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AppleM1: Update openssl to v1.1.1l
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1fe12b8e8c
commit
b787656eea
990 changed files with 13406 additions and 18710 deletions
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
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#include "internal/constant_time.h"
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int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *from, int flen)
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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int i, j;
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unsigned char *p;
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if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
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if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
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RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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return 0;
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@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
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int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
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if (flen < 10) {
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if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
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return -1;
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if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
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return -1;
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}
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@ -89,10 +92,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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from -= 1 & mask;
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*--em = *from & mask;
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}
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from = em;
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good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
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good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
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good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
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good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
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err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
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mask = ~good;
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@ -100,18 +102,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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found_zero_byte = 0;
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threes_in_row = 0;
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for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
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unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
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unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
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zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
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i, zero_index);
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found_zero_byte |= equals0;
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threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
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threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
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threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
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}
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/*
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* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
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* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
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* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
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* also fails.
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*/
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@ -120,6 +122,12 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
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mask = ~good;
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/*
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* Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note
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* that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject
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* if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is
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* corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC.
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*/
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good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
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err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
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RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
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@ -139,24 +147,25 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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/*
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* Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
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* |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
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* bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
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* where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
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* about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
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* memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
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* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
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* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
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* Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
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* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
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* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
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* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
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* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
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* parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
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* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
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* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
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*/
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tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
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msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
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mlen = num - msg_index;
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for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
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unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
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from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
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mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
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to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
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tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
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num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
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for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
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mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
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for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
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em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
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}
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for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
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mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
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to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
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}
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OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
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