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265 lines
7.8 KiB
C
265 lines
7.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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# include <openssl/x509.h>
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# include <openssl/evp.h>
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# include <openssl/hmac.h>
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# include "evp_local.h"
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/* set this to print out info about the keygen algorithm */
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/* #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 */
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# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
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static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len);
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# endif
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/*
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* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
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* derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
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* posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
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*/
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out)
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{
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const char *empty = "";
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unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
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int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
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unsigned long i = 1;
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HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
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mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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if (mdlen < 0)
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return 0;
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hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
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if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
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return 0;
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p = out;
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tkeylen = keylen;
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if (pass == NULL) {
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pass = empty;
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passlen = 0;
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} else if (passlen == -1) {
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passlen = strlen(pass);
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}
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
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if (hctx == NULL) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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while (tkeylen) {
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if (tkeylen > mdlen)
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cplen = mdlen;
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else
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cplen = tkeylen;
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/*
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* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
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* just in case...
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*/
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itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
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itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
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itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
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itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
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if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
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|| !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
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|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
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for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
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if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
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|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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return 0;
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}
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for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
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p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
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}
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tkeylen -= cplen;
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i++;
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p += cplen;
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}
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
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HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
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# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
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fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
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h__dump(pass, passlen);
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fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n");
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h__dump(salt, saltlen);
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fprintf(stderr, "Iteration count %d\n", iter);
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fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n");
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h__dump(out, keylen);
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# endif
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return 1;
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}
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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int keylen, unsigned char *out)
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{
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return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(),
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keylen, out);
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}
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/*
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* Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because it has
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* to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a few of
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* them...
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*/
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int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
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ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
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const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
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{
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PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
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EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *kdf;
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int rv = 0;
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pbe2 = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), param);
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if (pbe2 == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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/* See if we recognise the key derivation function */
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if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm),
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NULL, NULL, &kdf)) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
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EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
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*/
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cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm);
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if (!cipher) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
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goto err;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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rv = kdf(ctx, pass, passlen, pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, NULL, NULL, en_de);
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err:
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PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
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return rv;
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}
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int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
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int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
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const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
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{
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unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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int saltlen, iter;
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned int keylen = 0;
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int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
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PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
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const EVP_MD *prfmd;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
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goto err;
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}
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keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
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OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof(key));
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/* Decode parameter */
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kdf = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), param);
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if (kdf == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
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/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
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if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
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goto err;
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}
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if (kdf->prf)
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prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
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else
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prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
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if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
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goto err;
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}
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prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
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if (prfmd == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
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goto err;
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}
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if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* it seems that its all OK */
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salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
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saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
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iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
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if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
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keylen, key))
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goto err;
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rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
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PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
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return rv;
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}
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# ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2
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static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len)
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{
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for (; len--; p++)
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fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", *p);
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fprintf(stderr, "\n");
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}
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# endif
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