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AppleM1: Update openssl to v1.1.1l

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winlin 2022-08-14 19:05:01 +08:00
parent 1fe12b8e8c
commit b787656eea
990 changed files with 13406 additions and 18710 deletions
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52
trunk/3rdparty/openssl-1.1-fit/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c vendored
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
*/
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "rsa_locl.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen,
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
* encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
* decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
* num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
* |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
* the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
* This does not leak any side-channel information.
*/
@ -179,17 +179,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
from = em;
/*
* The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
* true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
* Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
*/
good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
maskedseed = from + 1;
maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
maskedseed = em + 1;
maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
goto cleanup;
@ -230,29 +229,30 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
/*
* Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
* |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
* bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
* where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
* about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
* memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
* Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left.
* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|.
* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
* parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */
mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) {
mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0);
for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++)
db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]);
}
/*