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			489 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			14 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			489 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			14 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
/*
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 * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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 *
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 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
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 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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 */
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "modes_local.h"
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#include "internal/thread_once.h"
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#include "rand_local.h"
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/*
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 * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
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 */
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static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
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{
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    unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0];
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    u32 n = 16, c = 1;
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    do {
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        --n;
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        c += p[n];
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        p[n] = (u8)c;
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        c >>= 8;
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    } while (n);
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}
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static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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    size_t i, n;
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    if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
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        return;
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    /*
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     * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
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     * are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
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     */
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    n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
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    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
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        ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
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    if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
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        return;
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    n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
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    if (n > 16) {
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        /* Should never happen */
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        n = 16;
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    }
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    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
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        ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
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}
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/*
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 * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
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 */
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__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
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                                const unsigned char *in, int len)
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{
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    int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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        out[i] ^= in[i];
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    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len)
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        || outlen != len)
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        return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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/*
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 * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
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 */
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__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
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{
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    unsigned char in_tmp[48];
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    unsigned char num_of_blk = 2;
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    memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16);
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    memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16);
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    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
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        memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16);
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        num_of_blk = 3;
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    }
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    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk);
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}
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/*
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 * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
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 * see 10.3.1 stage 7.
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 */
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__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
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{
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    unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0};
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    unsigned char num_of_blk;
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    memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
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    num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3;
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    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1;
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    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2;
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    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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}
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/*
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 * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
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 */
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__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
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                                 const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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    if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
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        return 1;
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    /* If we have partial block handle it first */
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    if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
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        size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
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        /* If we now have a complete block process it */
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        if (inlen >= left) {
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            memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
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            if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp))
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                return 0;
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            ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
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            inlen -= left;
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            in += left;
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        }
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    }
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    /* Process zero or more complete blocks */
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    for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
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        if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in))
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            return 0;
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    }
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    /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
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    if (inlen > 0) {
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        memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
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        ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
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    }
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    return 1;
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}
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__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
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{
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    if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
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        memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
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        if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp))
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            return 0;
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    }
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    return 1;
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}
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__owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
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                         const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
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                         const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
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                         const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
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{
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    static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
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    size_t inlen;
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    unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
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    int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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    if (!ctr_BCC_init(ctr))
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        return 0;
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    if (in1 == NULL)
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        in1len = 0;
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    if (in2 == NULL)
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        in2len = 0;
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    if (in3 == NULL)
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        in3len = 0;
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    inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len;
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    /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */
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    *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff;
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    *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff;
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    *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff;
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    *p++ = inlen & 0xff;
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    /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */
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    *p++ = 0;
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    *p++ = 0;
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    *p++ = 0;
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    *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
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    ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
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    if (!ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len)
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        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len)
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        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len)
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        || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1)
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        || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr))
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        return 0;
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    /* Set up key K */
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    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1))
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        return 0;
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    /* X follows key K */
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    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
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                          AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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        return 0;
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    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
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                          AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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        return 0;
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    if (ctr->keylen != 16)
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        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen,
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                              ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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            || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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            return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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/*
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 * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
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 * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
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 * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
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 * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
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 */
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__owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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                             const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
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                             const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
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                             const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
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{
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    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
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    int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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    unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48];
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    unsigned char len;
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    /* correct key is already set up. */
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    memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16);
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    inc_128(ctr);
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    memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16);
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    if (ctr->keylen == 16) {
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        len = 32;
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    } else {
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        inc_128(ctr);
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        memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16);
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        len = 48;
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    }
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    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len)
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            || outlen != len)
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        return 0;
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    memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen);
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    memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16);
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    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
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        /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
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        if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
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            if (!ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len))
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                return 0;
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        /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
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        if (in1len)
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            ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
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    } else {
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        ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
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        ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
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    }
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    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)
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        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
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        return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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__owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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                                       const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
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                                       const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
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                                       const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
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{
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    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
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    if (entropy == NULL)
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        return 0;
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    memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
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    memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
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    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
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        return 0;
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    inc_128(ctr);
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    if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen))
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        return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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__owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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                                  const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
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                                  const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
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{
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    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
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    if (entropy == NULL)
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        return 0;
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    inc_128(ctr);
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    if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0))
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        return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
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{
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    u32 n = 12, c = 1;
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    do {
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        --n;
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        c += counter[n];
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        counter[n] = (u8)c;
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        c >>= 8;
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    } while (n);
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}
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__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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                                    unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
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                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
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{
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    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
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    unsigned int ctr32, blocks;
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    int outl, buflen;
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    if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
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        inc_128(ctr);
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        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
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            return 0;
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        /* This means we reuse derived value */
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        if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
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            adin = NULL;
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            adinlen = 1;
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        }
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    } else {
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        adinlen = 0;
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    }
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    inc_128(ctr);
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    if (outlen == 0) {
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        inc_128(ctr);
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        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
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            return 0;
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        return 1;
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    }
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    memset(out, 0, outlen);
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    do {
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        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
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                               NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1))
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            return 0;
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        /*-
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         * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an
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         * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more
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         * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate
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         * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple
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         * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1.
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         */
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        buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen;
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        blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16;
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        ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks;
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        if (ctr32 < blocks) {
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            /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */
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            if (ctr32 != 0) {
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                blocks -= ctr32;
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                buflen = blocks * 16;
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                ctr32 = 0;
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            }
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            ctr96_inc(ctr->V);
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        }
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        PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32);
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        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen)
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            || outl != buflen)
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            return 0;
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        out += buflen;
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        outlen -= buflen;
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    } while (outlen);
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    if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
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        return 0;
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    return 1;
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}
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static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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{
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    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb);
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    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr);
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    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
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    OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
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    return 1;
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}
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static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_ctr_meth = {
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    drbg_ctr_instantiate,
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    drbg_ctr_reseed,
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    drbg_ctr_generate,
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    drbg_ctr_uninstantiate
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};
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int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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{
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    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
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    size_t keylen;
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    switch (drbg->type) {
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    default:
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        /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
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        return 0;
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    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
 | 
						|
        keylen = 16;
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
 | 
						|
        break;
 | 
						|
    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
 | 
						|
        keylen = 24;
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
 | 
						|
        break;
 | 
						|
    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
 | 
						|
        keylen = 32;
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
 | 
						|
        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
 | 
						|
        break;
 | 
						|
    }
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    ctr->keylen = keylen;
 | 
						|
    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL)
 | 
						|
        ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 | 
						|
    if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL)
 | 
						|
        ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 | 
						|
    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL
 | 
						|
        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
 | 
						|
                              ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
 | 
						|
        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
 | 
						|
                              ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))
 | 
						|
        return 0;
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
 | 
						|
    drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
 | 
						|
    drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
 | 
						|
        /* df initialisation */
 | 
						|
        static const unsigned char df_key[32] = {
 | 
						|
            0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
 | 
						|
            0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
 | 
						|
            0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
 | 
						|
            0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
 | 
						|
        };
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
 | 
						|
            ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 | 
						|
        if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
 | 
						|
            return 0;
 | 
						|
        /* Set key schedule for df_key */
 | 
						|
        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
 | 
						|
                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
 | 
						|
            return 0;
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
        drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 | 
						|
        drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
 | 
						|
    } else {
 | 
						|
        drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
 | 
						|
        /* Nonce not used */
 | 
						|
        drbg->min_noncelen = 0;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
 | 
						|
        drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
 | 
						|
    }
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
 | 
						|
 | 
						|
    return 1;
 | 
						|
}
 |