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AppleM1: Update openssl to v1.1.1l

This commit is contained in:
winlin 2022-08-14 19:05:01 +08:00
parent 1fe12b8e8c
commit b787656eea
990 changed files with 13406 additions and 18710 deletions

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -12,28 +12,25 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "modes_local.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "rand_local.h"
/*
* Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
*/
static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
int i;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0];
u32 n = 16, c = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
c = *p;
c++;
*p = c;
if (c != 0) {
/* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */
break;
}
}
do {
--n;
c += p[n];
p[n] = (u8)c;
c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
@ -66,15 +63,15 @@ static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
* Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
*/
__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in)
const unsigned char *in, int len)
{
int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
out[i] ^= in[i];
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len)
|| outlen != len)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@ -85,12 +82,16 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
*/
__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
{
if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in)
|| !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in))
return 0;
if (ctr->keylen != 16 && !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in))
return 0;
return 1;
unsigned char in_tmp[48];
unsigned char num_of_blk = 2;
memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16);
memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16);
if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16);
num_of_blk = 3;
}
return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk);
}
/*
@ -99,19 +100,14 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
*/
__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0};
unsigned char num_of_blk;
memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp))
return 0;
ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp))
return 0;
if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp))
return 0;
}
return 1;
num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3;
bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1;
bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2;
return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
/*
@ -200,20 +196,20 @@ __owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
|| !ctr_BCC_final(ctr))
return 0;
/* Set up key K */
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, 1))
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1))
return 0;
/* X follows key K */
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
if (ctr->keylen != 16)
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, ctr->KX + 16,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen,
ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
return 1;
@ -232,31 +228,25 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
{
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48];
unsigned char len;
/* correct key is already set up. */
memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16);
inc_128(ctr);
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
/* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16);
if (ctr->keylen == 16) {
len = 32;
} else {
inc_128(ctr);
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K+16, &outlen, ctr->V,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16);
len = 48;
}
inc_128(ctr);
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->V, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len)
|| outlen != len)
return 0;
/* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
}
memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen);
memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16);
if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
/* If no input reuse existing derived value */
@ -271,7 +261,8 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
}
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
@ -288,8 +279,10 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
return 0;
inc_128(ctr);
if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen))
return 0;
return 1;
@ -299,20 +292,40 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
if (entropy == NULL)
return 0;
inc_128(ctr);
if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
{
u32 n = 12, c = 1;
do {
--n;
c += counter[n];
counter[n] = (u8)c;
c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
unsigned int ctr32, blocks;
int outl, buflen;
if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
inc_128(ctr);
if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
return 0;
/* This means we reuse derived value */
@ -324,28 +337,53 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
adinlen = 0;
}
for ( ; ; ) {
int outl = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
inc_128(ctr);
if (outlen == 0) {
inc_128(ctr);
if (outlen < 16) {
/* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outl, ctr->V,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
break;
}
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, out, &outl, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|| outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
return 0;
out += 16;
outlen -= 16;
if (outlen == 0)
break;
return 1;
}
memset(out, 0, outlen);
do {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1))
return 0;
/*-
* outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an
* int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more
* than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate
* requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple
* of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1.
*/
buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen;
blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16;
ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks;
if (ctr32 < blocks) {
/* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */
if (ctr32 != 0) {
blocks -= ctr32;
buflen = blocks * 16;
ctr32 = 0;
}
ctr96_inc(ctr->V);
}
PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32);
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen)
|| outl != buflen)
return 0;
out += buflen;
outlen -= buflen;
} while (outlen);
if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
return 0;
return 1;
@ -353,7 +391,8 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
return 1;
@ -377,25 +416,36 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
return 0;
case NID_aes_128_ctr:
keylen = 16;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
break;
case NID_aes_192_ctr:
keylen = 24;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
break;
case NID_aes_256_ctr:
keylen = 32;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
break;
}
drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
ctr->keylen = keylen;
if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
ctr->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL)
ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL)
ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))
return 0;
drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
@ -413,7 +463,8 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
return 0;
/* Set key schedule for df_key */
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, ctr->cipher, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
return 0;
drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;