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704 lines
22 KiB
C
704 lines
22 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/ts.h>
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#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
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#include "ts_lcl.h"
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static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
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X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
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static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
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static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
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static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert);
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static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert);
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static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
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PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
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static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response);
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static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text);
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static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid,
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const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
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static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
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X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
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unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len);
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static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
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const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
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TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
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static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
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static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer);
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static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names,
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GENERAL_NAME *name);
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static int ts_find_cert_v2(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID_V2) *cert_ids, X509 *cert);
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static ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2 *ess_get_signing_cert_v2(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
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/*
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* This must be large enough to hold all values in ts_status_text (with
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* comma separator) or all text fields in ts_failure_info (also with comma).
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*/
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#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256
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/*
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* Local mapping between response codes and descriptions.
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*/
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static const char *ts_status_text[] = {
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"granted",
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"grantedWithMods",
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"rejection",
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"waiting",
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"revocationWarning",
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"revocationNotification"
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};
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#define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text)
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static struct {
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int code;
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const char *text;
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} ts_failure_info[] = {
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{TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "badAlg"},
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{TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "badRequest"},
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{TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "badDataFormat"},
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{TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "timeNotAvailable"},
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{TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "unacceptedPolicy"},
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{TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "unacceptedExtension"},
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{TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "addInfoNotAvailable"},
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{TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"}
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};
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/*-
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* This function carries out the following tasks:
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* - Checks if there is one and only one signer.
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* - Search for the signing certificate in 'certs' and in the response.
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* - Check the extended key usage and key usage fields of the signer
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* certificate (done by the path validation).
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* - Build and validate the certificate path.
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* - Check if the certificate path meets the requirements of the
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* SigningCertificate ESS signed attribute.
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* - Verify the signature value.
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* - Returns the signer certificate in 'signer', if 'signer' is not NULL.
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*/
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int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out)
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{
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STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = NULL;
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PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
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STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL;
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X509 *signer;
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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char buf[4096];
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int i, j = 0, ret = 0;
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BIO *p7bio = NULL;
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/* Some sanity checks first. */
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if (!token) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token);
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if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER);
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goto err;
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}
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si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0);
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if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Get hold of the signer certificate, search only internal certificates
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* if it was requested.
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*/
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signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(token, certs, 0);
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if (!signers || sk_X509_num(signers) != 1)
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goto err;
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signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0);
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if (!ts_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain))
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goto err;
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if (!ts_check_signing_certs(si, chain))
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goto err;
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p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL);
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/* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
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while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
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continue;
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j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer);
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if (j <= 0) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (signer_out) {
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*signer_out = signer;
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X509_up_ref(signer);
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BIO_free_all(p7bio);
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sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
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sk_X509_free(signers);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* The certificate chain is returned in chain. Caller is responsible for
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* freeing the vector.
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*/
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static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
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X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
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{
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X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL;
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int i;
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int ret = 0;
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*chain = NULL;
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cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
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if (cert_ctx == NULL) {
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted))
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goto end;
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
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i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx);
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if (i <= 0) {
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int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx);
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
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X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
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goto err;
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}
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*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(cert_ctx);
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ret = 1;
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goto end;
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err:
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ret = 0;
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end:
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X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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{
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ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ss = ess_get_signing_cert(si);
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STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids = NULL;
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ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2 *ssv2 = ess_get_signing_cert_v2(si);
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STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID_V2) *cert_ids_v2 = NULL;
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X509 *cert;
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int i = 0;
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int ret = 0;
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if (ss != NULL) {
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cert_ids = ss->cert_ids;
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cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0)
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goto err;
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/*
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* Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one
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* certificate ids in cert_ids.
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*/
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if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) {
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for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
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cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
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if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0)
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goto err;
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}
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}
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} else if (ssv2 != NULL) {
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cert_ids_v2 = ssv2->cert_ids;
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cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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if (ts_find_cert_v2(cert_ids_v2, cert) != 0)
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goto err;
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/*
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* Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one
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* certificate ids in cert_ids.
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*/
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if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_V2_num(cert_ids_v2) > 1) {
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for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
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cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
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if (ts_find_cert_v2(cert_ids_v2, cert) < 0)
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goto err;
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}
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}
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} else {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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if (!ret)
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS,
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TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
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ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ss);
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ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2_free(ssv2);
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return ret;
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}
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static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
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{
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ASN1_TYPE *attr;
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const unsigned char *p;
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attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate);
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if (!attr)
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return NULL;
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p = attr->value.sequence->data;
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return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
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}
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static ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2 *ess_get_signing_cert_v2(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
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{
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ASN1_TYPE *attr;
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const unsigned char *p;
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attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2);
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if (attr == NULL)
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return NULL;
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p = attr->value.sequence->data;
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return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
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}
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/* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */
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static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
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{
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int i;
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unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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if (!cert_ids || !cert)
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return -1;
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X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL);
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/* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */
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X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
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/* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
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ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i);
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if (cid->hash->length == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
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&& memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
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ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
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if (!is || !ts_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert))
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return i;
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}
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}
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return -1;
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}
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/* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */
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static int ts_find_cert_v2(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID_V2) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
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{
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int i;
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unsigned char cert_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int len;
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/* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_V2_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
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ESS_CERT_ID_V2 *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_V2_value(cert_ids, i);
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const EVP_MD *md;
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if (cid->hash_alg != NULL)
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md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hash_alg->algorithm);
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else
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md = EVP_sha256();
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X509_digest(cert, md, cert_digest, &len);
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if (cid->hash->length != (int)len)
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return -1;
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if (memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert_digest, cid->hash->length) == 0) {
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ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
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if (is == NULL || !ts_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert))
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return i;
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}
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}
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return -1;
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}
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static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert)
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{
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GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
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if (!is || !cert || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1)
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return -1;
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issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0);
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if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME
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|| X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
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return -1;
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if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*-
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* Verifies whether 'response' contains a valid response with regards
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* to the settings of the context:
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* - Gives an error message if the TS_TST_INFO is not present.
