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702 lines
21 KiB
C
702 lines
21 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2003-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/numbers.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "crypto/asn1.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/conf.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "crypto/x509.h"
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#include "ext_dat.h"
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static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
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X509V3_CTX *ctx,
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STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
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static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
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BIO *bp, int ind);
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static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
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STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp,
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int ind, const char *name);
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static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
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static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
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static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
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static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm);
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static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
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static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
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static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
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static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base);
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const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = {
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NID_name_constraints, 0,
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ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
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0, 0, 0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
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i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0,
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NULL
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};
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
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ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees,
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GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0),
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ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees,
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GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1),
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
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#define IA5_OFFSET_LEN(ia5base, offset) \
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((ia5base)->length - ((unsigned char *)(offset) - (ia5base)->data))
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/* Like memchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING. Additionally you can specify the
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* starting point to search from
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*/
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# define ia5memchr(str, start, c) memchr(start, c, IA5_OFFSET_LEN(str, start))
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/* Like memrrchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING */
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static char *ia5memrchr(ASN1_IA5STRING *str, int c)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = str->length; i > 0 && str->data[i - 1] != c; i--);
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if (i == 0)
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return NULL;
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return (char *)&str->data[i - 1];
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}
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/*
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* We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. It
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* also doesn't work with ASN1_STRINGs that may have embedded NUL characters.
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* For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
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* do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
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* numeric constants below).
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*/
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static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
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{
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for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) {
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if (*s1 != *s2) {
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unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2;
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/* Convert to lower case */
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if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
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c1 += 0x20;
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if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
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c2 += 0x20;
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if (c1 == c2)
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continue;
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if (c1 < c2)
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return -1;
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/* c1 > c2 */
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
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X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
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{
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int i;
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CONF_VALUE tval, *val;
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STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL;
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL;
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GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL;
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ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new();
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if (ncons == NULL)
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goto memerr;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
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val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
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if (strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) == 0 && val->name[9]) {
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ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees;
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tval.name = val->name + 10;
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} else if (strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) == 0 && val->name[8]) {
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ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees;
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tval.name = val->name + 9;
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} else {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
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goto err;
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}
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tval.value = val->value;
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sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
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if (sub == NULL)
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goto memerr;
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if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
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goto err;
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if (*ptree == NULL)
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*ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null();
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if (*ptree == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub))
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goto memerr;
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sub = NULL;
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}
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return ncons;
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memerr:
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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err:
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons);
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GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub);
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return NULL;
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}
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static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
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BIO *bp, int ind)
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{
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a;
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do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees,
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bp, ind, "Permitted");
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do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees,
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bp, ind, "Excluded");
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return 1;
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}
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static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
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STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees,
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BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name)
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{
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GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree;
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int i;
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if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0)
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BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) {
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tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i);
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BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, "");
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if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD)
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print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip);
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else
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GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base);
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BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip)
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{
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int i, len;
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unsigned char *p;
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p = ip->data;
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len = ip->length;
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BIO_puts(bp, "IP:");
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if (len == 8) {
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BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d",
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p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]);
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} else if (len == 32) {
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
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BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
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p += 2;
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if (i == 7)
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BIO_puts(bp, "/");
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else if (i != 15)
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BIO_puts(bp, ":");
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}
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} else
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BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:<invalid>");
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return 1;
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}
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#define NAME_CHECK_MAX (1 << 20)
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static int add_lengths(int *out, int a, int b)
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{
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/* sk_FOO_num(NULL) returns -1 but is effectively 0 when iterating. */
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if (a < 0)
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a = 0;
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if (b < 0)
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b = 0;
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if (a > INT_MAX - b)
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return 0;
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*out = a + b;
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return 1;
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}
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/*-
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* Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints.
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* Return values:
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* X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed.
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* X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation.
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* X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation.
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* X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type.
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* X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type.
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* X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax.
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* X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name
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*/
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int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
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{
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int r, i, name_count, constraint_count;
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X509_NAME *nm;
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nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
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/*
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* Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or
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* constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints check.
