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			414 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			12 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			414 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			12 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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|  *
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|  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
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|  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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|  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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|  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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|  */
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| 
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| #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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| #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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| #include <openssl/pem.h>
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| #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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| #include <openssl/err.h>
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| #include <openssl/cms.h>
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| #include <openssl/aes.h>
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| #include "cms_local.h"
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| #include "crypto/asn1.h"
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| 
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| /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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|                                     X509_ALGOR **palg,
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|                                     ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
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| {
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|     if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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|         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
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|                CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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|         return 0;
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|     }
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|     if (palg)
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|         *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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|     if (pukm)
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|         *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
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|     return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
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| 
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| STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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| *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| {
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|     if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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|         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
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|                CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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|         return NULL;
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|     }
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|     return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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|                                         X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
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|                                         ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
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|                                         ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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|                                         X509_NAME **issuer,
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|                                         ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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| {
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|     CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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|     if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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|         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
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|                CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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|         return 0;
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|     }
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|     oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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|     if (issuer)
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|         *issuer = NULL;
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|     if (sno)
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|         *sno = NULL;
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|     if (keyid)
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|         *keyid = NULL;
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|     if (pubalg)
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|         *pubalg = NULL;
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|     if (pubkey)
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|         *pubkey = NULL;
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|     if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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|         if (issuer)
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|             *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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|         if (sno)
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|             *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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|     } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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|         if (keyid)
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|             *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
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|     } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
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|         if (pubalg)
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|             *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
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|         if (pubkey)
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|             *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
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|     } else
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|         return 0;
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|     return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
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| {
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|     CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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|     if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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|         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
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|                CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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|         return -2;
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|     }
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|     oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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|     if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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|         return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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|     else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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|         return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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|     return -1;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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|                                       ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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|                                       ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
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|                                       CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
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|                                       X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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| {
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|     CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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|     if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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|         if (issuer)
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|             *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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|         if (sno)
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|             *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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|         if (keyid)
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|             *keyid = NULL;
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|         if (tm)
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|             *tm = NULL;
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|         if (other)
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|             *other = NULL;
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|     } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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|         if (keyid)
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|             *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
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|         if (tm)
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|             *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
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|         if (other)
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|             *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
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|         if (issuer)
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|             *issuer = NULL;
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|         if (sno)
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|             *sno = NULL;
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|     } else
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|         return 0;
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|     return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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|                                        X509 *cert)
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| {
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|     CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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|     if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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|         return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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|     else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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|         return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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|     else
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|         return -1;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
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| {
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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|     CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
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| 
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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|     kari->pctx = NULL;
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|     if (!pk)
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|         return 1;
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|     pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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|     if (!pctx || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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|         goto err;
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|     kari->pctx = pctx;
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|     return 1;
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|  err:
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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|     return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| {
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|     if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
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|         return ri->d.kari->ctx;
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|     return NULL;
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
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|  * or the encrypted CEK.
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|  */
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| 
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| static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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|                           const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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|                           CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
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| {
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|     /* Key encryption key */
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|     unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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|     size_t keklen;
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|     int rv = 0;
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|     unsigned char *out = NULL;
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|     int outlen;
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|     keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
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|     if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
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|         return 0;
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|     /* Derive KEK */
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|     if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
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|         goto err;
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|     /* Set KEK in context */
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|     if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
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|         goto err;
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|     /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
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|     if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
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|         goto err;
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|     out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
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|     if (out == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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|     if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
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|         goto err;
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|     *pout = out;
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|     *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
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|     rv = 1;
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| 
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|  err:
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|     OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
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|     if (!rv)
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|         OPENSSL_free(out);
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|     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
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|     /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here?  /RL */
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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|     kari->pctx = NULL;
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|     return rv;
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| }
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| 
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| int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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|                                    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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|                                    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
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| {
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|     int rv = 0;
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|     unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
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|     size_t enckeylen;
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|     size_t ceklen;
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|     CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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|     enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
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|     enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
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|     /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
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|     if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
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|         goto err;
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|     /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
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|     if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
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|         goto err;
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|     ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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|     OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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|     ec->key = cek;
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|     ec->keylen = ceklen;
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|     cek = NULL;
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|     rv = 1;
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|  err:
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|     OPENSSL_free(cek);
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|     return rv;
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| }
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| 
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| /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
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| static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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|                                          EVP_PKEY *pk)
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| {
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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|     EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
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|     int rv = 0;
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|     pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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|     if (!pctx)
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|         goto err;
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|     if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
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|         goto err;
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|     if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
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|         goto err;
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|     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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|     pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
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|     if (!pctx)
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|         goto err;
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|     if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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|         goto err;
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|     kari->pctx = pctx;
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|     rv = 1;
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|  err:
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|     if (!rv)
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|         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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|     EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
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|     return rv;
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| }
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| 
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| /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
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| 
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| int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
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|                                 EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
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| {
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|     CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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|     CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
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| 
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|     ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
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|     if (!ri->d.kari)
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|         return 0;
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|     ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
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| 
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|     kari = ri->d.kari;
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|     kari->version = 3;
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| 
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|     rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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|     if (rek == NULL)
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|         return 0;
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| 
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|     if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
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|         M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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|         return 0;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
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|         rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
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|         rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
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|         if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
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|             return 0;
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|         if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
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|             return 0;
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|     } else {
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|         rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
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|         if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
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|             return 0;
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* Create ephemeral key */
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|     if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
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|         return 0;
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| 
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|     EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
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|     rek->pkey = pk;
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|     return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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|                          const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
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| {
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|     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
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|     const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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|     int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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|     /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
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|     kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
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| 
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|     if (kekcipher) {
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|         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
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|             return 0;
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|         return 1;
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|     }
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|     /*
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|      * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
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|      * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
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|      */
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| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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|     if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
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|         kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
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|     else
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| #endif
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|     if (keylen <= 16)
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|         kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
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|     else if (keylen <= 24)
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|         kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
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|     else
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|         kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
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|     return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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| }
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| 
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| /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
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| 
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| int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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|                                    CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| {
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|     CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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|     CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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|     CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
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|     STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
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|     int i;
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| 
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|     if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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|         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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|         return 0;
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|     }
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|     kari = ri->d.kari;
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|     reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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|     ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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|     /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
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|     if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
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|         return 0;
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|     /*
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|      * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
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|      * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
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|      */
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|     if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
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|         CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
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|         oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
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|         oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
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|         if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
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|             return 0;
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|     }
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|     /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
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|     if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
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|         return 0;
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|     /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
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|     for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
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|         unsigned char *enckey;
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|         size_t enckeylen;
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|         rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
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|         if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
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|             return 0;
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|         if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
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|                             kari, 1))
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|             return 0;
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|         ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
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|     }
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| 
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|     return 1;
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| 
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| }
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