buf += align;
do {
/* Get a packet */
clear_sys_error();
n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (n <= 0) {
if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
/* Non-blocking IO */
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
* dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
* resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
* length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
* discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
* logged for diagnostic purposes."
*/
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Get the record header */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/*
* Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
* the same.
*/
if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
/* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
reclen = PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt);
/*
* We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
* be a second record (but we ignore it)
*/
/* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
/* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &msglen)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
if (msgseq > 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
/*
* We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
* listening because that would require server side state (which is
* against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
* mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
* and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
*/
if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
/* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* Verify client version is supported
*/
if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
/*
* Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
* ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
} else {
/*
* We have a cookie, so lets check it.
*/
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
(unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == 0) {
/*
* We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
* per RFC6347
*/
next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
} else {
/* Cookie verification succeeded */
next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
WPACKET wpkt;
unsigned int version;
size_t wreclen;
/*
* There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
* to resend, we just drop it.
*/
/* Generate the cookie */
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
cookielen > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
* 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
version = (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ? DTLS1_VERSION
: s->version;
/* Construct the record and message headers */
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt,
wbuf,
ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, version)
/*
* Record sequence number is always the same as in the
* received ClientHello
*/
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&wpkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
/* End of record, start sub packet for message */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&wpkt)
/* Message type */
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt,
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
/*
* Message length - doesn't follow normal TLS convention:
* the length isn't the last thing in the message header.
* We'll need to fill this in later when we know the
* length. Set it to zero for now
*/
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
/*
* Message sequence number is always 0 for a
* HelloVerifyRequest
*/
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, 0)
/*
* We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment
* offset is 0
*/
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
/*
* Fragment length is the same as message length, but
* this *is* the last thing in the message header so we
* can just start a sub-packet. No need to come back
* later for this one.
*/
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&wpkt)
/* Create the actual HelloVerifyRequest body */
|| !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&wpkt, cookie, cookielen)
/* Close message body */
|| !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
/* Close record body */
|| !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &wreclen)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
/*
* Fix up the message len in the message header. Its the same as the
* fragment len which has been filled in by WPACKET, so just copy
* that. Destination for the message len is after the record header
* plus one byte for the message content type. The source is the
* last 3 bytes of the message header
*/
memcpy(&wbuf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1],
&wbuf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3],
3);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
/*
* This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
* maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
* support this.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
(void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
}
BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
tmpclient = NULL;
/* TODO(size_t): convert this call */
if (BIO_write(wbio, wbuf, wreclen) < (int)wreclen) {
if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
}
} while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
/*
* Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
*/
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
/*
* We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
* SSL object
*/
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
/*
* Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
* exchange
*/
ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
/*
* Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address
*/
if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
/* Buffer the record in the processed_rcds queue */
if (!dtls_buffer_listen_record(s, reclen, seq, align))
return -1;
ret = 1;
end:
BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
return ret;
}
#endif
static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
{
return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
BIO *wbio;
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
if (ret == 0)
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
NULL);
}
#endif
ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
#endif
return ret;
}
int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
{
if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
s->d1->mtu =
s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
}
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/*
* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
*/
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
/* Set to min mtu */
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
(long)s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
} else
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
{
return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
}
size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
{
return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
}
size_t DTLS_get_data_mtu(const SSL *s)
{
size_t mac_overhead, int_overhead, blocksize, ext_overhead;
const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
size_t mtu = s->d1->mtu;
if (ciph == NULL)
return 0;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_overhead(ciph, &mac_overhead, &int_overhead,
&blocksize, &ext_overhead))
return 0;
if (SSL_READ_ETM(s))
ext_overhead += mac_overhead;
else
int_overhead += mac_overhead;
/* Subtract external overhead (e.g. IV/nonce, separate MAC) */
if (ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH >= mtu)
return 0;
mtu -= ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* Round encrypted payload down to cipher block size (for CBC etc.)
* No check for overflow since 'mtu % blocksize' cannot exceed mtu. */
if (blocksize)
mtu -= (mtu % blocksize);
/* Subtract internal overhead (e.g. CBC padding len byte) */
if (int_overhead >= mtu)
return 0;
mtu -= int_overhead;
return mtu;
}
void DTLS_set_timer_cb(SSL *s, DTLS_timer_cb cb)
{
s->d1->timer_cb = cb;
}

73
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/d1_msg.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
size_t *written)
{
int i;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
return -1;
}
return dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len, written);
}
int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
{
int i, j;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
size_t written;
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0, &written);
if (i <= 0) {
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
/* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
} else {
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
}
}
return i;
}

139
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/d1_srtp.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
/*
* Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc. Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[] = {
{
"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80",
SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80,
},
{
"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32",
SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32,
},
{
"SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM",
SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
},
{
"SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM",
SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
},
{0}
};
static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr, size_t len)
{
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
p = srtp_known_profiles;
while (p->name) {
if ((len == strlen(p->name))
&& strncmp(p->name, profile_name, len) == 0) {
*pptr = p;
return 0;
}
p++;
}
return 1;
}
static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
char *col;
char *ptr = (char *)profiles_string;
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
if ((profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
return 1;
}
do {
col = strchr(ptr, ':');
if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, col ? (size_t)(col - ptr)
: strlen(ptr))) {
if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles, p) >= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles, p)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
goto err;
}
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,
SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
goto err;
}
if (col)
ptr = col + 1;
} while (col);
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(*out);
*out = profiles;
return 0;
err:
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles)
{
return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &ctx->srtp_profiles);
}
int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *s, const char *profiles)
{
return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &s->srtp_profiles);
}
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->srtp_profiles != NULL) {
return s->srtp_profiles;
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->srtp_profiles != NULL)) {
return s->ctx->srtp_profiles;
}
}
return NULL;
}
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s)
{
return s->srtp_profile;
}
#endif

278
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/methods.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
/*-
* TLS/SSLv3 methods
*/
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
TLS_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3,
tlsv1_3_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_3_enc_data)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
tlsv1_2_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
tlsv1_1_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
tlsv1_method,
ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect)
#endif
/*-
* TLS/SSLv3 server methods
*/
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
TLS_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3,
tlsv1_3_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_3_enc_data)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
tlsv1_2_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
tlsv1_1_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
tlsv1_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function)
#endif
/*-
* TLS/SSLv3 client methods
*/
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
TLS_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3,
tlsv1_3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_3_enc_data)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2,
tlsv1_2_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
tlsv1_1_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1,
tlsv1_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect)
#endif
/*-
* DTLS methods
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
dtlsv1_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
dtlsv1_2_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
DTLS_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
/*-
* DTLS server methods
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
dtlsv1_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
dtlsv1_2_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
DTLS_server_method,
ossl_statem_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
/*-
* DTLS client methods
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
dtlsv1_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_BAD_VER, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1,
dtls_bad_ver_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2,
dtlsv1_2_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
#endif
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0,
DTLS_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_2_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_2_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_2_client_method();
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_1_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_1_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_1_client_method();
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void)
{
return tlsv1_client_method();
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void)
{
return sslv3_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
{
return sslv3_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void)
{
return sslv3_client_method();
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_2_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_2_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_2_client_method();
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_server_method();
}
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void)
{
return dtlsv1_client_method();
}
# endif
#endif

424
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/packet.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "packet_locl.h"
#include <openssl/sslerr.h>
#define DEFAULT_BUF_SIZE 256
int WPACKET_allocate_bytes(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len, unsigned char **allocbytes)
{
if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, len, allocbytes))
return 0;
pkt->written += len;
pkt->curr += len;
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len,
unsigned char **allocbytes, size_t lenbytes)
{
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__(pkt, lenbytes)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, allocbytes)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt))
return 0;
return 1;
}
#define GETBUF(p) (((p)->staticbuf != NULL) \
? (p)->staticbuf : (unsigned char *)(p)->buf->data)
int WPACKET_reserve_bytes(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len, unsigned char **allocbytes)
{
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL && len != 0))
return 0;
if (pkt->maxsize - pkt->written < len)
return 0;
if (pkt->staticbuf == NULL && (pkt->buf->length - pkt->written < len)) {
size_t newlen;
size_t reflen;
reflen = (len > pkt->buf->length) ? len : pkt->buf->length;
if (reflen > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
newlen = SIZE_MAX;
} else {
newlen = reflen * 2;
if (newlen < DEFAULT_BUF_SIZE)
newlen = DEFAULT_BUF_SIZE;
}
if (BUF_MEM_grow(pkt->buf, newlen) == 0)
return 0;
}
if (allocbytes != NULL)
*allocbytes = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt);
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len,
unsigned char **allocbytes, size_t lenbytes)
{
if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, lenbytes + len, allocbytes))
return 0;
*allocbytes += lenbytes;
return 1;
}
static size_t maxmaxsize(size_t lenbytes)
{
if (lenbytes >= sizeof(size_t) || lenbytes == 0)
return SIZE_MAX;
return ((size_t)1 << (lenbytes * 8)) - 1 + lenbytes;
}
static int wpacket_intern_init_len(WPACKET *pkt, size_t lenbytes)
{
unsigned char *lenchars;
pkt->curr = 0;
pkt->written = 0;
if ((pkt->subs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pkt->subs))) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_WPACKET_INTERN_INIT_LEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (lenbytes == 0)
return 1;
pkt->subs->pwritten = lenbytes;
pkt->subs->lenbytes = lenbytes;
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenbytes, &lenchars)) {
OPENSSL_free(pkt->subs);
pkt->subs = NULL;
return 0;
}
pkt->subs->packet_len = lenchars - GETBUF(pkt);
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_init_static_len(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
size_t lenbytes)
{
size_t max = maxmaxsize(lenbytes);
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(buf != NULL && len > 0))
return 0;
pkt->staticbuf = buf;
pkt->buf = NULL;
pkt->maxsize = (max < len) ? max : len;
return wpacket_intern_init_len(pkt, lenbytes);
}
int WPACKET_init_len(WPACKET *pkt, BUF_MEM *buf, size_t lenbytes)
{
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(buf != NULL))
return 0;
pkt->staticbuf = NULL;
pkt->buf = buf;
pkt->maxsize = maxmaxsize(lenbytes);
return wpacket_intern_init_len(pkt, lenbytes);
}
int WPACKET_init(WPACKET *pkt, BUF_MEM *buf)
{
return WPACKET_init_len(pkt, buf, 0);
}
int WPACKET_set_flags(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int flags)
{
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL))
return 0;
pkt->subs->flags = flags;
return 1;
}
/* Store the |value| of length |len| at location |data| */
static int put_value(unsigned char *data, size_t value, size_t len)
{
for (data += len - 1; len > 0; len--) {
*data = (unsigned char)(value & 0xff);
data--;
value >>= 8;
}
/* Check whether we could fit the value in the assigned number of bytes */
if (value > 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Internal helper function used by WPACKET_close(), WPACKET_finish() and
* WPACKET_fill_lengths() to close a sub-packet and write out its length if
* necessary. If |doclose| is 0 then it goes through the motions of closing
* (i.e. it fills in all the lengths), but doesn't actually close anything.
*/
static int wpacket_intern_close(WPACKET *pkt, WPACKET_SUB *sub, int doclose)
{
size_t packlen = pkt->written - sub->pwritten;
if (packlen == 0
&& (sub->flags & WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) != 0)
return 0;
if (packlen == 0
&& sub->flags & WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH) {
/* We can't handle this case. Return an error */
if (!doclose)
return 0;
/* Deallocate any bytes allocated for the length of the WPACKET */
if ((pkt->curr - sub->lenbytes) == sub->packet_len) {
pkt->written -= sub->lenbytes;
pkt->curr -= sub->lenbytes;
}
/* Don't write out the packet length */
sub->packet_len = 0;
sub->lenbytes = 0;
}
/* Write out the WPACKET length if needed */
if (sub->lenbytes > 0
&& !put_value(&GETBUF(pkt)[sub->packet_len], packlen,
sub->lenbytes))
return 0;
if (doclose) {
pkt->subs = sub->parent;
OPENSSL_free(sub);
}
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_fill_lengths(WPACKET *pkt)
{
WPACKET_SUB *sub;
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL))
return 0;
for (sub = pkt->subs; sub != NULL; sub = sub->parent) {
if (!wpacket_intern_close(pkt, sub, 0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_close(WPACKET *pkt)
{
/*
* Internal API, so should not fail - but we do negative testing of this
* so no assert (otherwise the tests fail)
*/
if (pkt->subs == NULL || pkt->subs->parent == NULL)
return 0;
return wpacket_intern_close(pkt, pkt->subs, 1);
}
int WPACKET_finish(WPACKET *pkt)
{
int ret;
/*
* Internal API, so should not fail - but we do negative testing of this
* so no assert (otherwise the tests fail)
*/
if (pkt->subs == NULL || pkt->subs->parent != NULL)
return 0;
ret = wpacket_intern_close(pkt, pkt->subs, 1);
if (ret) {
OPENSSL_free(pkt->subs);
pkt->subs = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t lenbytes)
{
WPACKET_SUB *sub;
unsigned char *lenchars;
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL))
return 0;
if ((sub = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sub))) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_WPACKET_START_SUB_PACKET_LEN__, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
sub->parent = pkt->subs;
pkt->subs = sub;
sub->pwritten = pkt->written + lenbytes;
sub->lenbytes = lenbytes;
if (lenbytes == 0) {
sub->packet_len = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenbytes, &lenchars))
return 0;
/* Convert to an offset in case the underlying BUF_MEM gets realloc'd */
sub->packet_len = lenchars - GETBUF(pkt);
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_start_sub_packet(WPACKET *pkt)
{
return WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__(pkt, 0);
}
int WPACKET_put_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int val, size_t size)
{
unsigned char *data;
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(size <= sizeof(unsigned int))
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, size, &data)
|| !put_value(data, val, size))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_set_max_size(WPACKET *pkt, size_t maxsize)
{
WPACKET_SUB *sub;
size_t lenbytes;
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL))
return 0;
/* Find the WPACKET_SUB for the top level */
for (sub = pkt->subs; sub->parent != NULL; sub = sub->parent)
continue;
lenbytes = sub->lenbytes;
if (lenbytes == 0)
lenbytes = sizeof(pkt->maxsize);
if (maxmaxsize(lenbytes) < maxsize || maxsize < pkt->written)
return 0;
pkt->maxsize = maxsize;
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_memset(WPACKET *pkt, int ch, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *dest;
if (len == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &dest))
return 0;
memset(dest, ch, len);
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_memcpy(WPACKET *pkt, const void *src, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *dest;
if (len == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &dest))
return 0;
memcpy(dest, src, len);
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_sub_memcpy__(WPACKET *pkt, const void *src, size_t len,
size_t lenbytes)
{
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__(pkt, lenbytes)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, src, len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_get_total_written(WPACKET *pkt, size_t *written)
{
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(written != NULL))
return 0;
*written = pkt->written;
return 1;
}
int WPACKET_get_length(WPACKET *pkt, size_t *len)
{
/* Internal API, so should not fail */
if (!ossl_assert(pkt->subs != NULL && len != NULL))
return 0;
*len = pkt->written - pkt->subs->pwritten;
return 1;
}
unsigned char *WPACKET_get_curr(WPACKET *pkt)
{
return GETBUF(pkt) + pkt->curr;
}
void WPACKET_cleanup(WPACKET *pkt)
{
WPACKET_SUB *sub, *parent;
for (sub = pkt->subs; sub != NULL; sub = parent) {
parent = sub->parent;
OPENSSL_free(sub);
}
pkt->subs = NULL;
}