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*/
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if (!add_lengths(&name_count, X509_NAME_entry_count(nm),
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sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname))
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|| !add_lengths(&constraint_count,
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sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees),
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sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees))
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|| (name_count > 0 && constraint_count > NAME_CHECK_MAX / name_count))
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return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) {
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GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
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gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME;
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gntmp.d.directoryName = nm;
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r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
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if (r != X509_V_OK)
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return r;
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gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL;
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/* Process any email address attributes in subject name */
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for (i = -1;;) {
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const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
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i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i);
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if (i == -1)
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break;
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ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
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gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
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if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
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return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
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r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
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if (r != X509_V_OK)
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return r;
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) {
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GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i);
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r = nc_match(gen, nc);
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if (r != X509_V_OK)
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return r;
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}
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return X509_V_OK;
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}
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static int cn2dnsid(ASN1_STRING *cn, unsigned char **dnsid, size_t *idlen)
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{
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int utf8_length;
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unsigned char *utf8_value;
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int i;
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int isdnsname = 0;
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/* Don't leave outputs uninitialized */
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*dnsid = NULL;
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*idlen = 0;
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/*-
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* Per RFC 6125, DNS-IDs representing internationalized domain names appear
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* in certificates in A-label encoded form:
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*
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* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.2
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*
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* The same applies to CNs which are intended to represent DNS names.
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* However, while in the SAN DNS-IDs are IA5Strings, as CNs they may be
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* needlessly encoded in 16-bit Unicode. We perform a conversion to UTF-8
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* to ensure that we get an ASCII representation of any CNs that are
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* representable as ASCII, but just not encoded as ASCII. The UTF-8 form
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* may contain some non-ASCII octets, and that's fine, such CNs are not
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* valid legacy DNS names.
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*
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* Note, 'int' is the return type of ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() so that's what
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* we must use for 'utf8_length'.
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*/
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if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, cn)) < 0)
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return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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/*
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* Some certificates have had names that include a *trailing* NUL byte.
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* Remove these harmless NUL characters. They would otherwise yield false
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* alarms with the following embedded NUL check.
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*/
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while (utf8_length > 0 && utf8_value[utf8_length - 1] == '\0')
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--utf8_length;
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/* Reject *embedded* NULs */
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if (memchr(utf8_value, 0, utf8_length) != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
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return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
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}
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/*
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* XXX: Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_'
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* Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal,
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* and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'.
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*
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* If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name. This
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* means that "CN=sometld" cannot be precluded by DNS name constraints, but
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* that is not a problem.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < utf8_length; ++i) {
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unsigned char c = utf8_value[i];
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if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
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|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
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|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
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|| c == '_')
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continue;
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/* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */
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if (i > 0 && i < utf8_length - 1) {
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if (c == '-')
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continue;
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/*
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* Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be
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* another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is
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* plausible, since it has two or more labels.
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*/
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if (c == '.'
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&& utf8_value[i + 1] != '.'
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&& utf8_value[i - 1] != '-'
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&& utf8_value[i + 1] != '-') {
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isdnsname = 1;
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continue;
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}
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}
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isdnsname = 0;
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break;
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}
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if (isdnsname) {
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*dnsid = utf8_value;
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*idlen = (size_t)utf8_length;
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return X509_V_OK;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
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return X509_V_OK;
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}
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/*
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* Check CN against DNS-ID name constraints.
