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458 lines
12 KiB
C
458 lines
12 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "internal/x509_int.h"
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int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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int i;
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const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
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ai = &a->cert_info;
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bi = &b->cert_info;
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i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
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if (i)
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return i;
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return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
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{
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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unsigned char md[16];
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char *f;
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
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goto err;
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OPENSSL_free(f);
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
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(ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
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(unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
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goto err;
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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) & 0xffffffffL;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
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}
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int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
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}
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int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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{
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return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
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}
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int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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{
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return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
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}
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X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
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{
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return a->cert_info.issuer;
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}
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unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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{
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return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
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}
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#endif
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X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
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{
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return a->cert_info.subject;
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}
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ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
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{
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return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
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}
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const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
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{
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return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
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}
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unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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{
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return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
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* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
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* arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
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* operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
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* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
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* "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
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*/
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int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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int rv;
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/* ensure hash is valid */
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
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rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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if (rv)
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return rv;
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/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
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if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
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if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
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return -1;
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if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
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return 1;
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return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
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a->cert_info.enc.len);
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}
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return rv;
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}
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int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
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{
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int ret;
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/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
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if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
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ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -2;
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}
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if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
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ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -2;
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}
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ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
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if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
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return ret;
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return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
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}
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unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
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{
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
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NULL))
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return 0;
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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) & 0xffffffffL;
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return ret;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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/*
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* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
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* this is reasonably efficient.
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*/
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unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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unsigned char md[16];
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if (md_ctx == NULL)
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return ret;
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/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
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&& EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
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&& EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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) & 0xffffffffL;
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
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X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
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ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
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{
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int i;
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X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
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if (!sk)
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return NULL;
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x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
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x.cert_info.issuer = name;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
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return x509;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
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{
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X509 *x509;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
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return x509;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
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{
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if (x == NULL)
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return NULL;
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return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
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}
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EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
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{
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if (x == NULL)
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return NULL;
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return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
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}
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int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
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{
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const EVP_PKEY *xk;
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int ret;
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xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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if (xk)
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ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
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else
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ret = -2;
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switch (ret) {
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case 1:
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break;
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case 0:
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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break;
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case -1:
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
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break;
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case -2:
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
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}
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if (ret > 0)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
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* of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
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* flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
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{
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const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
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int curve_nid;
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if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
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grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
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if (!grp)
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
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curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
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/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
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if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
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/*
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* Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
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*/
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if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
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if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
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/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
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*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
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} else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
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if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
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if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
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} else
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return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
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return X509_V_OK;
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}
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int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
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unsigned long flags)
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{
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int rv, i, sign_nid;
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EVP_PKEY *pk;
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unsigned long tflags = flags;
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if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
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return X509_V_OK;
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/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
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if (x == NULL) {
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x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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i = 1;
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} else
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i = 0;
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pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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/*
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* With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
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* a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
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* Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
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* pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
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*/
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if (chain == NULL)
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return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
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if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
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rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
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/* Correct error depth */
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i = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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/* Check EE key only */
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rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
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if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
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/* Correct error depth */
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i = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
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sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
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x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
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if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
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rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
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goto end;
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}
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pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
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if (rv != X509_V_OK)
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goto end;
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}
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/* Final check: root CA signature */
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rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
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end:
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if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
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/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
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if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
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|| rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
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i--;
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/*
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* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
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* with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
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*/
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if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
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rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
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if (perror_depth)
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*perror_depth = i;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
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{
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int sign_nid;
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if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
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return X509_V_OK;
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sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
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return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
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}
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#else
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int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
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unsigned long flags)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
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* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
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* each X509 structure.
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*/
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STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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{
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STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
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int i;
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ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
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X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
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X509_up_ref(x);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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