874
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/packet_locl.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,874 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#ifndef HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H
# define HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H
# include <string.h>
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/buffer.h>
# include <openssl/crypto.h>
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# include "internal/numbers.h"
typedef struct {
/* Pointer to where we are currently reading from */
const unsigned char *curr;
/* Number of bytes remaining */
size_t remaining;
} PACKET;
/* Internal unchecked shorthand; don't use outside this file. */
static ossl_inline void packet_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
{
pkt->curr += len;
pkt->remaining -= len;
}
/*
* Returns the number of bytes remaining to be read in the PACKET
*/
static ossl_inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt)
{
return pkt->remaining;
}
/*
* Returns a pointer to the first byte after the packet data.
* Useful for integrating with non-PACKET parsing code.
* Specifically, we use PACKET_end() to verify that a d2i_... call
* has consumed the entire packet contents.
*/
static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_end(const PACKET *pkt)
{
return pkt->curr + pkt->remaining;
}
/*
* Returns a pointer to the PACKET's current position.
* For use in non-PACKETized APIs.
*/
static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_data(const PACKET *pkt)
{
return pkt->curr;
}
/*
* Initialise a PACKET with |len| bytes held in |buf|. This does not make a
* copy of the data so |buf| must be present for the whole time that the PACKET
* is being used.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_buf_init(PACKET *pkt,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len)
{
/* Sanity check for negative values. */
if (len > (size_t)(SIZE_MAX / 2))
return 0;
pkt->curr = buf;
pkt->remaining = len;
return 1;
}
/* Initialize a PACKET to hold zero bytes. */
static ossl_inline void PACKET_null_init(PACKET *pkt)
{
pkt->curr = NULL;
pkt->remaining = 0;
}
/*
* Returns 1 if the packet has length |num| and its contents equal the |num|
* bytes read from |ptr|. Returns 0 otherwise (lengths or contents not equal).
* If lengths are equal, performs the comparison in constant time.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr,
size_t num)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != num)
return 0;
return CRYPTO_memcmp(pkt->curr, ptr, num) == 0;
}
/*
* Peek ahead and initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|.
* Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
* the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_sub_packet(const PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt, size_t len)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
return 0;
return PACKET_buf_init(subpkt, pkt->curr, len);
}
/*
* Initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|. Data is not
* copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with the
* original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_sub_packet(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt, size_t len)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_sub_packet(pkt, subpkt, len))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, len);
return 1;
}
/*
* Peek ahead at 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
* |*data|
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int *data)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 2)
return 0;
*data = ((unsigned int)(*pkt->curr)) << 8;
*data |= *(pkt->curr + 1);
return 1;
}
/* Equivalent of n2s */
/* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, 2);
return 1;
}
/* Same as PACKET_get_net_2() but for a size_t */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2_len(PACKET *pkt, size_t *data)
{
unsigned int i;
int ret = PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i);
if (ret)
*data = (size_t)i;
return ret;
}
/*
* Peek ahead at 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
* |*data|
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_3(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned long *data)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 3)
return 0;
*data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 16;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8;
*data |= *(pkt->curr + 2);
return 1;
}
/* Equivalent of n2l3 */
/* Get 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_net_3(pkt, data))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, 3);
return 1;
}
/* Same as PACKET_get_net_3() but for a size_t */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3_len(PACKET *pkt, size_t *data)
{
unsigned long i;
int ret = PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &i);
if (ret)
*data = (size_t)i;
return ret;
}
/*
* Peek ahead at 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
* |*data|
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_4(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned long *data)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4)
return 0;
*data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 24;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 16;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 8;
*data |= *(pkt->curr + 3);
return 1;
}
/* Equivalent of n2l */
/* Get 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_net_4(pkt, data))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, 4);
return 1;
}
/* Same as PACKET_get_net_4() but for a size_t */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4_len(PACKET *pkt, size_t *data)
{
unsigned long i;
int ret = PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &i);
if (ret)
*data = (size_t)i;
return ret;
}
/* Peek ahead at 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_1(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int *data)
{
if (!PACKET_remaining(pkt))
return 0;
*data = *pkt->curr;
return 1;
}
/* Get 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_1(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_1(pkt, data))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, 1);
return 1;
}
/* Same as PACKET_get_1() but for a size_t */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_1_len(PACKET *pkt, size_t *data)
{
unsigned int i;
int ret = PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i);
if (ret)
*data = (size_t)i;
return ret;
}
/*
* Peek ahead at 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value
* in |*data|
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_4(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned long *data)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4)
return 0;
*data = *pkt->curr;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 16;
*data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 3))) << 24;
return 1;
}
/* Equivalent of c2l */
/*
* Get 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value in
* |*data|
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_4(pkt, data))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, 4);
return 1;
}
/*
* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in
* |*data|. This just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The
* caller should not free this data directly (it will be freed when the
* underlying buffer gets freed
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
const unsigned char **data,
size_t len)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
return 0;
*data = pkt->curr;
return 1;
}
/*
* Read |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in |*data|. This
* just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The caller should
* not free this data directly (it will be freed when the underlying buffer gets
* freed
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
const unsigned char **data,
size_t len)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, data, len))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, len);
return 1;
}
/* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data| */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned char *data,
size_t len)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
return 0;
memcpy(data, pkt->curr, len);
return 1;
}
/*
* Read |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data|.
* The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
unsigned char *data, size_t len)
{
if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len))
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, len);
return 1;
}
/*
* Copy packet data to |dest|, and set |len| to the number of copied bytes.
* If the packet has more than |dest_len| bytes, nothing is copied.
* Returns 1 if the packet data fits in |dest_len| bytes, 0 otherwise.
* Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing
* done with a given PACKET).
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_all(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned char *dest,
size_t dest_len, size_t *len)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > dest_len) {
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
*len = pkt->remaining;
memcpy(dest, pkt->curr, pkt->remaining);
return 1;
}
/*
* Copy |pkt| bytes to a newly allocated buffer and store a pointer to the
* result in |*data|, and the length in |len|.
* If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd.
* If the packet is empty, or malloc fails, |*data| will be set to NULL.
* Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise.
* Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing
* done with a given PACKET).
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_memdup(const PACKET *pkt,
unsigned char **data, size_t *len)
{
size_t length;
OPENSSL_free(*data);
*data = NULL;
*len = 0;
length = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
if (length == 0)
return 1;
*data = OPENSSL_memdup(pkt->curr, length);
if (*data == NULL)
return 0;
*len = length;
return 1;
}
/*
* Read a C string from |pkt| and copy to a newly allocated, NUL-terminated
* buffer. Store a pointer to the result in |*data|.
* If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd.
* If the data in |pkt| does not contain a NUL-byte, the entire data is
* copied and NUL-terminated.
* Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise.
* Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing done
* with a given PACKET).
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_strndup(const PACKET *pkt, char **data)
{
OPENSSL_free(*data);
/* This will succeed on an empty packet, unless pkt->curr == NULL. */
*data = OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)pkt->curr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
return (*data != NULL);
}
/* Returns 1 if |pkt| contains at least one 0-byte, 0 otherwise. */
static ossl_inline int PACKET_contains_zero_byte(const PACKET *pkt)
{
return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL;
}
/* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
return 0;
packet_forward(pkt, len);
return 1;
}
/*
* Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a one-byte length, and stores
* the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
* Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
* the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
* Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt)
{
unsigned int length;
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
return 0;
}
*pkt = tmp;
subpkt->curr = data;
subpkt->remaining = length;
return 1;
}
/*
* Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1, but additionally, fails when there are
* leftover bytes in |pkt|.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt)
{
unsigned int length;
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) ||
PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) {
return 0;
}
*pkt = tmp;
subpkt->curr = data;
subpkt->remaining = length;
return 1;
}
/*
* Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a two-byte length, and stores
* the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
* Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
* the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
* Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt)
{
unsigned int length;
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) ||
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
return 0;
}
*pkt = tmp;
subpkt->curr = data;
subpkt->remaining = length;
return 1;
}
/*
* Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2, but additionally, fails when there are
* leftover bytes in |pkt|.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt)
{
unsigned int length;
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) ||
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) ||
PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) {
return 0;
}
*pkt = tmp;
subpkt->curr = data;
subpkt->remaining = length;
return 1;
}
/*
* Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a three-byte length, and stores
* the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
* Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
* the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
* Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
*/
__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(PACKET *pkt,
PACKET *subpkt)
{
unsigned long length;
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&tmp, &length) ||
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
return 0;
}
*pkt = tmp;
subpkt->curr = data;
subpkt->remaining = length;
return 1;
}
/* Writeable packets */
typedef struct wpacket_sub WPACKET_SUB;
struct wpacket_sub {
/* The parent WPACKET_SUB if we have one or NULL otherwise */
WPACKET_SUB *parent;
/*
* Offset into the buffer where the length of this WPACKET goes. We use an
* offset in case the buffer grows and gets reallocated.
*/
size_t packet_len;
/* Number of bytes in the packet_len or 0 if we don't write the length */
size_t lenbytes;
/* Number of bytes written to the buf prior to this packet starting */
size_t pwritten;
/* Flags for this sub-packet */
unsigned int flags;
};
typedef struct wpacket_st WPACKET;
struct wpacket_st {
/* The buffer where we store the output data */
BUF_MEM *buf;
/* Fixed sized buffer which can be used as an alternative to buf */
unsigned char *staticbuf;
/*
* Offset into the buffer where we are currently writing. We use an offset
* in case the buffer grows and gets reallocated.
*/
size_t curr;
/* Number of bytes written so far */
size_t written;
/* Maximum number of bytes we will allow to be written to this WPACKET */
size_t maxsize;
/* Our sub-packets (always at least one if not finished) */
WPACKET_SUB *subs;
};
/* Flags */
/* Default */
#define WPACKET_FLAGS_NONE 0
/* Error on WPACKET_close() if no data written to the WPACKET */
#define WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH 1
/*
* Abandon all changes on WPACKET_close() if no data written to the WPACKET,
* i.e. this does not write out a zero packet length
*/
#define WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH 2
/*
* Initialise a WPACKET with the buffer in |buf|. The buffer must exist
* for the whole time that the WPACKET is being used. Additionally |lenbytes| of
* data is preallocated at the start of the buffer to store the length of the
* WPACKET once we know it.
*/
int WPACKET_init_len(WPACKET *pkt, BUF_MEM *buf, size_t lenbytes);
/*
* Same as WPACKET_init_len except there is no preallocation of the WPACKET
* length.
*/
int WPACKET_init(WPACKET *pkt, BUF_MEM *buf);
/*
* Same as WPACKET_init_len except we do not use a growable BUF_MEM structure.
* A fixed buffer of memory |buf| of size |len| is used instead. A failure will
* occur if you attempt to write beyond the end of the buffer
*/
int WPACKET_init_static_len(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
size_t lenbytes);
/*
* Set the flags to be applied to the current sub-packet
*/
int WPACKET_set_flags(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int flags);
/*
* Closes the most recent sub-packet. It also writes out the length of the
* packet to the required location (normally the start of the WPACKET) if
* appropriate. The top level WPACKET should be closed using WPACKET_finish()
* instead of this function.
*/
int WPACKET_close(WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* The same as WPACKET_close() but only for the top most WPACKET. Additionally
* frees memory resources for this WPACKET.
*/
int WPACKET_finish(WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* Iterate through all the sub-packets and write out their lengths as if they
* were being closed. The lengths will be overwritten with the final lengths
* when the sub-packets are eventually closed (which may be different if more
* data is added to the WPACKET). This function fails if a sub-packet is of 0
* length and WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH is set.
*/
int WPACKET_fill_lengths(WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* Initialise a new sub-packet. Additionally |lenbytes| of data is preallocated
* at the start of the sub-packet to store its length once we know it. Don't
* call this directly. Use the convenience macros below instead.
*/
int WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t lenbytes);
/*
* Convenience macros for calling WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len with different
* lengths
*/
#define WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) \
WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__((pkt), 1)
#define WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) \
WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__((pkt), 2)
#define WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) \
WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__((pkt), 3)
#define WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u32(pkt) \
WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__((pkt), 4)
/*
* Same as WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len__() except no bytes are pre-allocated
* for the sub-packet length.
*/
int WPACKET_start_sub_packet(WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* Allocate bytes in the WPACKET for the output. This reserves the bytes
* and counts them as "written", but doesn't actually do the writing. A pointer
* to the allocated bytes is stored in |*allocbytes|. |allocbytes| may be NULL.
* WARNING: the allocated bytes must be filled in immediately, without further
* WPACKET_* calls. If not then the underlying buffer may be realloc'd and
* change its location.
*/
int WPACKET_allocate_bytes(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len,
unsigned char **allocbytes);
/*
* The same as WPACKET_allocate_bytes() except additionally a new sub-packet is
* started for the allocated bytes, and then closed immediately afterwards. The
* number of length bytes for the sub-packet is in |lenbytes|. Don't call this
* directly. Use the convenience macros below instead.
*/
int WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len,
unsigned char **allocbytes, size_t lenbytes);
/*
* Convenience macros for calling WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes with different
* lengths
*/
#define WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 1)
#define WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 2)
#define WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 3)
#define WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u32(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 4)
/*
* The same as WPACKET_allocate_bytes() except the reserved bytes are not
* actually counted as written. Typically this will be for when we don't know
* how big arbitrary data is going to be up front, but we do know what the
* maximum size will be. If this function is used, then it should be immediately
* followed by a WPACKET_allocate_bytes() call before any other WPACKET
* functions are called (unless the write to the allocated bytes is abandoned).
*
* For example: If we are generating a signature, then the size of that
* signature may not be known in advance. We can use WPACKET_reserve_bytes() to
* handle this:
*
* if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(&pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey), &sigbytes1)
* || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
* || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(&pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
* || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2)
* goto err;
*/
int WPACKET_reserve_bytes(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len, unsigned char **allocbytes);
/*
* The "reserve_bytes" equivalent of WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes__()
*/
int WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, size_t len,
unsigned char **allocbytes, size_t lenbytes);
/*
* Convenience macros for WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes with different lengths
*/
#define WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u8(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_reserve_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 1)
#define WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 2)
#define WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u24(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 3)
#define WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u32(pkt, len, bytes) \
WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes__((pkt), (len), (bytes), 4)
/*
* Write the value stored in |val| into the WPACKET. The value will consume
* |bytes| amount of storage. An error will occur if |val| cannot be
* accommodated in |bytes| storage, e.g. attempting to write the value 256 into
* 1 byte will fail. Don't call this directly. Use the convenience macros below
* instead.
*/
int WPACKET_put_bytes__(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int val, size_t bytes);
/*
* Convenience macros for calling WPACKET_put_bytes with different
* lengths
*/
#define WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, val) \
WPACKET_put_bytes__((pkt), (val), 1)
#define WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, val) \
WPACKET_put_bytes__((pkt), (val), 2)
#define WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, val) \
WPACKET_put_bytes__((pkt), (val), 3)
#define WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, val) \
WPACKET_put_bytes__((pkt), (val), 4)
/* Set a maximum size that we will not allow the WPACKET to grow beyond */
int WPACKET_set_max_size(WPACKET *pkt, size_t maxsize);
/* Copy |len| bytes of data from |*src| into the WPACKET. */
int WPACKET_memcpy(WPACKET *pkt, const void *src, size_t len);
/* Set |len| bytes of data to |ch| into the WPACKET. */
int WPACKET_memset(WPACKET *pkt, int ch, size_t len);
/*
* Copy |len| bytes of data from |*src| into the WPACKET and prefix with its
* length (consuming |lenbytes| of data for the length). Don't call this
* directly. Use the convenience macros below instead.
*/
int WPACKET_sub_memcpy__(WPACKET *pkt, const void *src, size_t len,
size_t lenbytes);
/* Convenience macros for calling WPACKET_sub_memcpy with different lengths */
#define WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, src, len) \
WPACKET_sub_memcpy__((pkt), (src), (len), 1)
#define WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, src, len) \
WPACKET_sub_memcpy__((pkt), (src), (len), 2)
#define WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, src, len) \
WPACKET_sub_memcpy__((pkt), (src), (len), 3)
#define WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u32(pkt, src, len) \
WPACKET_sub_memcpy__((pkt), (src), (len), 4)
/*
* Return the total number of bytes written so far to the underlying buffer
* including any storage allocated for length bytes
*/
int WPACKET_get_total_written(WPACKET *pkt, size_t *written);
/*
* Returns the length of the current sub-packet. This excludes any bytes
* allocated for the length itself.
*/
int WPACKET_get_length(WPACKET *pkt, size_t *len);
/*
* Returns a pointer to the current write location, but does not allocate any
* bytes.
*/
unsigned char *WPACKET_get_curr(WPACKET *pkt);
/* Release resources in a WPACKET if a failure has occurred. */
void WPACKET_cleanup(WPACKET *pkt);
#endif /* HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H */