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*/
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int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
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{
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int r, i;
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X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
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ASN1_STRING stmp;
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GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
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stmp.flags = 0;
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stmp.type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
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gntmp.type = GEN_DNS;
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gntmp.d.dNSName = &stmp;
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/* Process any commonName attributes in subject name */
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for (i = -1;;) {
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X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
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ASN1_STRING *cn;
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unsigned char *idval;
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size_t idlen;
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i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, i);
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if (i == -1)
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break;
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ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
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cn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
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/* Only process attributes that look like host names */
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if ((r = cn2dnsid(cn, &idval, &idlen)) != X509_V_OK)
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return r;
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if (idlen == 0)
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continue;
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stmp.length = idlen;
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stmp.data = idval;
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r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
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OPENSSL_free(idval);
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if (r != X509_V_OK)
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return r;
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}
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return X509_V_OK;
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}
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static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
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{
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GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
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int i, r, match = 0;
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/*
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* Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
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* least one subtree must match.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
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sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
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if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
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continue;
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if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
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return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
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/* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */
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if (match == 2)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (match == 0)
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
|
|
if (r == X509_V_OK)
|
|
match = 2;
|
|
else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (match == 1)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
/* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
|
|
sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
|
|
if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
|
|
|
|
r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
|
|
if (r == X509_V_OK)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
|
|
else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (base->type) {
|
|
case GEN_DIRNAME:
|
|
return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
|
|
|
|
case GEN_DNS:
|
|
return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName);
|
|
|
|
case GEN_EMAIL:
|
|
return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name);
|
|
|
|
case GEN_URI:
|
|
return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier,
|
|
base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier);
|
|
|
|
case GEN_IPADD:
|
|
return nc_ip(gen->d.iPAddress, base->d.iPAddress);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of
|
|
* X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a
|
|
* subset of the name.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */
|
|
if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
|
|
if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
|
|
if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
|
|
{
|
|
char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
|
|
char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
|
|
|
|
/* Empty matches everything */
|
|
if (base->length == 0)
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
if (dns->length < base->length)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
|
|
* and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dns->length > base->length) {
|
|
dnsptr += dns->length - base->length;
|
|
if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.')
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr, base->length))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
|
|
const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
|
|
const char *baseat = ia5memrchr(base, '@');
|
|
const char *emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@');
|
|
size_t basehostlen, emlhostlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!emlat)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
|
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
|
|
if (!baseat && base->length > 0 && (*baseptr == '.')) {
|
|
if (eml->length > base->length) {
|
|
emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
|
|
if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, base->length) == 0)
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have anything before '@' match local part */
|
|
|
|
if (baseat) {
|
|
if (baseat != baseptr) {
|
|
if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
/* Case sensitive match of local part */
|
|
if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Position base after '@' */
|
|
baseptr = baseat + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
emlptr = emlat + 1;
|
|
basehostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(base, baseptr);
|
|
emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr);
|
|
/* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
|
|
if (basehostlen != emlhostlen || ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlhostlen))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
|
|
const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
|
|
const char *p = ia5memchr(uri, (char *)uri->data, ':');
|
|
int hostlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
|
|
if (p == NULL
|
|
|| IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, p) < 3
|
|
|| p[1] != '/'
|
|
|| p[2] != '/')
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
|
hostptr = p + 3;
|
|
|
|
/* Determine length of hostname part of URI */
|
|
|
|
/* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
|
|
|
|
p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, ':');
|
|
/* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, '/');
|
|
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
hostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, hostptr);
|
|
else
|
|
hostlen = p - hostptr;
|
|
|
|
if (hostlen == 0)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
|
|
|
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
|
|
if (base->length > 0 && *baseptr == '.') {
|
|
if (hostlen > base->length) {
|
|
p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
|
|
if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
|
|
|| ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base)
|
|
{
|
|
int hostlen, baselen, i;
|
|
unsigned char *hostptr, *baseptr, *maskptr;
|
|
hostptr = ip->data;
|
|
hostlen = ip->length;
|
|
baseptr = base->data;
|
|
baselen = base->length;
|
|
|
|
/* Invalid if not IPv4 or IPv6 */
|
|
if (!((hostlen == 4) || (hostlen == 16)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
|
if (!((baselen == 8) || (baselen == 32)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
|
|
|
/* Do not match IPv4 with IPv6 */
|
|
if (hostlen * 2 != baselen)
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
maskptr = base->data + hostlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Considering possible not aligned base ipAddress */
|
|
/* Not checking for wrong mask definition: i.e.: 255.0.255.0 */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++)
|
|
if ((hostptr[i] & maskptr[i]) != (baseptr[i] & maskptr[i]))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|