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			435 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			13 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			435 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			13 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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|  *
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|  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
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|  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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|  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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|  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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| #include "ocsp_local.h"
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| #include <openssl/err.h>
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| #include <string.h>
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| 
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| static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
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|                             STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
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| static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
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| static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
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| static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
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|                           OCSP_CERTID **ret);
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| static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
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|                                STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
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| static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
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| static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
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|                                 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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|                                 unsigned long flags);
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| 
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| /* Verify a basic response message */
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| 
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| int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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|                       X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
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| {
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|     X509 *signer, *x;
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|     STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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|     STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
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|     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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|     int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
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| 
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|     if (!ret) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
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|                 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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|         goto end;
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|     }
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|     ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
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|     if (ctx == NULL) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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|         goto f_err;
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|     }
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|     if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
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|         flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
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|         EVP_PKEY *skey;
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|         skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
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|         if (skey == NULL) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
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|             goto err;
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|         }
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|         ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
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|         if (ret <= 0) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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|             goto end;
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|         }
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|     }
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
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|         int init_res;
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|         if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
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|             untrusted = NULL;
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|         } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
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|             untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
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|             for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
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|                 if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
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|                     OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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|                     goto f_err;
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|                 }
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|             }
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|         } else if (certs != NULL) {
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|             untrusted = certs;
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|         } else {
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|             untrusted = bs->certs;
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|         }
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|         init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
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|         if (!init_res) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
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|             goto f_err;
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|         }
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| 
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|         X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
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|         ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
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|         chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
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|         if (ret <= 0) {
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|             i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
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|                     OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
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|             ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
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|                                X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
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|             goto end;
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|         }
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|         if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
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|             ret = 1;
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|             goto end;
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|         }
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|         /*
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|          * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
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|          * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
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|          */
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|         ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
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| 
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|         /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
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|         if (ret != 0)
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|             goto end;
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| 
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|         /*
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|          * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
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|          * trust
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|          */
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|         if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
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|             goto end;
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| 
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|         x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
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|         if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
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|             goto err;
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|         }
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|         ret = 1;
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|     }
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|  end:
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|     X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
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|     if (bs->certs && certs)
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|         sk_X509_free(untrusted);
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|     return ret;
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| 
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|  err:
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|     ret = 0;
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|     goto end;
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|  f_err:
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|     ret = -1;
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|     goto end;
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| }
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| 
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| int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
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|                           STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
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| {
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|     int ret;
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| 
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|     ret = ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0);
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|     return (ret > 0) ? 1 : 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
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|                             STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
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| {
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|     X509 *signer;
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|     OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
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|     if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
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|         *psigner = signer;
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|         return 2;
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|     }
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
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|         (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
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|         *psigner = signer;
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|         return 1;
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|     }
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|     /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
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| 
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|     *psigner = NULL;
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|     return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
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| {
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|     int i;
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|     unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
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|     X509 *x;
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| 
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|     /* Easy if lookup by name */
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|     if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
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|         return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
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| 
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|     /* Lookup by key hash */
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| 
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|     /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
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|     if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
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|         return NULL;
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|     keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
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|     /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
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|     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
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|         x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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|         X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
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|         if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
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|             return x;
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|     }
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|     return NULL;
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| }
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| 
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| static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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| {
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|     STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
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|     X509 *signer, *sca;
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|     OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
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|     int i;
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|     sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
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| 
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|     if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
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|         return -1;
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
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|     i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
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| 
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|     /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
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|     if (i <= 0)
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|         return i;
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| 
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|     signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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|     /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
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|     if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
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|         sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
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|         i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
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|         if (i < 0)
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|             return i;
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|         if (i) {
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|             /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
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|             if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
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|                 return 1;
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|             return 0;
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|         }
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
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|     return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
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|  * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
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|  * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
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|  * equality against one of them.
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|  */
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| 
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| static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
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| {
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|     OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
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|     int i, idcount;
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| 
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|     idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
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|     if (idcount <= 0) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
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|                 OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
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|         return -1;
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|     }
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| 
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|     cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
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| 
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|     *ret = NULL;
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| 
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|     for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
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|         tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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|         /* Check to see if IDs match */
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|         if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
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|             /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
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|             if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
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|                         cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
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|                 return 2;
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|             /* Else mismatch */
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|             return 0;
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|         }
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
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|     *ret = cid;
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|     return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
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|                                STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
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| {
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|     /* If only one ID to match then do it */
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|     if (cid) {
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|         const EVP_MD *dgst;
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|         X509_NAME *iname;
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|         int mdlen;
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|         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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|         if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
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|                 == NULL) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
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|                     OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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|             return -1;
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|         }
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| 
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|         mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
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|         if (mdlen < 0)
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|             return -1;
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|         if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
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|             (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
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|             return 0;
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|         iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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|         if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
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|             return -1;
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|         if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
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|             return 0;
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|         X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
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|         if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
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|             return 0;
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| 
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|         return 1;
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| 
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|     } else {
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|         /* We have to match the whole lot */
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|         int i, ret;
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|         OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
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|         for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
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|             tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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|             ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
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|             if (ret <= 0)
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|                 return ret;
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|         }
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|         return 1;
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|     }
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| 
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| }
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| 
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| static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
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| {
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|     if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
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|         && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
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|         return 1;
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|     OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
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|     return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
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|  * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
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|  * trust value.
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|  */
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| 
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| int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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|                         X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
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| {
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|     X509 *signer;
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|     X509_NAME *nm;
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|     GENERAL_NAME *gen;
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|     int ret = 0;
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|     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
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| 
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|     if (ctx == NULL) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (!req->optionalSignature) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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|     gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
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|     if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
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|                 OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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|     nm = gen->d.directoryName;
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|     ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
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|     if (ret <= 0) {
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|         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
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|                 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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|     if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
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|         flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
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|         EVP_PKEY *skey;
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|         skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
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|         ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
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|         if (ret <= 0) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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|             goto err;
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|         }
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|     }
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
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|         int init_res;
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|         if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
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|             init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
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|         else
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|             init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
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|                                            req->optionalSignature->certs);
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|         if (!init_res) {
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
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|             goto err;
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|         }
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| 
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|         X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
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|         X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
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|         ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
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|         if (ret <= 0) {
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|             ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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|             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
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|                     OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
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|             ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
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|                                X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
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|             goto err;
 | |
|         }
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|     }
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|     ret = 1;
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|     goto end;
 | |
| 
 | |
| err:
 | |
|     ret = 0;
 | |
| end:
 | |
|     X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     return ret;
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| 
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| }
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| 
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| static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
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|                                 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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|                                 unsigned long flags)
 | |
| {
 | |
|     X509 *signer;
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|     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
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|         signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
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|         if (signer) {
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|             *psigner = signer;
 | |
|             return 1;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
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|     signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
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|     if (signer) {
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|         *psigner = signer;
 | |
|         return 2;
 | |
|     }
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|     return 0;
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| }
 |