158
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/pqueue.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
struct pqueue_st {
pitem *items;
int count;
};
pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data)
{
pitem *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item));
if (item == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_PITEM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(item->priority, prio64be, sizeof(item->priority));
item->data = data;
item->next = NULL;
return item;
}
void pitem_free(pitem *item)
{
OPENSSL_free(item);
}
pqueue *pqueue_new(void)
{
pqueue *pq = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pq));
if (pq == NULL)
SSLerr(SSL_F_PQUEUE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return pq;
}
void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq)
{
OPENSSL_free(pq);
}
pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item)
{
pitem *curr, *next;
if (pq->items == NULL) {
pq->items = item;
return item;
}
for (curr = NULL, next = pq->items;
next != NULL; curr = next, next = next->next) {
/*
* we can compare 64-bit value in big-endian encoding with memcmp:-)
*/
int cmp = memcmp(next->priority, item->priority, 8);
if (cmp > 0) { /* next > item */
item->next = next;
if (curr == NULL)
pq->items = item;
else
curr->next = item;
return item;
}
else if (cmp == 0) /* duplicates not allowed */
return NULL;
}
item->next = NULL;
curr->next = item;
return item;
}
pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq)
{
return pq->items;
}
pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq)
{
pitem *item = pq->items;
if (pq->items != NULL)
pq->items = pq->items->next;
return item;
}
pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be)
{
pitem *next;
pitem *found = NULL;
if (pq->items == NULL)
return NULL;
for (next = pq->items; next->next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0) {
found = next;
break;
}
}
/* check the one last node */
if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0)
found = next;
if (!found)
return NULL;
return found;
}
pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq)
{
return pqueue_peek(pq);
}
pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *item)
{
pitem *ret;
if (item == NULL || *item == NULL)
return NULL;
/* *item != NULL */
ret = *item;
*item = (*item)->next;
return ret;
}
size_t pqueue_size(pqueue *pq)
{
pitem *item = pq->items;
size_t count = 0;
while (item != NULL) {
count++;
item = item->next;
}
return count;
}

74
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/README vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
Record Layer Design
===================
This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the
record layer code to aid future maintenance.
The record layer is divided into a number of components. At the time of writing
there are four: SSL3_RECORD, SSL3_BUFFER, DLTS1_BITMAP and RECORD_LAYER. Each
of these components is defined by:
1) A struct definition of the same name as the component
2) A set of source files that define the functions for that component
3) A set of accessor macros
All struct definitions are in record.h. The functions and macros are either
defined in record.h or record_locl.h dependent on whether they are intended to
be private to the record layer, or whether they form part of the API to the rest
of libssl.
The source files map to components as follows:
dtls1_bitmap.c -> DTLS1_BITMAP component
ssl3_buffer.c -> SSL3_BUFFER component
ssl3_record.c -> SSL3_RECORD component
rec_layer_s3.c, rec_layer_d1.c -> RECORD_LAYER component
The RECORD_LAYER component is a facade pattern, i.e. it provides a simplified
interface to the record layer for the rest of libssl. The other 3 components are
entirely private to the record layer and therefore should never be accessed
directly by libssl.
Any component can directly access its own members - they are private to that
component, e.g. ssl3_buffer.c can access members of the SSL3_BUFFER struct
without using a macro. No component can directly access the members of another
component, e.g. ssl3_buffer cannot reach inside the RECORD_LAYER component to
directly access its members. Instead components use accessor macros, so if code
in ssl3_buffer.c wants to access the members of the RECORD_LAYER it uses the
RECORD_LAYER_* macros.
Conceptually it looks like this:
libssl
|
---------------------------|-----record.h--------------------------------------
|
_______V______________
| |
| RECORD_LAYER |
| |
| rec_layer_s3.c |
| ^ |
| _________|__________ |
|| ||
|| DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER ||
|| ||
|| rec_layer_d1.c ||
||____________________||
|______________________|
record_locl.h ^ ^ ^
_________________| | |_________________
| | |
_____V_________ ______V________ _______V________
| | | | | |
| SSL3_BUFFER | | SSL3_RECORD | | DTLS1_BITMAP |
| |--->| | | |
| ssl3_buffer.c | | ssl3_record.c | | dtls1_bitmap.c |
|_______________| |_______________| |________________|
The two RECORD_LAYER source files build on each other, i.e.
the main one is rec_layer_s3.c which provides the core SSL/TLS layer. The second
one is rec_layer_d1.c which builds off of the SSL/TLS code to provide DTLS
specific capabilities. It uses some DTLS specific RECORD_LAYER component members
which should only be accessed from rec_layer_d1.c. These are held in the
DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER struct.

78
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "record_locl.h"
/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
{
int64_t ret;
uint64_t l1, l2;
n2l8(v1, l1);
n2l8(v2, l2);
ret = l1 - l2;
/* We do not permit wrap-around */
if (l1 > l2 && ret < 0)
return 128;
else if (l2 > l1 && ret > 0)
return -128;
if (ret > 128)
return 128;
else if (ret < -128)
return -128;
else
return (int)ret;
}
int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
const unsigned char *seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
if (cmp > 0) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
return 1; /* this record in new */
}
shift = -cmp;
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
return 0; /* record previously received */
SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
return 1;
}
void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
const unsigned char *seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
if (cmp > 0) {
shift = cmp;
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
else
bitmap->map = 1UL;
memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
} else {
shift = -cmp;
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
}
}

1059
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1771
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

236
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/record.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* These structures should be considered PRIVATE to the record layer. No *
* non-record layer code should be using these structures in any way. *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
/* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
unsigned char *buf;
/* default buffer size (or 0 if no default set) */
size_t default_len;
/* buffer size */
size_t len;
/* where to 'copy from' */
size_t offset;
/* how many bytes left */
size_t left;
} SSL3_BUFFER;
#define SEQ_NUM_SIZE 8
typedef struct ssl3_record_st {
/* Record layer version */
/* r */
int rec_version;
/* type of record */
/* r */
int type;
/* How many bytes available */
/* rw */
size_t length;
/*
* How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used
* to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records.
*/
/* rw */
size_t orig_len;
/* read/write offset into 'buf' */
/* r */
size_t off;
/* pointer to the record data */
/* rw */
unsigned char *data;
/* where the decode bytes are */
/* rw */
unsigned char *input;
/* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
/* r */
unsigned char *comp;
/* Whether the data from this record has already been read or not */
/* r */
unsigned int read;
/* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
/* r */
unsigned long epoch;
/* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
/* r */
unsigned char seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
} SSL3_RECORD;
typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st {
/* Track 32 packets on 32-bit systems and 64 - on 64-bit systems */
unsigned long map;
/* Max record number seen so far, 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */
unsigned char max_seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
} DTLS1_BITMAP;
typedef struct record_pqueue_st {
unsigned short epoch;
struct pqueue_st *q;
} record_pqueue;
typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st {
unsigned char *packet;
size_t packet_length;
SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
SSL3_RECORD rrec;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo;
#endif
} DTLS1_RECORD_DATA;
typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st {
/*
* The current data and handshake epoch. This is initially
* undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is
* completed
*/
unsigned short r_epoch;
unsigned short w_epoch;
/* records being received in the current epoch */
DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap;
/* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */
DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap;
/* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */
record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
record_pqueue processed_rcds;
/*
* Buffered application records. Only for records between CCS and
* Finished to prevent either protocol violation or unnecessary message
* loss.
*/
record_pqueue buffered_app_data;
/* save last and current sequence numbers for retransmissions */
unsigned char last_write_sequence[8];
unsigned char curr_write_sequence[8];
} DTLS_RECORD_LAYER;
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the *
* record layer. No non-record layer code should be accessing the members of *
* this structure. *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
typedef struct record_layer_st {
/* The parent SSL structure */
SSL *s;
/*
* Read as many input bytes as possible (for
* non-blocking reads)
*/
int read_ahead;
/* where we are when reading */
int rstate;
/* How many pipelines can be used to read data */
size_t numrpipes;
/* How many pipelines can be used to write data */
size_t numwpipes;
/* read IO goes into here */
SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
/* write IO goes into here */
SSL3_BUFFER wbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
/* each decoded record goes in here */
SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
/* used internally to point at a raw packet */
unsigned char *packet;
size_t packet_length;
/* number of bytes sent so far */
size_t wnum;
unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
size_t handshake_fragment_len;
/* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
size_t empty_record_count;
/* partial write - check the numbers match */
/* number bytes written */
size_t wpend_tot;
int wpend_type;
/* number of bytes submitted */
size_t wpend_ret;
const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
/* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
unsigned int is_first_record;
/* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */
unsigned int alert_count;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
} RECORD_LAYER;
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the *
* record layer. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
#define MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN 9
#define RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(rl, ra) ((rl)->read_ahead = (ra))
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(rl) ((rl)->read_ahead)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(rl) ((rl)->packet)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length)
#define RECORD_LAYER_add_packet_length(rl, inc) ((rl)->packet_length += (inc))
#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->w_epoch)
#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(rl) \
((rl)->d->processed_rcds)
#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(rl) \
((rl)->d->unprocessed_rcds)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(rl) (&(rl)->rbuf)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(rl) ((rl)->wbuf)
void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s);
void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
__owur size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, size_t len,
size_t *written);
int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written);
__owur int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek,
size_t *readbytes);
__owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send);
__owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
__owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
size_t *written);
__owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send);
__owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
__owur int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send);
int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq);
__owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek,
size_t *readbytes);
__owur int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, size_t len,
size_t *written);
int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written);
void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq,
size_t off);

116
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/record_locl.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* The following macros/functions are PRIVATE to the record layer. They *
* should NOT be used outside of the record layer. *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
#define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5
/* Functions/macros provided by the RECORD_LAYER component */
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(rl) ((rl)->rrec)
#define RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(rl, p) ((rl)->packet = (p))
#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length = 0)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(rl) ((rl)->rstate)
#define RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(rl, st) ((rl)->rstate = (st))
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(rl) ((rl)->read_sequence)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(rl) ((rl)->write_sequence)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl) ((rl)->numrpipes)
#define RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(rl, n) ((rl)->numrpipes = (n))
#define RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count++)
#define RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(rl) \
((rl)->empty_record_count = 0)
#define RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count)
#define RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record)
#define RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 1)
#define RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 0)
#define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->r_epoch)
__owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
size_t *readbytes);
DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s);
int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue);
int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority);
void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
/* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */
int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_BUFFER component */
#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(b) ((b)->buf)
#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(b, n) ((b)->buf = (n))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(b) ((b)->len)
#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(b, l) ((b)->len = (l))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(b) ((b)->left)
#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(b, l) ((b)->left = (l))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(b, l) ((b)->left -= (l))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(b) ((b)->offset)
#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset = (o))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset += (o))
#define SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(b) ((b)->buf != NULL)
#define SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(b, l) ((b)->default_len = (l))
void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b);
void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, size_t n);
void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b);
__owur int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, size_t numwpipes, size_t len);
int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
/* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_RECORD component */
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_type(r) ((r)->type)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_type(r, t) ((r)->type = (t))
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(r, v) ((r)->rec_version = (v))
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_length(r) ((r)->length)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_length(r, l) ((r)->length = (l))
#define SSL3_RECORD_add_length(r, l) ((r)->length += (l))
#define SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(r, l) ((r)->length -= (l))
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_data(r) ((r)->data)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_data(r, d) ((r)->data = (d))
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_input(r) ((r)->input)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_input(r, i) ((r)->input = (i))
#define SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(r) ((r)->input = (r)->data)
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(r) ((r)->seq_num)
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_off(r) ((r)->off)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_off(r, o) ((r)->off = (o))
#define SSL3_RECORD_add_off(r, o) ((r)->off += (o))
#define SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(r) ((r)->epoch)
#define SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(r) \
((r)->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION)
#define SSL3_RECORD_is_read(r) ((r)->read)
#define SSL3_RECORD_set_read(r) ((r)->read = 1)
void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t);
void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs);
void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num);
int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr);
__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr);
int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size);
__owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
__owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
__owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send);

179
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "record_locl.h"
void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, size_t n)
{
if (d != NULL)
memcpy(b->buf, d, n);
b->left = n;
b->offset = 0;
}
/*
* Clear the contents of an SSL3_BUFFER but retain any memory allocated. Also
* retains the default_len setting
*/
void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b)
{
b->offset = 0;
b->left = 0;
}
void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b)
{
OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
b->buf = NULL;
}
int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
SSL3_BUFFER *b;
b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
#endif
if (b->buf == NULL) {
len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if (b->default_len > len)
len = b->default_len;
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
/*
* We've got a malloc failure, and we're still initialising buffers.
* We assume we're so doomed that we won't even be able to send an
* alert.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
b->buf = p;
b->len = len;
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(&s->rlayer, &(b->buf[0]));
return 1;
}
int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, size_t numwpipes, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t align = 0, headerlen;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
size_t currpipe;
s->rlayer.numwpipes = numwpipes;
if (len == 0) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
#endif
len = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
}
wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
for (currpipe = 0; currpipe < numwpipes; currpipe++) {
SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb = &wb[currpipe];
if (thiswb->buf != NULL && thiswb->len != len) {
OPENSSL_free(thiswb->buf);
thiswb->buf = NULL; /* force reallocation */
}
if (thiswb->buf == NULL) {
p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (p == NULL) {
s->rlayer.numwpipes = currpipe;
/*
* We've got a malloc failure, and we're still initialising
* buffers. We assume we're so doomed that we won't even be able
* to send an alert.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memset(thiswb, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
thiswb->buf = p;
thiswb->len = len;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
size_t pipes;
pipes = s->rlayer.numwpipes;
while (pipes > 0) {
wb = &RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)[pipes - 1];
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
wb->buf = NULL;
pipes--;
}
s->rlayer.numwpipes = 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_BUFFER *b;
b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
b->buf = NULL;
return 1;
}

2057
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

196
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "record_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
/*-
* tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
* internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
unsigned char *staticiv;
unsigned char *seq;
int lenu, lenf;
SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
uint32_t alg_enc;
WPACKET wpkt;
if (n_recs != 1) {
/* Should not happen */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
staticiv = s->write_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
staticiv = s->read_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
/*
* If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
* plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
* plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
* far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
*/
if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
rec->input = rec->data;
return 1;
}
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
if (s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0) {
alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
} else {
if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
&& s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
} else {
/*
* To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
* be NULL
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) {
if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) {
taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) {
taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!sending) {
/*
* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
* well as the tag
*/
if (rec->length < taglen + 1)
return 0;
rec->length -= taglen;
}
/* Set up IV */
if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
/* Should not happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
/* Increment the sequence counter */
for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
++seq[loop - 1];
if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
break;
}
if (loop == 0) {
/* Sequence has wrapped */
return -1;
}
/* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
|| (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
return -1;
}
/* Set up the AAD */
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + taglen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
|| hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
return -1;
}
/*
* For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
* any AAD.
*/
if (((alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) != 0
&& EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
/* Add the tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
rec->length += taglen;
}
return 1;
}