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* - Calls _TS_RESP_verify_token to verify the token content.
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*/
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int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response)
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{
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PKCS7 *token = response->token;
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TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = response->tst_info;
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int ret = 0;
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if (!ts_check_status_info(response))
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goto err;
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if (!int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Tries to extract a TS_TST_INFO structure from the PKCS7 token and
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* calls the internal int_TS_RESP_verify_token function for verifying it.
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*/
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int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token)
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{
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TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token);
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int ret = 0;
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if (tst_info) {
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ret = int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info);
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TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*-
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* Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token
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* with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are
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* carried out that are specified in the context:
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* - Verifies the signature of the TS_TST_INFO.
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* - Checks the version number of the response.
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* - Check if the requested and returned policies math.
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* - Check if the message imprints are the same.
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* - Check if the nonces are the same.
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* - Check if the TSA name matches the signer.
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* - Check if the TSA name is the expected TSA.
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*/
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static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
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PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
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{
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X509 *signer = NULL;
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GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = tst_info->tsa;
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X509_ALGOR *md_alg = NULL;
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unsigned char *imprint = NULL;
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unsigned imprint_len = 0;
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int ret = 0;
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int flags = ctx->flags;
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/* Some options require us to also check the signature */
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if (((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER) && tsa_name != NULL)
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|| (flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)) {
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flags |= TS_VFY_SIGNATURE;
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}
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
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&& !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
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goto err;
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
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&& TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
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TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
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goto err;
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}
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
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&& !ts_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
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goto err;
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
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&& !ts_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
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tst_info))
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goto err;
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
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&& (!ts_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
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&md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
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|| !ts_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
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goto err;
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
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&& !ts_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
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goto err;
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if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
|
|
&& tsa_name && !ts_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
|
|
&& !ts_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
X509_free(signer);
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(imprint);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
|
|
{
|
|
TS_STATUS_INFO *info = response->status_info;
|
|
long status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(info->status);
|
|
const char *status_text = NULL;
|
|
char *embedded_status_text = NULL;
|
|
char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = "";
|
|
|
|
if (status == 0 || status == 1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */
|
|
if (0 <= status && status < (long) OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text))
|
|
status_text = ts_status_text[status];
|
|
else
|
|
status_text = "unknown code";
|
|
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0
|
|
&& (embedded_status_text = ts_get_status_text(info->text)) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Fill in failure_text with the failure information. */
|
|
if (info->failure_info) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
int first = 1;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(ts_failure_info); ++i) {
|
|
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
|
|
ts_failure_info[i].code)) {
|
|
if (!first)
|
|
strcat(failure_text, ",");
|
|
else
|
|
first = 0;
|
|
strcat(failure_text, ts_failure_info[i].text);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (failure_text[0] == '\0')
|
|
strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified");
|
|
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(6,
|
|
"status code: ", status_text,
|
|
", status text: ", embedded_status_text ?
|
|
embedded_status_text : "unspecified",
|
|
", failure codes: ", failure_text);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(embedded_status_text);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
int length = 0;
|
|
char *result = NULL;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
|
|
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_length(current) > TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH - length - 1)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
|
|
length += 1; /* separator character */
|
|
}
|
|
if ((result = OPENSSL_malloc(length)) == NULL) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
|
|
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
|
|
length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
*p++ = '/';
|
|
strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current), length);
|
|
p += length;
|
|
}
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid,
|
|
const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
|
|
{
|
|
const ASN1_OBJECT *resp_oid = tst_info->policy_id;
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_cmp(req_oid, resp_oid) != 0) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY, TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
|
|
X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
|
|
unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len)
|
|
{
|
|
TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = tst_info->msg_imprint;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = msg_imprint->hash_algo;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char buffer[4096];
|
|
int length;
|
|
|
|
*md_alg = NULL;
|
|
*imprint = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm)) == NULL) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
length = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
|
if (length < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
*imprint_len = length;
|
|
if ((*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len)) == NULL) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
|
|
*imprint_len = 0;
|
|
*imprint = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
|
|
const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
|
|
TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
|
|
{
|
|
TS_MSG_IMPRINT *b = tst_info->msg_imprint;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *algor_b = b->hash_algo;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (algor_a) {
|
|
if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* The parameter must be NULL in both. */
|
|
if ((algor_a->parameter
|
|
&& ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_a->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
|
|
|| (algor_b->parameter
|
|
&& ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_b->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
|
|
memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS, TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
|
|
{
|
|
const ASN1_INTEGER *b = tst_info->nonce;
|
|
|
|
if (!b) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* No error if a nonce is returned without being requested. */
|
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a, b) != 0) {
|
|
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the specified TSA name matches either the subject or one of the
|
|
* subject alternative names of the TSA certificate.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names = NULL;
|
|
int idx = -1;
|
|
int found = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME
|
|
&& X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, X509_get_subject_name(signer)) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
|
|
while (gen_names != NULL) {
|
|
found = ts_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0;
|
|
if (found)
|
|
break;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the next subject alternative name, although there should be no
|
|
* more than one.
|
|
*/
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
|
|
gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
|
|
}
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
|
|
|
|
return found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns 1 if name is in gen_names, 0 otherwise. */
|
|
static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, found;
|
|
for (i = 0, found = 0; !found && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gen_names); ++i) {
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *current = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gen_names, i);
|
|
found = GENERAL_NAME_cmp(current, name) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return found ? i - 1 : -1;
|
|
}
|