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AppleM1: Update openssl to v1.1.1l
This commit is contained in:
winlin
parent
1fe12b8e8c
commit
b787656eea
990 changed files with 13406 additions and 18710 deletions
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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@ -10,14 +10,15 @@
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#include <string.h>
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#include "internal/nelem.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include "statem_locl.h"
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#include "../ssl_local.h"
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#include "statem_local.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
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static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
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static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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#endif
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static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
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@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
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static int final_psk(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
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/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
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typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
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@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
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/*
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* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
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* of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
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* indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
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* indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_local.h.
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* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
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* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
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* extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the
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@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
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TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
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SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
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| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
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NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
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init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
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tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
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final_ec_pt_formats
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},
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@ -336,6 +338,8 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
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tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
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final_key_share
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},
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#else
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INVALID_EXTENSION,
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#endif
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{
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/* Must be after key_share */
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@ -387,7 +391,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
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SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
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| SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
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NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
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tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL
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tls_construct_ctos_psk, final_psk
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}
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};
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@ -949,8 +953,7 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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* was successful.
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*/
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if (s->server) {
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/* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) revisit !sent case */
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if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
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if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && !s->hit) {
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/* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */
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OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
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s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
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@ -967,7 +970,8 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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* context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good
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* exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
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*/
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if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
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if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx
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&& s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) {
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tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept);
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tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
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}
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@ -989,7 +993,6 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
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ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
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ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
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ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
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if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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@ -1012,6 +1015,7 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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/* TLSv1.3 doesn't have warning alerts so we suppress this */
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if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
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ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
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s->servername_done = 0;
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return 1;
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case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
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@ -1024,6 +1028,15 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
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s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
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s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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{
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unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
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@ -1041,18 +1054,18 @@ static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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*/
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if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
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&& s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
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&& s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
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&& s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
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&& s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL
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&& s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0
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&& ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
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/* we are using an ECC cipher */
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size_t i;
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unsigned char *list = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
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unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats;
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for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
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for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
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if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
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break;
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}
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if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
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if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
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SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
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return 0;
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@ -1137,6 +1150,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
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OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
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s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
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s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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@ -1146,6 +1160,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
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OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs);
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s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL;
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s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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@ -1169,14 +1184,26 @@ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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{
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if (!s->server)
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if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
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s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
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s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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{
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/*
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* Check extended master secret extension is not dropped on
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* renegotiation.
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*/
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if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
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&& (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS)) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
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SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!s->server && s->hit) {
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/*
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* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
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@ -1449,8 +1476,13 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
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unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char *early_secret;
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#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
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static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = { 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
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static const unsigned char external_label[] = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
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#else
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static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
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static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder";
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#endif
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const unsigned char *label;
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size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize;
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int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md);
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@ -1646,13 +1678,12 @@ static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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if (s->max_early_data == 0
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|| !s->hit
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|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
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|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
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|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
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|| s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
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|| (s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
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&& !s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb(s,
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s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
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|| (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
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&& !s->allow_early_data_cb(s,
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s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
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s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
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} else {
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s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
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@ -1698,3 +1729,19 @@ static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* If clients offer "pre_shared_key" without a "psk_key_exchange_modes"
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* extension, servers MUST abort the handshake.
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*/
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static int final_psk(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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{
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if (s->server && sent && s->clienthello != NULL
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&& !s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes].present) {
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SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_PSK,
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SSL_R_MISSING_PSK_KEX_MODES_EXTENSION);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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