487
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/s3_cbc.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
/*
* Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
/*
* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
* length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
*/
#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
/*
* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
* Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
* supported by TLS.)
*/
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
/*
* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
* little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
*/
#define u32toLE(n, p) \
(*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
/*
* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
* standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such
* a function typically does.
*/
static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
}
static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
}
static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
}
}
static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
}
}
#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
/*
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
* which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
*/
char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha224:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
case NID_sha512:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*-
* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
* record.
*
* ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
* md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
* md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
* header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
* data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV.
* data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
* once the padding has been removed.
* data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
* record, including padding.
* is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
*
* On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
* functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
* a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
* padding too. )
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
*/
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
const unsigned char *data,
size_t data_plus_mac_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const unsigned char *mac_secret,
size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
{
union {
double align;
unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
} md_state;
void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
size_t md_size, md_block_size = 64;
size_t sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
size_t bits; /* at most 18 bits */
unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t i, j;
unsigned md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
/*
* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
* terminates * the hash.
*/
size_t md_length_size = 8;
char length_is_big_endian = 1;
int ret;
/*
* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
* many possible overflows later in this function.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
return 0;
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
md_size = 16;
sslv3_pad_length = 48;
length_is_big_endian = 0;
break;
case NID_sha1:
if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
md_size = 20;
break;
case NID_sha224:
if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 224 / 8;
break;
case NID_sha256:
if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 32;
break;
case NID_sha384:
if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
md_size = 384 / 8;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
break;
case NID_sha512:
if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
md_size = 64;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
break;
default:
/*
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
* check that the hash function is supported.
*/
if (md_out_size != NULL)
*md_out_size = 0;
return ossl_assert(0);
}
if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES)
|| !ossl_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| !ossl_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
return 0;
header_length = 13;
if (is_sslv3) {
header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence
* number */ +
1 /* record type */ +
2 /* record length */ ;
}
/*
* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
* calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
* padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of
* the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively
* assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes
* of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
* block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
* TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
* required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final |variance_blocks|
* blocks can
* vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
* short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
* variance_blocks can be reduced.
*/
variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : ( ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1);
/*
* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
* bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
* (SSLv3)
*/
len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
/*
* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC,
* including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
*/
max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
/* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
num_blocks =
(max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size -
1) / md_block_size;
/*
* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the
* final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end
* to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't
* leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed
* right away because no padding value can affect whether they are
* plaintext.
*/
num_starting_blocks = 0;
/*
* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
* we start processing.
*/
k = 0;
/*
* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
*/
mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
/*
* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
* application data.
*/
c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
/*
* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
* value.
*/
index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
/*
* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length,
* in bits.
*/
index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
/*
* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block
* for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3.
*/
/*
* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at
* least two because the header is larger than a single block.
*/
if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
}
bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
if (!is_sslv3) {
/*
* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret
* bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a
* single block.
*/
bits += 8 * md_block_size;
memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)))
return 0;
memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
}
if (length_is_big_endian) {
memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
} else {
memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
}
if (k > 0) {
if (is_sslv3) {
size_t overhang;
/*
* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
* the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
* consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
* ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
* therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
* greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
* in case
*/
if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
/* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
md_transform(md_state.c, header);
memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++)
md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang);
} else {
/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++)
md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
}
}
memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
/*
* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it
* in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
* bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
* constant time, to |mac_out|.
*/
for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
i++) {
unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_a);
unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_b);
for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
if (k < header_length)
b = header[k];
else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
b = data[k - header_length];
k++;
is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c);
is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c + 1);
/*
* If this is the block containing the end of the application
* data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
* overwrite b with 0x80.
*/
b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
/*
* If this block contains the end of the application data
* and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
*/
b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
/*
* If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end
* of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a
* and we're having to add an extra block of zeros.
*/
b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
/*
* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length.
*/
if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b,
length_bytes[j -
(md_block_size -
md_length_size)], b);
}
block[j] = b;
}
md_transform(md_state.c, block);
md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
/* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx), NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
goto err;
if (is_sslv3) {
/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
}
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
if (ret && md_out_size)
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 0;
}

595
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/s3_enc.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *m5;
EVP_MD_CTX *s1;
unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char c = 'A';
unsigned int i, j, k;
int ret = 0;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii[c]; /* 'A' in ASCII */
#endif
k = 0;
m5 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
s1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (m5 == NULL || s1 == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
k++;
if (k > sizeof(buf)) {
/* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (j = 0; j < k; j++)
buf[j] = c;
c++;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, buf, k)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(s1, smd, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(m5, EVP_md5(), NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, smd, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(km, smd, (num - i));
} else {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, km, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, sizeof(smd));
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m5);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(s1);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
COMP_METHOD *comp;
#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
int mdi;
size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
/* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
if (!ossl_assert(m != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
comp = NULL;
else
comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
#endif
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
reuse_dd = 1;
} else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
} else {
/*
* make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
}
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
if (s->expand == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
} else {
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
reuse_dd = 1;
} else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
} else {
/*
* make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
}
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
if (s->compress == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
}
if (reuse_dd)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
mdi = EVP_MD_size(m);
if (mdi < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
i = mdi;
cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
j = cl;
k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
ms = &(p[0]);
n = i + i;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + j;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k + k;
} else {
n = i;
ms = &(p[n]);
n += i + j;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + k;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k;
}
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
int ret = 0;
SSL_COMP *comp;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return 1;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#else
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
#endif
num = EVP_MD_size(hash);
if (num < 0)
return 0;
num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num);
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) {
/*
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
}
}
return ret;
}
void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
}
int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
{
BIO *buf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (buf == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = buf;
(void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
return 1;
}
/*
* Free digest list. Also frees handshake buffer since they are always freed
* together.
*/
void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
{
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
}
int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
int ret;
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
/* Note: this writes to a memory BIO so a failure is a fatal error */
if (len > INT_MAX) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINISH_MAC,
SSL_R_OVERFLOW_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ret = BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, (int)len);
if (ret <= 0 || ret != (int)len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
ret = EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, buf, len);
if (!ret) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
long hdatalen;
void *hdata;
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
s->s3->handshake_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, hdata, hdatalen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (keep == 0) {
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
size_t ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, size_t len,
unsigned char *p)
{
int ret;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst) != NID_md5_sha1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
|| EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
(int)s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, p, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = 0;
}
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
{
static const unsigned char *salt[3] = {
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
(const unsigned char *)"A",
(const unsigned char *)"BB",
(const unsigned char *)"CCC",
#else
(const unsigned char *)"\x41",
(const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
(const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
#endif
};
unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
int i, ret = 1;
unsigned int n;
size_t ret_secret_size = 0;
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt[i],
strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
/* TODO(size_t) : convert me */
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, n) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = 0;
break;
}
out += n;
ret_secret_size += n;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret)
*secret_size = ret_secret_size;
return ret;
}
int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code) {
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
return -1; /* Don't send it :-) */
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
default:
return -1;
}
}

4864
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/s3_lib.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

104
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/s3_msg.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if (s->server)
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
else
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
return 0;
}
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
return 0;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s))
desc = tls13_alert_code(desc);
else
desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
* protocol_version alerts */
if (desc < 0)
return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
if (!RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
/* data still being written out? */
return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
}
/*
* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
* the future
*/
return -1;
}
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
{
int i, j;
size_t alertlen;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
size_t written;
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
alertlen = 2;
i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], &alertlen, 1, 0,
&written);
if (i <= 0) {
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
} else {
/*
* Alert sent to BIO - now flush. If the message does not get sent due
* to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much.
*/
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
}
}
return i;
}

393
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_asn1.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
typedef struct {
uint32_t version;
int32_t ssl_version;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cipher;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *comp_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *master_key;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key_arg;
int64_t time;
int64_t timeout;
X509 *peer;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id_context;
int32_t verify_result;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_hostname;
uint64_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
uint32_t tlsext_tick_age_add;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_tick;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity_hint;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *srp_username;
#endif
uint64_t flags;
uint32_t max_early_data;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *alpn_selected;
uint32_t tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ticket_appdata;
} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) = {
ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, version, UINT32),
ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ssl_version, INT32),
ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, cipher, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, master_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, key_arg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, time, ZINT64, 1),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, timeout, ZINT64, 2),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, peer, X509, 3),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id_context, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, verify_result, ZINT32, 5),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_hostname, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity_hint, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8),
#endif
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, ZUINT64, 9),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, comp_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, srp_username, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12),
#endif
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, flags, ZUINT64, 13),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_age_add, ZUINT32, 14),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, max_early_data, ZUINT32, 15),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, alpn_selected, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 16),
ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode, ZUINT32, 17),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ticket_appdata, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 18)
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SSL_SESSION_ASN1)
IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(SSL_SESSION_ASN1)
/* Utility functions for i2d_SSL_SESSION */
/* Initialise OCTET STRING from buffer and length */
static void ssl_session_oinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
unsigned char *data, size_t len)
{
os->data = data;
os->length = (int)len;
os->flags = 0;
*dest = os;
}
/* Initialise OCTET STRING from string */
static void ssl_session_sinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
char *data)
{
if (data != NULL)
ssl_session_oinit(dest, os, (unsigned char *)data, strlen(data));
else
*dest = NULL;
}
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
{
SSL_SESSION_ASN1 as;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
unsigned char cipher_data[2];
ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key, session_id, sid_ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
unsigned char comp_id_data;
#endif
ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname, tlsext_tick;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity, psk_identity_hint;
#endif
ASN1_OCTET_STRING alpn_selected;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING ticket_appdata;
long l;
if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
return 0;
memset(&as, 0, sizeof(as));
as.version = SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION;
as.ssl_version = in->ssl_version;
if (in->cipher == NULL)
l = in->cipher_id;
else
l = in->cipher->id;
cipher_data[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
cipher_data[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
ssl_session_oinit(&as.cipher, &cipher, cipher_data, 2);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (in->compress_meth) {
comp_id_data = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
ssl_session_oinit(&as.comp_id, &comp_id, &comp_id_data, 1);
}
#endif
ssl_session_oinit(&as.master_key, &master_key,
in->master_key, in->master_key_length);
ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id, &session_id,
in->session_id, in->session_id_length);
ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id_context, &sid_ctx,
in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length);
as.time = in->time;
as.timeout = in->timeout;
as.verify_result = in->verify_result;
as.peer = in->peer;
ssl_session_sinit(&as.tlsext_hostname, &tlsext_hostname,
in->ext.hostname);
if (in->ext.tick) {
ssl_session_oinit(&as.tlsext_tick, &tlsext_tick,
in->ext.tick, in->ext.ticklen);
}
if (in->ext.tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
as.tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = in->ext.tick_lifetime_hint;
as.tlsext_tick_age_add = in->ext.tick_age_add;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity_hint, &psk_identity_hint,
in->psk_identity_hint);
ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity, &psk_identity, in->psk_identity);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ssl_session_sinit(&as.srp_username, &srp_username, in->srp_username);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
as.flags = in->flags;
as.max_early_data = in->ext.max_early_data;
if (in->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)
as.alpn_selected = NULL;
else
ssl_session_oinit(&as.alpn_selected, &alpn_selected,
in->ext.alpn_selected, in->ext.alpn_selected_len);
as.tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode = in->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
if (in->ticket_appdata == NULL)
as.ticket_appdata = NULL;
else
ssl_session_oinit(&as.ticket_appdata, &ticket_appdata,
in->ticket_appdata, in->ticket_appdata_len);
return i2d_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(&as, pp);
}
/* Utility functions for d2i_SSL_SESSION */
/* OPENSSL_strndup an OCTET STRING */
static int ssl_session_strndup(char **pdst, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src)
{
OPENSSL_free(*pdst);
*pdst = NULL;
if (src == NULL)
return 1;
*pdst = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)src->data, src->length);
if (*pdst == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* Copy an OCTET STRING, return error if it exceeds maximum length */
static int ssl_session_memcpy(unsigned char *dst, size_t *pdstlen,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src, size_t maxlen)
{
if (src == NULL) {
*pdstlen = 0;
return 1;
}
if (src->length < 0 || src->length > (int)maxlen)
return 0;
memcpy(dst, src->data, src->length);
*pdstlen = src->length;
return 1;
}
SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
long id;
size_t tmpl;
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
SSL_SESSION_ASN1 *as = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
as = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(NULL, &p, length);
/* ASN.1 code returns suitable error */
if (as == NULL)
goto err;
if (!a || !*a) {
ret = SSL_SESSION_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
ret = *a;
}
if (as->version != SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
if ((as->ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&& (as->ssl_version >> 8) != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
&& as->ssl_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
ret->ssl_version = (int)as->ssl_version;
if (as->cipher->length != 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)as->cipher->data[0] << 8L)
| (unsigned long)as->cipher->data[1];
ret->cipher_id = id;
ret->cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(id);
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length,
as->session_id, SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->master_key, &tmpl,
as->master_key, TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH))
goto err;
ret->master_key_length = tmpl;
if (as->time != 0)
ret->time = (long)as->time;
else
ret->time = (long)time(NULL);
if (as->timeout != 0)
ret->timeout = (long)as->timeout;
else
ret->timeout = 3;
X509_free(ret->peer);
ret->peer = as->peer;
as->peer = NULL;
if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length,
as->session_id_context, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH))
goto err;
/* NB: this defaults to zero which is X509_V_OK */
ret->verify_result = as->verify_result;
if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->ext.hostname, as->tlsext_hostname))
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity_hint, as->psk_identity_hint))
goto err;
if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity, as->psk_identity))
goto err;
#endif
ret->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = (unsigned long)as->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
ret->ext.tick_age_add = as->tlsext_tick_age_add;
OPENSSL_free(ret->ext.tick);
if (as->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
ret->ext.tick = as->tlsext_tick->data;
ret->ext.ticklen = as->tlsext_tick->length;
as->tlsext_tick->data = NULL;
} else {
ret->ext.tick = NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (as->comp_id) {
if (as->comp_id->length != 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
ret->compress_meth = as->comp_id->data[0];
} else {
ret->compress_meth = 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->srp_username, as->srp_username))
goto err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
/* Flags defaults to zero which is fine */
ret->flags = (int32_t)as->flags;
ret->ext.max_early_data = as->max_early_data;
OPENSSL_free(ret->ext.alpn_selected);
if (as->alpn_selected != NULL) {
ret->ext.alpn_selected = as->alpn_selected->data;
ret->ext.alpn_selected_len = as->alpn_selected->length;
as->alpn_selected->data = NULL;
} else {
ret->ext.alpn_selected = NULL;
ret->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
}
ret->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = as->tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode;
OPENSSL_free(ret->ticket_appdata);
if (as->ticket_appdata != NULL) {
ret->ticket_appdata = as->ticket_appdata->data;
ret->ticket_appdata_len = as->ticket_appdata->length;
as->ticket_appdata->data = NULL;
} else {
ret->ticket_appdata = NULL;
ret->ticket_appdata_len = 0;
}
M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1);
if ((a != NULL) && (*a == NULL))
*a = ret;
*pp = p;
return ret;
err:
M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1);
if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
return NULL;
}

1040
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_cert.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

23
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_cert_table.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
/*
* Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Certificate table information. NB: table entries must match SSL_PKEY indices
*/
static const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP ssl_cert_info [] = {
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_aRSA}, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
{EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_aRSA}, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
{EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_aDSS}, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
{EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_aECDSA}, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
{NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_aGOST01}, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
{NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_aGOST12}, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
{NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_aGOST12}, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
{EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_aECDSA}, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
{EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_aECDSA} /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
};

2163
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_ciph.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

993
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_conf.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,993 @@
/*
* Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
/*
* structure holding name tables. This is used for permitted elements in lists
* such as TLSv1.
*/
typedef struct {
const char *name;
int namelen;
unsigned int name_flags;
unsigned long option_value;
} ssl_flag_tbl;
/* Switch table: use for single command line switches like no_tls2 */
typedef struct {
unsigned long option_value;
unsigned int name_flags;
} ssl_switch_tbl;
/* Sense of name is inverted e.g. "TLSv1" will clear SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 */
#define SSL_TFLAG_INV 0x1
/* Mask for type of flag referred to */
#define SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK 0xf00
/* Flag is for options */
#define SSL_TFLAG_OPTION 0x000
/* Flag is for cert_flags */
#define SSL_TFLAG_CERT 0x100
/* Flag is for verify mode */
#define SSL_TFLAG_VFY 0x200
/* Option can only be used for clients */
#define SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT
/* Option can only be used for servers */
#define SSL_TFLAG_SERVER SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER
#define SSL_TFLAG_BOTH (SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER)
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CLI(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV_INV(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CERT(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CERT|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag}
#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV(str, flag) \
{str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
/*
* Opaque structure containing SSL configuration context.
*/
struct ssl_conf_ctx_st {
/*
* Various flags indicating (among other things) which options we will
* recognise.
*/
unsigned int flags;
/* Prefix and length of commands */
char *prefix;
size_t prefixlen;
/* SSL_CTX or SSL structure to perform operations on */
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
/* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX options field or NULL if none */
uint32_t *poptions;
/* Certificate filenames for each type */
char *cert_filename[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
/* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX cert_flags or NULL if none */
uint32_t *pcert_flags;
/* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX verify_mode or NULL if none */
uint32_t *pvfy_flags;
/* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX min_version field or NULL if none */
int *min_version;
/* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX max_version field or NULL if none */
int *max_version;
/* Current flag table being worked on */
const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
/* Size of table */
size_t ntbl;
/* Client CA names */
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *canames;
};
static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags,
unsigned long option_value, int onoff)
{
uint32_t *pflags;
if (cctx->poptions == NULL)
return;
if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_INV)
onoff ^= 1;
switch (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK) {
case SSL_TFLAG_CERT:
pflags = cctx->pcert_flags;
break;
case SSL_TFLAG_VFY:
pflags = cctx->pvfy_flags;
break;
case SSL_TFLAG_OPTION:
pflags = cctx->poptions;
break;
default:
return;
}
if (onoff)
*pflags |= option_value;
else
*pflags &= ~option_value;
}
static int ssl_match_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl,
const char *name, int namelen, int onoff)
{
/* If name not relevant for context skip */
if (!(cctx->flags & tbl->name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_BOTH))
return 0;
if (namelen == -1) {
if (strcmp(tbl->name, name))
return 0;
} else if (tbl->namelen != namelen || strncasecmp(tbl->name, name, namelen))
return 0;
ssl_set_option(cctx, tbl->name_flags, tbl->option_value, onoff);
return 1;
}
static int ssl_set_option_list(const char *elem, int len, void *usr)
{
SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = usr;
size_t i;
const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
int onoff = 1;
/*
* len == -1 indicates not being called in list context, just for single
* command line switches, so don't allow +, -.
*/
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
if (len != -1) {
if (*elem == '+') {
elem++;
len--;
onoff = 1;
} else if (*elem == '-') {
elem++;
len--;
onoff = 0;
}
}
for (i = 0, tbl = cctx->tbl; i < cctx->ntbl; i++, tbl++) {
if (ssl_match_option(cctx, tbl, elem, len, onoff))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Set supported signature algorithms */
static int cmd_SignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv;
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value);
/* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
else
rv = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value);
return rv > 0;
}
/* Set supported client signature algorithms */
static int cmd_ClientSignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv;
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value);
/* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
else
rv = SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value);
return rv > 0;
}
static int cmd_Groups(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv;
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set1_groups_list(cctx->ssl, value);
/* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */
else
rv = SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(cctx->ctx, value);
return rv > 0;
}
/* This is the old name for cmd_Groups - retained for backwards compatibility */
static int cmd_Curves(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return cmd_Groups(cctx, value);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ECDH temporary parameters */
static int cmd_ECDHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
EC_KEY *ecdh;
int nid;
/* Ignore values supported by 1.0.2 for the automatic selection */
if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE)
&& (strcasecmp(value, "+automatic") == 0
|| strcasecmp(value, "automatic") == 0))
return 1;
if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) &&
strcmp(value, "auto") == 0)
return 1;
nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value);
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value);
if (nid == 0)
return 0;
ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (!ecdh)
return 0;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ctx, ecdh);
else if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ssl, ecdh);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
return rv > 0;
}
#endif
static int cmd_CipherString(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx->ctx, value);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_cipher_list(cctx->ssl, value);
return rv > 0;
}
static int cmd_Ciphersuites(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(cctx->ctx, value);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_ciphersuites(cctx->ssl, value);
return rv > 0;
}
static int cmd_Protocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_protocol_list[] = {
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("ALL", SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)
};
cctx->tbl = ssl_protocol_list;
cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocol_list);
return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
}
/*
* protocol_from_string - converts a protocol version string to a number
*
* Returns -1 on failure or the version on success
*/
static int protocol_from_string(const char *value)
{
struct protocol_versions {
const char *name;
int version;
};
static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = {
{"None", 0},
{"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION},
{"TLSv1", TLS1_VERSION},
{"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
{"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
{"TLSv1.3", TLS1_3_VERSION},
{"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION},
{"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}
};
size_t i;
size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
if (strcmp(versions[i].name, value) == 0)
return versions[i].version;
return -1;
}
static int min_max_proto(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value, int *bound)
{
int method_version;
int new_version;
if (cctx->ctx != NULL)
method_version = cctx->ctx->method->version;
else if (cctx->ssl != NULL)
method_version = cctx->ssl->ctx->method->version;
else
return 0;
if ((new_version = protocol_from_string(value)) < 0)
return 0;
return ssl_set_version_bound(method_version, new_version, bound);
}
/*
* cmd_MinProtocol - Set min protocol version
* @cctx: config structure to save settings in
* @value: The min protocol version in string form
*
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
*/
static int cmd_MinProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->min_version);
}
/*
* cmd_MaxProtocol - Set max protocol version
* @cctx: config structure to save settings in
* @value: The max protocol version in string form
*
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
*/
static int cmd_MaxProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->max_version);
}
static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_option_list[] = {
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SessionTicket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EmptyFragments",
SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("Bugs", SSL_OP_ALL),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ServerPreference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("NoResumptionOnRenegotiation",
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("DHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ECDHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation",
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("MiddleboxCompat", SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("AntiReplay", SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY)
};
if (value == NULL)
return -3;
cctx->tbl = ssl_option_list;
cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_option_list);
return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
}
static int cmd_VerifyMode(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_vfy_list[] = {
SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI("Peer", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Request", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Require",
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Once", SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("RequestPostHandshake",
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE),
SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("RequirePostHandshake",
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE |
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
};
if (value == NULL)
return -3;
cctx->tbl = ssl_vfy_list;
cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_vfy_list);
return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
}
static int cmd_Certificate(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
CERT *c = NULL;
if (cctx->ctx) {
rv = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ctx, value);
c = cctx->ctx->cert;
}
if (cctx->ssl) {
rv = SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ssl, value);
c = cctx->ssl->cert;
}
if (rv > 0 && c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) {
char **pfilename = &cctx->cert_filename[c->key - c->pkeys];
OPENSSL_free(*pfilename);
*pfilename = OPENSSL_strdup(value);
if (!*pfilename)
rv = 0;
}
return rv > 0;
}
static int cmd_PrivateKey(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE))
return -2;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ctx, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ssl, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
return rv > 0;
}
static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 1;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(cctx->ctx, value);
return rv > 0;
}
static int do_store(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int verify_store)
{
CERT *cert;
X509_STORE **st;
if (cctx->ctx)
cert = cctx->ctx->cert;
else if (cctx->ssl)
cert = cctx->ssl->cert;
else
return 1;
st = verify_store ? &cert->verify_store : &cert->chain_store;
if (*st == NULL) {
*st = X509_STORE_new();
if (*st == NULL)
return 0;
}
return X509_STORE_load_locations(*st, CAfile, CApath) > 0;
}
static int cmd_ChainCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 0);
}
static int cmd_ChainCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 0);
}
static int cmd_VerifyCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 1);
}
static int cmd_VerifyCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 1);
}
static int cmd_RequestCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
if (cctx->canames == NULL)
cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (cctx->canames == NULL)
return 0;
return SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
}
static int cmd_ClientCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return cmd_RequestCAFile(cctx, value);
}
static int cmd_RequestCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
if (cctx->canames == NULL)
cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (cctx->canames == NULL)
return 0;
return SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
}
static int cmd_ClientCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
return cmd_RequestCAPath(cctx, value);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 0;
DH *dh = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
if (cctx->ctx || cctx->ssl) {
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
goto end;
if (BIO_read_filename(in, value) <= 0)
goto end;
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (dh == NULL)
goto end;
} else
return 1;
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ctx, dh);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ssl, dh);
end:
DH_free(dh);
BIO_free(in);
return rv > 0;
}
#endif
static int cmd_RecordPadding(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 0;
int block_size = atoi(value);
/*
* All we care about is a non-negative value,
* the setters check the range
*/
if (block_size >= 0) {
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_block_padding(cctx->ctx, block_size);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_block_padding(cctx->ssl, block_size);
}
return rv;
}
static int cmd_NumTickets(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{
int rv = 0;
int num_tickets = atoi(value);
if (num_tickets >= 0) {
if (cctx->ctx)
rv = SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(cctx->ctx, num_tickets);
if (cctx->ssl)
rv = SSL_set_num_tickets(cctx->ssl, num_tickets);
}
return rv;
}
typedef struct {
int (*cmd) (SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value);
const char *str_file;
const char *str_cmdline;
unsigned short flags;
unsigned short value_type;
} ssl_conf_cmd_tbl;
/* Table of supported parameters */
#define SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, type) \
{cmd_##name, #name, cmdopt, flags, type}
#define SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(name, cmdopt, flags) \
SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING)
#define SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH(name, flags) \
{0, NULL, name, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE}
/* See apps/apps.h if you change this table. */
static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = {
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ssl3", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_1", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_2", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_3", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("bugs", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_comp", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("comp", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("ecdh_single", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ticket", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("serverpref", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_renegotiation", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_renegotiation", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_resumption_on_reneg", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("allow_no_dhe_kex", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("prioritize_chacha", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("strict", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_middlebox", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("anti_replay", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_anti_replay", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(SignatureAlgorithms, "sigalgs", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ClientSignatureAlgorithms, "client_sigalgs", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Curves, "curves", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Groups, "groups", 0),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ECDHParameters, "named_curve", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
#endif
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(CipherString, "cipher", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Ciphersuites, "ciphersuites", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Protocol, NULL, 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MinProtocol, "min_protocol", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MaxProtocol, "max_protocol", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL, 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(VerifyMode, NULL, 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL,
SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAPath, "chainCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAFile, "chainCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAPath, "verifyCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAFile, "verifyCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(RequestCAFile, "requestCAFile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAFile, NULL,
SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
SSL_CONF_CMD(RequestCAPath, NULL, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAPath, NULL,
SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam",
SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
#endif
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(RecordPadding, "record_padding", 0),
SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(NumTickets, "num_tickets", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER),
};
/* Supported switches: must match order of switches in ssl_conf_cmds */
static const ssl_switch_tbl ssl_cmd_switches[] = {
{SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, 0}, /* no_ssl3 */
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, 0}, /* no_tls1 */
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0}, /* no_tls1_1 */
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0}, /* no_tls1_2 */
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3, 0}, /* no_tls1_3 */
{SSL_OP_ALL, 0}, /* bugs */
{SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, 0}, /* no_comp */
{SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, SSL_TFLAG_INV}, /* comp */
{SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE, 0}, /* ecdh_single */
{SSL_OP_NO_TICKET, 0}, /* no_ticket */
{SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE, 0}, /* serverpref */
/* legacy_renegotiation */
{SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
/* legacy_server_connect */
{SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, 0},
/* no_renegotiation */
{SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
/* no_resumption_on_reneg */
{SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION, 0},
/* no_legacy_server_connect */
{SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, SSL_TFLAG_INV},
/* allow_no_dhe_kex */
{SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX, 0},
/* chacha reprioritization */
{SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA, 0},
{SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT, SSL_TFLAG_CERT}, /* strict */
/* no_middlebox */
{SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT, SSL_TFLAG_INV},
/* anti_replay */
{SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY, SSL_TFLAG_INV},
/* no_anti_replay */
{SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY, 0},
};
static int ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char **pcmd)
{
if (!pcmd || !*pcmd)
return 0;
/* If a prefix is set, check and skip */
if (cctx->prefix) {
if (strlen(*pcmd) <= cctx->prefixlen)
return 0;
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE &&
strncmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen))
return 0;
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE &&
strncasecmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen))
return 0;
*pcmd += cctx->prefixlen;
} else if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) {
if (**pcmd != '-' || !(*pcmd)[1])
return 0;
*pcmd += 1;
}
return 1;
}
/* Determine if a command is allowed according to cctx flags */
static int ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * t)
{
unsigned int tfl = t->flags;
unsigned int cfl = cctx->flags;
if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER))
return 0;
if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT))
return 0;
if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE)
&& !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
const char *cmd)
{
const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *t;
size_t i;
if (cmd == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Look for matching parameter name in table */
for (i = 0, t = ssl_conf_cmds; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_conf_cmds); i++, t++) {
if (ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(cctx, t)) {
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) {
if (t->str_cmdline && strcmp(t->str_cmdline, cmd) == 0)
return t;
}
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE) {
if (t->str_file && strcasecmp(t->str_file, cmd) == 0)
return t;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
static int ctrl_switch_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * cmd)
{
/* Find index of command in table */
size_t idx = cmd - ssl_conf_cmds;
const ssl_switch_tbl *scmd;
/* Sanity check index */
if (idx >= OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cmd_switches))
return 0;
/* Obtain switches entry with same index */
scmd = ssl_cmd_switches + idx;
ssl_set_option(cctx, scmd->name_flags, scmd->option_value, 1);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value)
{
const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd;
if (cmd == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd))
return -2;
runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd);
if (runcmd) {
int rv;
if (runcmd->value_type == SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE) {
return ctrl_switch_option(cctx, runcmd);
}
if (value == NULL)
return -3;
rv = runcmd->cmd(cctx, value);
if (rv > 0)
return 2;
if (rv == -2)
return -2;
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "cmd=", cmd, ", value=", value);
}
return 0;
}
if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "cmd=", cmd);
}
return -2;
}
int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv)
{
int rv;
const char *arg = NULL, *argn;
if (pargc && *pargc == 0)
return 0;
if (!pargc || *pargc > 0)
arg = **pargv;
if (arg == NULL)
return 0;
if (!pargc || *pargc > 1)
argn = (*pargv)[1];
else
argn = NULL;
cctx->flags &= ~SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE;
cctx->flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE;
rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, arg, argn);
if (rv > 0) {
/* Success: update pargc, pargv */
(*pargv) += rv;
if (pargc)
(*pargc) -= rv;
return rv;
}
/* Unknown switch: indicate no arguments processed */
if (rv == -2)
return 0;
/* Some error occurred processing command, return fatal error */
if (rv == 0)
return -1;
return rv;
}
int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd)
{
if (ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd)) {
const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd;
runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd);
if (runcmd)
return runcmd->value_type;
}
return SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void)
{
SSL_CONF_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
return ret;
}
int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
{
/* See if any certificates are missing private keys */
size_t i;
CERT *c = NULL;
if (cctx->ctx)
c = cctx->ctx->cert;
else if (cctx->ssl)
c = cctx->ssl->cert;
if (c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) {
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
const char *p = cctx->cert_filename[i];
/*
* If missing private key try to load one from certificate file
*/
if (p && !c->pkeys[i].privatekey) {
if (!cmd_PrivateKey(cctx, p))
return 0;
}
}
}
if (cctx->canames) {
if (cctx->ssl)
SSL_set0_CA_list(cctx->ssl, cctx->canames);
else if (cctx->ctx)
SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(cctx->ctx, cctx->canames);
else
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
cctx->canames = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
{
if (cctx) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
OPENSSL_free(cctx->cert_filename[i]);
OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
OPENSSL_free(cctx);
}
}
unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags)
{
cctx->flags |= flags;
return cctx->flags;
}
unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags)
{
cctx->flags &= ~flags;
return cctx->flags;
}
int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre)
{
char *tmp = NULL;
if (pre) {
tmp = OPENSSL_strdup(pre);
if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
cctx->prefix = tmp;
if (tmp)
cctx->prefixlen = strlen(tmp);
else
cctx->prefixlen = 0;
return 1;
}
void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl)
{
cctx->ssl = ssl;
cctx->ctx = NULL;
if (ssl) {
cctx->poptions = &ssl->options;
cctx->min_version = &ssl->min_proto_version;
cctx->max_version = &ssl->max_proto_version;
cctx->pcert_flags = &ssl->cert->cert_flags;
cctx->pvfy_flags = &ssl->verify_mode;
} else {
cctx->poptions = NULL;
cctx->min_version = NULL;
cctx->max_version = NULL;
cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
}
}
void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
cctx->ctx = ctx;
cctx->ssl = NULL;
if (ctx) {
cctx->poptions = &ctx->options;
cctx->min_version = &ctx->min_proto_version;
cctx->max_version = &ctx->max_proto_version;
cctx->pcert_flags = &ctx->cert->cert_flags;
cctx->pvfy_flags = &ctx->verify_mode;
} else {
cctx->poptions = NULL;
cctx->min_version = NULL;
cctx->max_version = NULL;
cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
}
}

1277
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_err.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

221
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_init.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "e_os.h"
#include "internal/err.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
static int stopped;
static void ssl_library_stop(void);
static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_base = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int ssl_base_inited = 0;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
"Adding SSL ciphers and digests\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
/*
* Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work if an
* application only calls SSL_library_init().
*/
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
#endif
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256());
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ARIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aria_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aria_256_gcm());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20_poly1305());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5, "ssl3-md5");
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5_sha1());
#endif
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1, "ssl3-sha1");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA);
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
"SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods()\n");
# endif
/*
* This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms. The value
* returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can be discarded safely
*/
SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
#endif
/* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
if (!ssl_load_ciphers())
return 0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: "
"SSL_add_ssl_module()\n");
#endif
/*
* We ignore an error return here. Not much we can do - but not that bad
* either. We can still safely continue.
*/
OPENSSL_atexit(ssl_library_stop);
ssl_base_inited = 1;
return 1;
}
static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int ssl_strings_inited = 0;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)
{
/*
* OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
* pulling in all the error strings during static linking
*/
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT)
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_ssl_strings: "
"ERR_load_SSL_strings()\n");
# endif
ERR_load_SSL_strings();
ssl_strings_inited = 1;
#endif
return 1;
}
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings,
ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)
{
/* Do nothing in this case */
return 1;
}
static void ssl_library_stop(void)
{
/* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */
if (stopped)
return;
stopped = 1;
if (ssl_base_inited) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: "
"ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int()\n");
# endif
ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int();
#endif
}
if (ssl_strings_inited) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: "
"err_free_strings_int()\n");
#endif
/*
* If both crypto and ssl error strings are inited we will end up
* calling err_free_strings_int() twice - but that's ok. The second
* time will be a no-op. It's easier to do that than to try and track
* between the two libraries whether they have both been inited.
*/
err_free_strings_int();
}
}
/*
* If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be
* called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions,
* i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded.
*/
int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS * settings)
{
static int stoperrset = 0;
if (stopped) {
if (!stoperrset) {
/*
* We only ever set this once to avoid getting into an infinite
* loop where the error system keeps trying to init and fails so
* sets an error etc
*/
stoperrset = 1;
SSLerr(SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
}
return 0;
}
opts |= OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOLOAD_CONFIG
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG) == 0)
opts |= OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG;
#endif
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(opts, settings))
return 0;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_base, ossl_init_ssl_base))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS)
&& !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings,
ossl_init_load_ssl_strings))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_load_ssl_strings))
return 0;
return 1;
}

5581
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_lib.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

2666
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_locl.h vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

99
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/sslconf.h"
/* SSL library configuration module. */
void SSL_add_ssl_module(void)
{
/* Do nothing. This will be added automatically by libcrypto */
}
static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name, int system)
{
SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
size_t i, idx, cmd_count;
int rv = 0;
unsigned int flags;
const SSL_METHOD *meth;
const SSL_CONF_CMD *cmds;
if (s == NULL && ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (name == NULL && system)
name = "system_default";
if (!conf_ssl_name_find(name, &idx)) {
if (!system) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", name);
}
goto err;
}
cmds = conf_ssl_get(idx, &name, &cmd_count);
cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
if (cctx == NULL)
goto err;
flags = SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE;
if (!system)
flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE;
if (s != NULL) {
meth = s->method;
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(cctx, s);
} else {
meth = ctx->method;
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
}
if (meth->ssl_accept != ssl_undefined_function)
flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER;
if (meth->ssl_connect != ssl_undefined_function)
flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT;
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, flags);
for (i = 0; i < cmd_count; i++) {
char *cmdstr, *arg;
conf_ssl_get_cmd(cmds, i, &cmdstr, &arg);
rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cmdstr, arg);
if (rv <= 0) {
if (rv == -2)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", name, ", cmd=", cmdstr,
", arg=", arg);
goto err;
}
}
rv = SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx);
err:
SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
return rv <= 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name)
{
return ssl_do_config(s, NULL, name, 0);
}
int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
return ssl_do_config(NULL, ctx, name, 0);
}
void ssl_ctx_system_config(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
ssl_do_config(NULL, ctx, NULL, 1);
}

1148
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_rsa.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1317
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_sess.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

388
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_stat.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
{
if (ossl_statem_in_error(s))
return "error";
switch (SSL_get_state(s)) {
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate status";
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
return "SSLv3/TLS write next proto";
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return "SSLv3/TLS read next proto";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate status";
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
return "before SSL initialization";
case TLS_ST_OK:
return "SSL negotiation finished successfully";
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return "SSLv3/TLS write client hello";
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server hello";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate";
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server key exchange";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate request";
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server session ticket";
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return "SSLv3/TLS read server done";
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return "SSLv3/TLS write client certificate";
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
return "SSLv3/TLS write client key exchange";
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate verify";
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
return "SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec";
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
return "SSLv3/TLS write finished";
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return "SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec";
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return "SSLv3/TLS read finished";
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return "SSLv3/TLS read client hello";
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
return "SSLv3/TLS write hello request";
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
return "SSLv3/TLS write server hello";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate";
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
return "SSLv3/TLS write key exchange";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate request";
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
return "SSLv3/TLS write session ticket";
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return "SSLv3/TLS write server done";
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return "SSLv3/TLS read client certificate";
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return "SSLv3/TLS read client key exchange";
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate verify";
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return "DTLS1 read hello verify request";
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return "DTLS1 write hello verify request";
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return "TLSv1.3 write encrypted extensions";
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return "TLSv1.3 read encrypted extensions";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
return "TLSv1.3 read server certificate verify";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
return "TLSv1.3 write server certificate verify";
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
return "SSLv3/TLS read hello request";
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TLSv1.3 write server key update";
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TLSv1.3 write client key update";
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TLSv1.3 read client key update";
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TLSv1.3 read server key update";
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return "TLSv1.3 early data";
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
return "TLSv1.3 pending early data end";
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return "TLSv1.3 write end of early data";
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return "TLSv1.3 read end of early data";
default:
return "unknown state";
}
}
const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
{
if (ossl_statem_in_error(s))
return "SSLERR";
switch (SSL_get_state(s)) {
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return "TRNP";
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
return "TWST";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
return "TWCS";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return "TRCS";
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return "TRST";
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
return "TWNP";
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
return "PINIT ";
case TLS_ST_OK:
return "SSLOK ";
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return "TWCH";
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return "TRSH";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return "TRSC";
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return "TRSKE";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return "TRCR";
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return "TRSD";
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return "TWCC";
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
return "TWCKE";
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
return "TWCV";
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
return "TWCCS";
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
return "TWFIN";
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return "TRCCS";
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return "TRFIN";
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
return "TWHR";
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return "TRCH";
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
return "TWSH";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
return "TWSC";
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
return "TWSKE";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
return "TWCR";
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return "TWSD";
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return "TRCC";
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return "TRCKE";
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return "TRCV";
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return "DRCHV";
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return "DWCHV";
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return "TWEE";
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return "TREE";
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
return "TRSCV";
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
return "TRSCV";
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
return "TRHR";
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TWSKU";
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TWCKU";
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TRCKU";
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
return "TRSKU";
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return "TED";
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
return "TPEDE";
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return "TWEOED";
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return "TWEOED";
default:
return "UNKWN ";
}
}
const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value)
{
switch (value >> 8) {
case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
return "warning";
case SSL3_AL_FATAL:
return "fatal";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value)
{
switch (value >> 8) {
case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
return "W";
case SSL3_AL_FATAL:
return "F";
default:
return "U";
}
}
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value)
{
switch (value & 0xff) {
case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
return "CN";
case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
return "UM";
case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
return "BM";
case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
return "DF";
case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
return "HF";
case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return "NC";
case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
return "BC";
case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
return "UC";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
return "CR";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
return "CE";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
return "CU";
case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
return "IP";
case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
return "DC";
case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
return "RO";
case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
return "CA";
case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
return "AD";
case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
return "DE";
case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
return "CY";
case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
return "ER";
case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return "PV";
case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
return "IS";
case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return "IE";
case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
return "US";
case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
return "NR";
case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
return "UE";
case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
return "CO";
case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
return "UN";
case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
return "BR";
case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
return "BH";
case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
return "UP";
default:
return "UK";
}
}
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value)
{
switch (value & 0xff) {
case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
return "close notify";
case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
return "unexpected_message";
case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
return "bad record mac";
case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
return "decompression failure";
case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
return "handshake failure";
case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return "no certificate";
case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
return "bad certificate";
case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
return "unsupported certificate";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
return "certificate revoked";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
return "certificate expired";
case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
return "certificate unknown";
case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
return "illegal parameter";
case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
return "decryption failed";
case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
return "record overflow";
case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
return "unknown CA";
case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
return "access denied";
case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
return "decode error";
case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
return "decrypt error";
case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
return "export restriction";
case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return "protocol version";
case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
return "insufficient security";
case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return "internal error";
case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
return "user canceled";
case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
return "no renegotiation";
case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
return "unsupported extension";
case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
return "certificate unobtainable";
case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
return "unrecognized name";
case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
return "bad certificate status response";
case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
return "bad certificate hash value";
case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
return "unknown PSK identity";
case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
return "no application protocol";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}

203
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_txt.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
{
BIO *b;
int ret;
if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
ret = SSL_SESSION_print(b, x);
BIO_free(b);
return ret;
}
#endif
int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
{
size_t i;
const char *s;
int istls13;
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
istls13 = (x->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION);
if (BIO_puts(bp, "SSL-Session:\n") <= 0)
goto err;
s = ssl_protocol_to_string(x->ssl_version);
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Protocol : %s\n", s) <= 0)
goto err;
if (x->cipher == NULL) {
if (((x->cipher_id) & 0xff000000) == 0x02000000) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cipher : %06lX\n",
x->cipher_id & 0xffffff) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cipher : %04lX\n",
x->cipher_id & 0xffff) <= 0)
goto err;
}
} else {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cipher : %s\n",
((x->cipher->name == NULL) ? "unknown"
: x->cipher->name)) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, " Session-ID: ") <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Session-ID-ctx: ") <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < x->sid_ctx_length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->sid_ctx[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (istls13) {
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Resumption PSK: ") <= 0)
goto err;
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Master-Key: ") <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < x->master_key_length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity ? x->psk_identity : "None") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity hint: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf
(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0)
goto err;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n SRP username: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0)
goto err;
#endif
if (x->ext.tick_lifetime_hint) {
if (BIO_printf(bp,
"\n TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)",
x->ext.tick_lifetime_hint) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (x->ext.tick) {
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0)
goto err;
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
if (BIO_dump_indent
(bp, (const char *)x->ext.tick, (int)x->ext.ticklen, 4)
<= 0)
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (x->compress_meth != 0) {
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(x, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0))
goto err;
if (comp == NULL) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d", x->compress_meth) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id,
comp->name) <= 0)
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (x->time != 0L) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Start Time: %ld", x->time) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (x->timeout != 0L) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Timeout : %ld (sec)", x->timeout) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, " Verify return code: ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%ld (%s)\n", x->verify_result,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(x->verify_result)) <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Extended master secret: %s\n",
x->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS ? "yes" : "no") <= 0)
goto err;
if (istls13) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Max Early Data: %u\n",
x->ext.max_early_data) <= 0)
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
/*
* print session id and master key in NSS keylog format (RSA
* Session-ID:<session id> Master-Key:<master key>)
*/
int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
{
size_t i;
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
if (x->session_id_length == 0 || x->master_key_length == 0)
goto err;
/*
* the RSA prefix is required by the format's definition although there's
* nothing RSA-specific in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
* the cipher suite is based on RSA
*/
if (BIO_puts(bp, "RSA ") <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Session-ID:") <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, " Master-Key:") <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < x->master_key_length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
goto err;
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}

24
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/ssl_utst.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
/*
* Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
static const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions ssl_test_functions = {
ssl_init_wbio_buffer,
ssl3_setup_buffers,
};
const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void)
{
return &ssl_test_functions;
}
#endif

63
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/README vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
State Machine Design
====================
This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the
state machine code to aid future maintenance.
The state machine code replaces an older state machine present in OpenSSL
versions 1.0.2 and below. The new state machine has the following objectives:
- Remove duplication of state code between client and server
- Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
- Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
so that it is easier to validate
- Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
- Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
else)
- Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
understand each)
- message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
- handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
- Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
the state changes local to the state machine component
The message flow state machine is divided into a reading sub-state machine and a
writing sub-state machine. See the source comments in statem.c for a more
detailed description of the various states and transitions possible.
Conceptually the state machine component is designed as follows:
libssl
|
---------------------------|-----statem.h--------------------------------------
|
_______V____________________
| |
| statem.c |
| |
| Core state machine code |
|____________________________|
statem_locl.h ^ ^
_________| |_______
| |
_____________|____________ _____________|____________
| | | |
| statem_clnt.c | | statem_srvr.c |
| | | |
| TLS/DTLS client specific | | TLS/DTLS server specific |
| state machine code | | state machine code |
|__________________________| |__________________________|
| |_______________|__ |
| ________________| | |
| | | |
____________V_______V________ ________V______V_______________
| | | |
| statem_both.c | | statem_dtls.c |
| | | |
| Non core functions common | | Non core functions common to |
| to both servers and clients | | both DTLS servers and clients |
|_____________________________| |_______________________________|

1700
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/extensions.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1991
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

533
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
/*
* Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* Custom extension utility functions */
#include <openssl/ct.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
typedef struct {
void *add_arg;
custom_ext_add_cb add_cb;
custom_ext_free_cb free_cb;
} custom_ext_add_cb_wrap;
typedef struct {
void *parse_arg;
custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb;
} custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap;
/*
* Provide thin wrapper callbacks which convert new style arguments to old style
*/
static int custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
const unsigned char **out,
size_t *outlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int *al, void *add_arg)
{
custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg;
if (add_cb_wrap->add_cb == NULL)
return 1;
return add_cb_wrap->add_cb(s, ext_type, out, outlen, al,
add_cb_wrap->add_arg);
}
static void custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg)
{
custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg;
if (add_cb_wrap->free_cb == NULL)
return;
add_cb_wrap->free_cb(s, ext_type, out, add_cb_wrap->add_arg);
}
static int custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int *al, void *parse_arg)
{
custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap =
(custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *)parse_arg;
if (parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb == NULL)
return 1;
return parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb(s, ext_type, in, inlen, al,
parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg);
}
/*
* Find a custom extension from the list. The |role| param is there to
* support the legacy API where custom extensions for client and server could
* be set independently on the same SSL_CTX. It is set to ENDPOINT_SERVER if we
* are trying to find a method relevant to the server, ENDPOINT_CLIENT for the
* client, or ENDPOINT_BOTH for either
*/
custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts,
ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type,
size_t *idx)
{
size_t i;
custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) {
if (ext_type == meth->ext_type
&& (role == ENDPOINT_BOTH || role == meth->role
|| meth->role == ENDPOINT_BOTH)) {
if (idx != NULL)
*idx = i;
return meth;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Initialise custom extensions flags to indicate neither sent nor received.
*/
void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *exts)
{
size_t i;
custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths;
for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++)
meth->ext_flags = 0;
}
/* Pass received custom extension data to the application for parsing. */
int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int ext_type,
const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int al;
custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext;
custom_ext_method *meth;
ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
if ((context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0)
role = s->server ? ENDPOINT_SERVER : ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
meth = custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL);
/* If not found return success */
if (!meth)
return 1;
/* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
if (!extension_is_relevant(s, meth->context, context))
return 1;
if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) != 0) {
/*
* If it's ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions we can't have any
* extensions not sent in ClientHello.
*/
if ((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Extensions received in the ClientHello are marked with the
* SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED. This is so we know to add the equivalent
* extensions in the ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions message
*/
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED;
/* If no parse function set return success */
if (!meth->parse_cb)
return 1;
if (meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, context, ext_data, ext_size, x, chainidx,
&al, meth->parse_arg) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Request custom extension data from the application and add to the return
* buffer.
*/
int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int context, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int maxversion)
{
custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext;
custom_ext_method *meth;
size_t i;
int al;
for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++) {
const unsigned char *out = NULL;
size_t outlen = 0;
meth = exts->meths + i;
if (!should_add_extension(s, meth->context, context, maxversion))
continue;
if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)) != 0) {
/* Only send extensions present in ClientHello. */
if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED))
continue;
}
/*
* We skip it if the callback is absent - except for a ClientHello where
* we add an empty extension.
*/
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0 && meth->add_cb == NULL)
continue;
if (meth->add_cb != NULL) {
int cb_retval = meth->add_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, &out,
&outlen, x, chainidx, &al,
meth->add_arg);
if (cb_retval < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0; /* error */
}
if (cb_retval == 0)
continue; /* skip this extension */
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, meth->ext_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| (outlen > 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, out, outlen))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
/*
* We can't send duplicates: code logic should prevent this.
*/
if (!ossl_assert((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Indicate extension has been sent: this is both a sanity check to
* ensure we don't send duplicate extensions and indicates that it
* is not an error if the extension is present in ServerHello.
*/
meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
}
if (meth->free_cb != NULL)
meth->free_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, out, meth->add_arg);
}
return 1;
}
/* Copy the flags from src to dst for any extensions that exist in both */
int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst,
const custom_ext_methods *src)
{
size_t i;
custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths;
for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++, methsrc++) {
custom_ext_method *methdst = custom_ext_find(dst, methsrc->role,
methsrc->ext_type, NULL);
if (methdst == NULL)
continue;
methdst->ext_flags = methsrc->ext_flags;
}
return 1;
}
/* Copy table of custom extensions */
int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src)
{
size_t i;
int err = 0;
if (src->meths_count > 0) {
dst->meths =
OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths,
sizeof(*src->meths) * src->meths_count);
if (dst->meths == NULL)
return 0;
dst->meths_count = src->meths_count;
for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++) {
custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths + i;
custom_ext_method *methdst = dst->meths + i;
if (methsrc->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap)
continue;
/*
* We have found an old style API wrapper. We need to copy the
* arguments too.
*/
if (err) {
methdst->add_arg = NULL;
methdst->parse_arg = NULL;
continue;
}
methdst->add_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->add_arg,
sizeof(custom_ext_add_cb_wrap));
methdst->parse_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->parse_arg,
sizeof(custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap));
if (methdst->add_arg == NULL || methdst->parse_arg == NULL)
err = 1;
}
}
if (err) {
custom_exts_free(dst);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts)
{
size_t i;
custom_ext_method *meth;
for (i = 0, meth = exts->meths; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) {
if (meth->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap)
continue;
/* Old style API wrapper. Need to free the arguments too */
OPENSSL_free(meth->add_arg);
OPENSSL_free(meth->parse_arg);
}
OPENSSL_free(exts->meths);
}
/* Return true if a client custom extension exists, false otherwise */
int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type)
{
return custom_ext_find(&ctx->cert->custext, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type,
NULL) != NULL;
}
static int add_custom_ext_intern(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role,
unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb,
SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb,
void *add_arg,
SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb,
void *parse_arg)
{
custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->custext;
custom_ext_method *meth, *tmp;
/*
* Check application error: if add_cb is not set free_cb will never be
* called.
*/
if (add_cb == NULL && free_cb != NULL)
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
/*
* We don't want applications registering callbacks for SCT extensions
* whilst simultaneously using the built-in SCT validation features, as
* these two things may not play well together.
*/
if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
&& (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(ctx))
return 0;
#endif
/*
* Don't add if extension supported internally, but make exception
* for extension types that previously were not supported, but now are.
*/
if (SSL_extension_supported(ext_type)
&& ext_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
return 0;
/* Extension type must fit in 16 bits */
if (ext_type > 0xffff)
return 0;
/* Search for duplicate */
if (custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL))
return 0;
tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(exts->meths,
(exts->meths_count + 1) * sizeof(custom_ext_method));
if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
exts->meths = tmp;
meth = exts->meths + exts->meths_count;
memset(meth, 0, sizeof(*meth));
meth->role = role;
meth->context = context;
meth->parse_cb = parse_cb;
meth->add_cb = add_cb;
meth->free_cb = free_cb;
meth->ext_type = ext_type;
meth->add_arg = add_arg;
meth->parse_arg = parse_arg;
exts->meths_count++;
return 1;
}
static int add_old_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role,
unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
void *add_arg,
custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
{
custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*add_cb_wrap));
custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*parse_cb_wrap));
int ret;
if (add_cb_wrap == NULL || parse_cb_wrap == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap);
OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap);
return 0;
}
add_cb_wrap->add_arg = add_arg;
add_cb_wrap->add_cb = add_cb;
add_cb_wrap->free_cb = free_cb;
parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg = parse_arg;
parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb = parse_cb;
ret = add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, role, ext_type,
context,
custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap,
custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap,
add_cb_wrap,
custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap,
parse_cb_wrap);
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap);
OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap);
}
return ret;
}
/* Application level functions to add the old custom extension callbacks */
int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
void *add_arg,
custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
{
return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY
| SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION,
add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
custom_ext_free_cb free_cb,
void *add_arg,
custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
{
return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_SERVER, ext_type,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY
| SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION,
add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb,
SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb,
void *add_arg,
SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb, void *parse_arg)
{
return add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, ENDPOINT_BOTH, ext_type, context, add_cb,
free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
}
int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type)
{
switch (ext_type) {
/* Internally supported extensions. */
case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg:
#endif
case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
case TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp:
#endif
case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk:
case TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}

1959
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

972
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <assert.h>
/*
* This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines.
*
* There are two primary state machines:
*
* 1) Message flow state machine
* 2) Handshake state machine
*
* The Message flow state machine controls the reading and sending of messages
* including handling of non-blocking IO events, flushing of the underlying
* write BIO, handling unexpected messages, etc. It is itself broken into two
* separate sub-state machines which control reading and writing respectively.
*
* The Handshake state machine keeps track of the current SSL/TLS handshake
* state. Transitions of the handshake state are the result of events that
* occur within the Message flow state machine.
*
* Overall it looks like this:
*
* --------------------------------------------- -------------------
* | | | |
* | Message flow state machine | | |
* | | | |
* | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state |
* | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
* | | sub-state | | sub-state | |----------->| |
* | | machine for | | machine for | | | |
* | | reading messages | | writing messages | | | |
* | -------------------- -------------------- | | |
* | | | |
* --------------------------------------------- -------------------
*
*/
/* Sub state machine return values */
typedef enum {
/* Something bad happened or NBIO */
SUB_STATE_ERROR,
/* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */
SUB_STATE_FINISHED,
/* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */
SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE
} SUB_STATE_RETURN;
static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server);
static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s);
static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s);
static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->statem.hand_state;
}
int SSL_in_init(const SSL *s)
{
return s->statem.in_init;
}
int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *s)
{
return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK);
}
int SSL_in_before(const SSL *s)
{
/*
* Historically being "in before" meant before anything had happened. In the
* current code though we remain in the "before" state for a while after we
* have started the handshake process (e.g. as a server waiting for the
* first message to arrive). There "in before" is taken to mean "in before"
* and not started any handshake process yet.
*/
return (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE)
&& (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED);
}
/*
* Clear the state machine state and reset back to MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
*/
void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s)
{
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 0;
}
/*
* Set the state machine up ready for a renegotiation handshake
*/
void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
s->statem.in_init = 1;
s->statem.request_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
}
/*
* Put the state machine into an error state and send an alert if appropriate.
* This is a permanent error for the current connection.
*/
void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file,
int line)
{
ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line);
/* We shouldn't call SSLfatal() twice. Once is enough */
if (s->statem.in_init && s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)
return;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR;
if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
&& s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
/*
* This macro should only be called if we are already expecting to be in
* a fatal error state. We verify that we are, and set it if not (this would
* indicate a bug).
*/
#define check_fatal(s, f) \
do { \
if (!ossl_assert((s)->statem.in_init \
&& (s)->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)) \
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, (f), \
SSL_R_MISSING_FATAL); \
} while (0)
/*
* Discover whether the current connection is in the error state.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)
return 1;
return 0;
}
void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init)
{
s->statem.in_init = init;
}
int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s)
{
return s->statem.in_handshake;
}
void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand)
{
if (inhand)
s->statem.in_handshake++;
else
s->statem.in_handshake--;
}
/* Are we in a sensible state to skip over unreadable early data? */
int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s)
{
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED)
return 0;
if (!s->server
|| s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
|| s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Called when we are in SSL_read*(), SSL_write*(), or SSL_accept()
* /SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake(). Used to test whether we are in an early
* data state and whether we should attempt to move the handshake on if so.
* |sending| is 1 if we are attempting to send data (SSL_write*()), 0 if we are
* attempting to read data (SSL_read*()), or -1 if we are in SSL_do_handshake()
* or similar.
*/
void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int sending)
{
if (sending == -1) {
if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
|| s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) {
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
/*
* SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake() has been called directly.
* We don't allow any more writing of early data.
*/
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
}
}
} else if (!s->server) {
if ((sending && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
|| s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING)
|| (!sending && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)) {
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
/*
* SSL_write() has been called directly. We don't allow any more
* writing of early data.
*/
if (sending && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY)
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
}
} else {
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
&& s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
}
}
void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s)
{
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
/*
* This will get reset (briefly) back to TLS_ST_BEFORE when we enter
* state_machine() because |state| is MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, but until then any
* calls to SSL_in_before() will return false. Also calls to
* SSL_state_string() and SSL_state_string_long() will return something
* sensible.
*/
s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
}
int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 0);
}
int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 1);
}
typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int);
static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s)
{
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
return s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
return s->ctx->info_callback;
return NULL;
}
/*
* The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or
* MSG_FLOW_FINISHED state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and
* transitions are as follows:
*
* MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
* | |
* +-----------------------+
* v
* MSG_FLOW_WRITING <---> MSG_FLOW_READING
* |
* V
* MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
* |
* V
* [SUCCESS]
*
* We may exit at any point due to an error or NBIO event. If an NBIO event
* occurs then we restart at the point we left off when we are recalled.
* MSG_FLOW_WRITING and MSG_FLOW_READING have sub-state machines associated with them.
*
* In addition to the above there is also the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state. We can move
* into that state at any point in the event that an irrecoverable error occurs.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* <=0: NBIO or error
*/
static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret = -1;
int ssret;
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) {
/* Shouldn't have been called if we're already in the error state */
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
cb = get_callback(s);
st->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
/*
* If we are stateless then we already called SSL_clear() - don't do
* it again and clear the STATELESS flag itself.
*/
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0 && !SSL_clear(s))
return -1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
/*
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
* identifier other than 0.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
st->in_handshake, NULL);
}
#endif
/* Initialise state machine */
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
|| st->state == MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
}
s->server = server;
if (cb != NULL) {
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
}
/*
* Fatal errors in this block don't send an alert because we have
* failed to even initialise properly. Sending an alert is probably
* doomed to failure.
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
(server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
} else {
if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* Should have been reset by tls_process_finished, too.
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
/*
* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with
* SCTP
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
#endif
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_in_before(s))
|| s->renegotiate) {
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto end;
}
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
st->read_state_first_init = 1;
}
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
init_write_state_machine(s);
}
while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) {
ssret = read_state_machine(s);
if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
init_write_state_machine(s);
} else {
/* NBIO or error */
goto end;
}
} else if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_WRITING) {
ssret = write_state_machine(s);
if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
st->state = MSG_FLOW_READING;
init_read_state_machine(s);
} else if (ssret == SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE) {
st->state = MSG_FLOW_FINISHED;
} else {
/* NBIO or error */
goto end;
}
} else {
/* Error */
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
goto end;
}
}
ret = 1;
end:
st->in_handshake--;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
/*
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
* identifier other than 0.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
st->in_handshake, NULL);
}
#endif
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL) {
if (server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Initialise the MSG_FLOW_READING sub-state machine
*/
static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
}
static int grow_init_buf(SSL *s, size_t size) {
size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data;
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)size))
return 0;
if (size < msg_offset)
return 0;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset;
return 1;
}
/*
* This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
* MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
*
* READ_STATE_HEADER <--+<-------------+
* | | |
* v | |
* READ_STATE_BODY -----+-->READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS
* | |
* +----------------------------+
* v
* [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
*
* READ_STATE_HEADER has the responsibility for reading in the message header
* and transitioning the state of the handshake state machine.
*
* READ_STATE_BODY reads in the rest of the message and then subsequently
* processes it.
*
* READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post
* processing activity performed on the message may block.
*
* Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case
* control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we
* will resume in the same state where we left off.
*/
static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret, mt;
size_t len = 0;
int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
PACKET pkt;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
size_t (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
}
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
s->first_packet = 1;
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->read_state) {
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
*/
ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
} else {
ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
/*
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
* to that state if so
*/
if (!transition(s, mt))
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
/* dtls_get_message already did this */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0
&& !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
/* Fall through */
case READ_STATE_BODY:
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* We already got this above for DTLS */
ret = tls_get_message_body(s, &len);
if (ret == 0) {
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
s->first_packet = 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
/* Discard the packet data */
s->init_num = 0;
switch (ret) {
case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
default:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
}
break;
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
switch (st->read_state_work) {
case WORK_ERROR:
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE);
/* Fall through */
case WORK_MORE_A:
case WORK_MORE_B:
case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
}
break;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
/*
* Send a previously constructed message to the peer.
*/
static int statem_do_write(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
|| st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
else
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
} else {
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
}
/*
* Initialise the MSG_FLOW_WRITING sub-state machine
*/
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
}
/*
* This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
* MSG_FLOW_WRITING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
*
* +-> WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION ------> [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
* | |
* | v
* | WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK -----> [SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE]
* | |
* | v
* | WRITE_STATE_SEND
* | |
* | v
* | WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK
* | |
* +-------------+
*
* WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine
* WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later
* sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in
* which case control returns to the calling application. When this function
* is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off.
*
* WRITE_STATE_SEND sends the message and performs any work to be done after
* sending.
*
* WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK performs any work necessary after the sending of the
* message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also
* result in an NBIO event.
*/
static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret;
WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s);
WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
int (*get_construct_message_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
int (**confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt),
int *mt);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int (*confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
int mt;
WPACKET pkt;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition;
pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work;
post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work;
get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_server_construct_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition;
pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work;
post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work;
get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_client_construct_message;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->write_state) {
case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION:
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
switch (transition(s)) {
case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED:
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
break;
case WRITE_TRAN_ERROR:
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
break;
case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK:
switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
case WORK_ERROR:
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
/* Fall through */
case WORK_MORE_A:
case WORK_MORE_B:
case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_SEND;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
}
if (!get_construct_message_f(s, &pkt, &confunc, &mt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_DUMMY) {
/* Skip construction and sending. This isn't a "real" state */
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
|| !ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, mt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (confunc != NULL && !confunc(s, &pkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt, mt)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
/* Fall through */
case WRITE_STATE_SEND:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && st->use_timer) {
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = statem_do_write(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
/* Fall through */
case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK:
switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
case WORK_ERROR:
check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
/* Fall through */
case WORK_MORE_A:
case WORK_MORE_B:
case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
}
break;
default:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
/*
* Flush the write BIO
*/
int statem_flush(SSL *s)
{
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return 1;
}
/*
* Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is
* allowed to be received in the current handshake state or not.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes (application data allowed)
* 0: No (application data not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED)
return 0;
if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0))
return 0;
if (s->server) {
/*
* If we're a server and we haven't got as far as writing our
* ServerHello yet then we allow app data
*/
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
|| st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
return 1;
} else {
/*
* If we're a client and we haven't read the ServerHello yet then we
* allow app data
*/
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* This function returns 1 if TLS exporter is ready to export keying
* material, or 0 if otherwise.
*/
int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s)
{
return s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0
&& s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
}
/*
* Return 1 if early TLS exporter is ready to export keying material,
* or 0 if otherwise.
*/
int ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(SSL *s)
{
/*
* The early exporter secret is only present on the server if we
* have accepted early_data. It is present on the client as long
* as we have sent early_data.
*/
return s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
|| (!s->server && s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT);
}

157
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* These enums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No *
* non-state machine code should need to use these *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
/*
* Valid return codes used for functions performing work prior to or after
* sending or receiving a message
*/
typedef enum {
/* Something went wrong */
WORK_ERROR,
/* We're done working and there shouldn't be anything else to do after */
WORK_FINISHED_STOP,
/* We're done working move onto the next thing */
WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE,
/* We're working on phase A */
WORK_MORE_A,
/* We're working on phase B */
WORK_MORE_B,
/* We're working on phase C */
WORK_MORE_C
} WORK_STATE;
/* Write transition return codes */
typedef enum {
/* Something went wrong */
WRITE_TRAN_ERROR,
/* A transition was successfully completed and we should continue */
WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE,
/* There is no more write work to be done */
WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
} WRITE_TRAN;
/* Message flow states */
typedef enum {
/* No handshake in progress */
MSG_FLOW_UNINITED,
/* A permanent error with this connection */
MSG_FLOW_ERROR,
/* We are reading messages */
MSG_FLOW_READING,
/* We are writing messages */
MSG_FLOW_WRITING,
/* Handshake has finished */
MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
} MSG_FLOW_STATE;
/* Read states */
typedef enum {
READ_STATE_HEADER,
READ_STATE_BODY,
READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS
} READ_STATE;
/* Write states */
typedef enum {
WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION,
WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK,
WRITE_STATE_SEND,
WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK
} WRITE_STATE;
typedef enum {
/* The enc_write_ctx can be used normally */
ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID,
/* The enc_write_ctx cannot be used */
ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID,
/* Write alerts in plaintext, but otherwise use the enc_write_ctx */
ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
} ENC_WRITE_STATES;
typedef enum {
/* The enc_read_ctx can be used normally */
ENC_READ_STATE_VALID,
/* We may receive encrypted or plaintext alerts */
ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS
} ENC_READ_STATES;
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the *
* state machine. No non-state machine code should be accessing the members *
* of this structure. *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
struct ossl_statem_st {
MSG_FLOW_STATE state;
WRITE_STATE write_state;
WORK_STATE write_state_work;
READ_STATE read_state;
WORK_STATE read_state_work;
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE hand_state;
/* The handshake state requested by an API call (e.g. HelloRequest) */
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE request_state;
int in_init;
int read_state_first_init;
/* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
int in_handshake;
/*
* True when are processing a "real" handshake that needs cleaning up (not
* just a HelloRequest or similar).
*/
int cleanuphand;
/* Should we skip the CertificateVerify message? */
unsigned int no_cert_verify;
int use_timer;
ENC_WRITE_STATES enc_write_state;
ENC_READ_STATES enc_read_state;
};
typedef struct ossl_statem_st OSSL_STATEM;
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the *
* state machine. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
__owur int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s);
__owur int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file,
int line);
# define SSL_AD_NO_ALERT -1
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
# define SSLfatal(s, al, f, r) ossl_statem_fatal((s), (al), (f), (r), \
OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
# else
# define SSLfatal(s, al, f, r) ossl_statem_fatal((s), (al), (f), (r), NULL, 0)
# endif
int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init);
int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand);
__owur int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s);
void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int send);
void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s);
__owur int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s);
__owur int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s);
__owur int ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(SSL *s);
/* Flush the write BIO */
int statem_flush(SSL *s);

3851
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1281
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

2403
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

420
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
/*
* Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* The following definitions are PRIVATE to the state machine. They should *
* NOT be used outside of the state machine. *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
/* Max message length definitions */
/* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */
#define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258
#define END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH 0
#define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000
#define HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 20000
#define ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH 20000
#define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400
#define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0
#define KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH 1
#define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1
/* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */
#define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64
/* Dummy message type */
#define SSL3_MT_DUMMY -1
extern const unsigned char hrrrandom[];
/* Message processing return codes */
typedef enum {
/* Something bad happened */
MSG_PROCESS_ERROR,
/* We've finished reading - swap to writing */
MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING,
/*
* We've completed the main processing of this message but there is some
* post processing to be done.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING,
/* We've finished this message - read the next message */
MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
} MSG_PROCESS_RETURN;
typedef int (*confunc_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s);
int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
size_t num_groups, int checkallow);
int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
size_t hrrlen);
int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s);
int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt);
size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
const void *param, size_t paramlen);
/*
* TLS/DTLS client state machine functions
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt);
size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s);
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
/*
* TLS/DTLS server state machine functions
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
confunc_f *confunc,int *mt);
size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s);
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
/* Functions for getting new message data */
__owur int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt);
__owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len);
__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len);
/* Message construction and processing functions */
__owur int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs,
int stop);
__owur WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s);
/* some client-only functions */
__owur int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
__owur int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
__owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s);
__owur int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
__owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
#endif
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/* some server-only functions */
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
__owur int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
#endif
__owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
/* Extension processing */
typedef enum ext_return_en {
EXT_RETURN_FAIL,
EXT_RETURN_SENT,
EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
} EXT_RETURN;
__owur int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx,
RAW_EXTENSION *exts);
__owur int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx,
unsigned int thisctx);
__owur int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init);
__owur int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
__owur int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int fin);
__owur int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx,
unsigned int thisctx, int max_version);
__owur int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
__owur int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *msgstart,
size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
unsigned char *binderout,
SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign, int external);
/* Server Extension processing */
int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidxl);
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/*
* Not in public headers as this is not an official extension. Only used when
* SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set.
*/
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug 0xfde8
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/* Client Extension processing */
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s);
int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s);
int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s);

4272
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

678
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/t1_enc.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/comp.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (md == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, (int)slen) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, (int)seed1_len) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, (int)seed2_len) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, (int)seed3_len) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, (int)seed4_len) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, (int)seed5_len) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &olen) <= 0) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ret;
}
static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
{
int ret;
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
ret = tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
return ret;
}
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
size_t *mac_secret_size;
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
if (s->ext.use_etm)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
else
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
reuse_dd = 1;
} else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
} else {
/*
* make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
}
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
if (mac_ctx == NULL)
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->expand == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
/*
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
} else {
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
if (s->ext.use_etm)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
else
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
reuse_dd = 1;
} else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
} else {
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->compress == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
/*
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
if (reuse_dd)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
j = cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
/* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
else
k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
ms = &(p[0]);
n = i + i;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + j;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k + k;
} else {
n = i;
ms = &(p[n]);
n += i + j;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + k;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k;
}
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
(int)*mac_secret_size);
if (mac_key == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
{
size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
iv)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
int taglen;
if (s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
&& !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
(int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("\niv=");
{
size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("\n");
#endif
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type = NID_undef;
size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return 1;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
&comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("server random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("master key\n");
{
size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
/*
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
}
size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
size_t hashlen;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
}
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
{
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
size_t hashlen;
/*
* Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
* affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
* point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
|| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
#endif
if (!tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
hash, hashlen,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, p, len, out,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
} else {
if (!tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0,
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0, p, len, out,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
#endif
*secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
return 1;
}
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
unsigned char *val = NULL;
size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
int rv;
/*
* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
* than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
* concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
*/
vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
if (use_context) {
vallen += 2 + contextlen;
}
val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
if (val == NULL)
goto err2;
currentvalpos = 0;
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
currentvalpos += llen;
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
if (use_context) {
val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
currentvalpos++;
val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
currentvalpos++;
if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
}
}
/*
* disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
* label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
* the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
*/
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
rv = tls1_PRF(s,
val, vallen,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
out, olen, 0);
goto ret;
err1:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
rv = 0;
goto ret;
err2:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rv = 0;
ret:
OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
return rv;
}
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code) {
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return -1;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
default:
return -1;
}
}

2792
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/t1_lib.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1566
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/t1_trce.c vendored Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

833
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/tls13_enc.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,833 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
/* Always filled with zeros */
static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/*
* Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
* |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
* secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
* The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
* |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
{
static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
int ret;
size_t hkdflabellen;
size_t hashlen;
/*
* 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
* prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
* + bytes for the hash itself
*/
unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+ (sizeof(label_prefix) - 1) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+ 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
WPACKET pkt;
if (pctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
if (fatal) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
} else {
/*
* Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
* or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
|| !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY)
<= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, secret, hashlen) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (ret != 0) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
return ret == 0;
}
/*
* Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
}
/*
* Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
}
int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
}
/*
* Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
* length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
* pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *prevsecret,
const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen,
unsigned char *outsecret)
{
size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
int mdleni;
int ret;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (pctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
mdleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
if (insecret == NULL) {
insecret = default_zeros;
insecretlen = mdlen;
}
if (prevsecret == NULL) {
prevsecret = default_zeros;
prevsecretlen = 0;
} else {
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
/* Generate the pre-extract secret */
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
(unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen,
preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
prevsecret = preextractsec;
prevsecretlen = mdlen;
}
ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
<= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, insecret, insecretlen) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, prevsecret, prevsecretlen)
<= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen)
<= 0;
if (ret != 0)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
return ret == 0;
}
/*
* Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen)
{
/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
insecret, insecretlen,
(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
}
/*
* Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
* secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
* failure.
*/
int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
size_t *secret_size)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
*secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
}
/*
* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
* 0 on error.
*/
size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
} else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
} else {
unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
s->client_app_traffic_secret,
finsecret, hashlen))
goto err;
key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finsecret,
hashlen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
}
if (key == NULL
|| ctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = hashlen;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
return 1;
}
static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
const unsigned char *insecret,
const unsigned char *hash,
const unsigned char *label,
size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
{
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
size_t hashlen;
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
secret, hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
uint32_t algenc;
ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
/* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
} else {
algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
taglen = 0;
}
if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
|| !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
|| (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen, NULL))
|| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
return 0;
}
int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
unsigned char *iv;
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *hash = hashval;
unsigned char *insecret;
unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
const char *log_label = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
size_t finsecretlen = 0;
const unsigned char *label;
size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
int ret = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
} else {
s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
iv = s->read_iv;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
} else {
s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
iv = s->write_iv;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
long handlen;
void *hdata;
unsigned int hashlenui;
const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
insecret = s->early_secret;
label = client_early_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (handlen <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->max_early_data > 0
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
/*
* If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
* actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
* must be using an external PSK.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
&& s->max_early_data ==
s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
}
if (sslcipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
goto err;
}
/*
* We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
* the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
* use ssl_handshake_md().
*/
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mdctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(sslcipher));
md = ssl_md(sslcipher->algorithm2);
if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
goto err;
}
hashlen = hashlenui;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
early_exporter_master_secret,
sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
hashval, hashlen,
s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
label = client_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
/*
* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
* processed early data then we delay changing the server
* read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
* hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
* when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
*/
hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
} else {
insecret = s->master_secret;
label = client_application_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
/*
* For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
* Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
* what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
* previously saved value.
*/
hash = s->server_finished_hash;
}
} else {
/* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
label = server_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
} else {
insecret = s->master_secret;
label = server_application_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
}
}
if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
|| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
* client application traffic secret
*/
if (label == server_application_traffic)
memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
if (label == client_application_traffic) {
/*
* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
* hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
*/
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
resumption_master_secret,
sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, iv,
ciph_ctx)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (label == server_application_traffic) {
memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
/* Now we create the exporter master secret */
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
exporter_master_secret,
sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (label == client_application_traffic)
memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (finsecret != NULL
&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
else
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
return ret;
}
int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
{
static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
int ret = 0;
if (s->server == sending)
insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
else
insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
if (sending) {
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
iv = s->write_iv;
ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
iv = s->read_iv;
ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
application_traffic,
sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, iv,
ciph_ctx)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
return ret;
}
int tls13_alert_code(int code)
{
/* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
return code;
return tls1_alert_code(code);
}
int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
int ret = 0;
if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
goto err;
if (!use_context)
contextlen = 0;
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
out, olen, 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen)
{
static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
int ret = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
goto err;
if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
else
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
md = ssl_md(sslcipher->algorithm2);
/*
* Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
* the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
* is like so:
*
* TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
* "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
*
* Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
* Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
*
* Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
*/
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
out, olen, 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}

456
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/ssl/tls_srp.c vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
/*
* Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
* for the EdelKey project.
*/
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
# include <openssl/srp.h>
int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b);
BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v);
memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx));
ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
return 1;
}
int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
return 1;
}
int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL))
return 0;
memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg;
/* set client Hello login callback */
s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback;
/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback =
ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback;
/* set SRP client passwd callback */
s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback;
s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength;
if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) ||
((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL) &&
((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.info)) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx));
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx));
ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
return 1;
}
/* server side */
int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
{
unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int al;
*ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL) &&
((al =
s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad,
s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)) !=
SSL_ERROR_NONE))
return al;
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
if (RAND_priv_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b, sizeof(b), NULL);
OPENSSL_cleanse(b, sizeof(b));
/* Calculate: B = (kv + g^b) % N */
return ((s->srp_ctx.B =
SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g,
s->srp_ctx.v)) !=
NULL) ? SSL_ERROR_NONE : SSL3_AL_FATAL;
}
/*
* If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the
* fly
*/
int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
const char *grp)
{
SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp);
if (GN == NULL)
return -1;
s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N);
s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g);
BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN
(user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, GN->N, GN->g))
return -1;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info)
{
if (N != NULL) {
if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N, N)) {
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
}
} else
s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N);
}
if (g != NULL) {
if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g, g)) {
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
}
} else
s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g);
}
if (sa != NULL) {
if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s, sa)) {
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
}
} else
s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa);
}
if (v != NULL) {
if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v, v)) {
BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
}
} else
s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v);
}
if (info != NULL) {
if (s->srp_ctx.info)
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info);
if ((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(info)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) ||
!(s->srp_ctx.g) || !(s->srp_ctx.s) || !(s->srp_ctx.v))
return -1;
return 1;
}
int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s)
{
BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL;
int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N))
goto err;
if ((u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b,
s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)
goto err;
tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SRP_GENERATE_SERVER_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1);
err:
BN_clear_free(K);
BN_clear_free(u);
return ret;
}
/* client side */
int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s)
{
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL;
int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0;
char *passwd = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
/*
* Checks if b % n == 0
*/
if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N) == 0
|| (u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N))
== NULL
|| s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SRP_GENERATE_CLIENT_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s,
s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))
== NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SRP_GENERATE_CLIENT_MASTER_SECRET,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if ((x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd)) == NULL
|| (K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B,
s->srp_ctx.g, x,
s->srp_ctx.a, u)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SRP_GENERATE_CLIENT_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SRP_GENERATE_CLIENT_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1);
err:
BN_clear_free(K);
BN_clear_free(x);
if (passwd != NULL)
OPENSSL_clear_free(passwd, strlen(passwd));
BN_clear_free(u);
return ret;
}
int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s)
{
SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
/*
* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0 by checking B
* != 0 since B < N
*/
if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(srp->B)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SRP_VERIFY_SERVER_PARAM,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, SSL_F_SRP_VERIFY_SERVER_PARAM,
SSL_R_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
return 0;
}
if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback) {
if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY,
SSL_F_SRP_VERIFY_SERVER_PARAM,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0;
}
} else if (!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, SSL_F_SRP_VERIFY_SERVER_PARAM,
SSL_R_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (RAND_priv_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
return 0;
s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
return s->srp_ctx.g;
return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g;
}
BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
return s->srp_ctx.N;
return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N;
}
char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
return s->srp_ctx.login;
return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login;
}
char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
return s->srp_ctx.info;
return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info;
}
# define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl
# define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name)
{
return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME, 0, name);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password)
{
return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD, 0, password);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength)
{
return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength,
NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *, void *))
{
return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB,
(void (*)(void))cb);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
{
return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG, 0, arg);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *))
{
return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB,
(void (*)(void))cb);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *))
{
return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB,
(void (*)(void))cb);
}
#endif