Fix RUTX support

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/071-bpf-dont-allow-vmlinux-btf-to-be-used-in-map_create-and-prog_load.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+Index: linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+@@ -593,6 +593,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *at
+ 			err = PTR_ERR(btf);
+ 			goto free_map;
+ 		}
++		if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
++			btf_put(btf);
++			err = -EACCES;
++			goto free_map;
++		}
+ 
+ 		err = map_check_btf(map, btf, attr->btf_key_type_id,
+ 				    attr->btf_value_type_id);
+Index: linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -6959,6 +6959,11 @@ static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_ver
+ 	btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
+ 	if (IS_ERR(btf))
+ 		return PTR_ERR(btf);
++	if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
++		btf_put(btf);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
+ 	env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
+ 
+ 	err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
+Index: linux-5.4.147/include/linux/btf.h
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/include/linux/btf.h
++++ linux-5.4.147/include/linux/btf.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void btf_type_seq_show(const struct btf
+ 		       struct seq_file *m);
+ int btf_get_fd_by_id(u32 id);
+ u32 btf_id(const struct btf *btf);
++bool btf_is_kernel(const struct btf *btf);
+ bool btf_member_is_reg_int(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *s,
+ 			   const struct btf_member *m,
+ 			   u32 expected_offset, u32 expected_size);
+Index: linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/kernel/bpf/btf.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct btf {
+ 	refcount_t refcnt;
+ 	u32 id;
+ 	struct rcu_head rcu;
++	bool kernel_btf;
+ };
+ 
+ enum verifier_phase {
+@@ -352,6 +353,11 @@ static bool btf_type_nosize(const struct
+ 	       btf_type_is_func(t) || btf_type_is_func_proto(t);
+ }
+ 
++bool btf_is_kernel(const struct btf *btf)
++{
++	return btf->kernel_btf;
++}
++
+ static bool btf_type_nosize_or_null(const struct btf_type *t)
+ {
+ 	return !t || btf_type_nosize(t);
+Index: linux-5.4.147/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
++++ linux-5.4.147/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+@@ -3275,6 +3275,7 @@ struct bpf_btf_info {
+ 	__aligned_u64 btf;
+ 	__u32 btf_size;
+ 	__u32 id;
++	__u32 kernel_btf;
+ } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+ 
+ /* User bpf_sock_addr struct to access socket fields and sockaddr struct passed

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/097-bpf-fix-integer-overflow-in-arg-calculation.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From: Bui Quang Minh @ 2021-01-26  8:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
+  To: ast, daniel, davem, kuba, hawk, john.fastabend, andrii, kafai,
+	songliubraving, yhs, kpsingh, jakub, lmb
+  Cc: netdev, bpf, linux-kernel, minhquangbui99
+
+In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
+the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
+can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
+bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
+
+Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
+---
+ kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 4 ++--
+ net/core/sock_map.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *dev_map_create
+ 	int i;
+ 	struct hlist_head *hash;
+ 
+-	hash = bpf_map_area_alloc(entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
++	hash = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
+ 	if (hash != NULL)
+ 		for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
+ 			INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&hash[i]);
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int dev_map_init_map(struct bpf_d
+ 
+ 		spin_lock_init(&dtab->index_lock);
+ 	} else {
+-		dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(dtab->map.max_entries *
++		dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) dtab->map.max_entries *
+ 						      sizeof(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *),
+ 						      dtab->map.numa_node);
+ 		if (!dtab->netdev_map)
+Index: linux-5.4.147/net/core/sock_map.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/net/core/sock_map.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/net/core/sock_map.c
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(un
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto free_stab;
+ 
+-	stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc(stab->map.max_entries *
++	stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) stab->map.max_entries *
+ 				       sizeof(struct sock *),
+ 				       stab->map.numa_node);
+ 	if (stab->sks)

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/500-ovl-check-permission-to-open-real-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 05acefb4872dae89e772729efb194af754c877e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
+Subject: ovl: check permission to open real file
+
+Call inode_permission() on real inode before opening regular file on one of
+the underlying layers.
+
+In some cases ovl_permission() already checks access to an underlying file,
+but it misses the metacopy case, and possibly other ones as well.
+
+Removing the redundant permission check from ovl_permission() should be
+considered later.
+
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+---
+ fs/overlayfs/file.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Index: linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/fs/overlayfs/file.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+@@ -34,10 +34,22 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(co
+ 	struct file *realfile;
+ 	const struct cred *old_cred;
+ 	int flags = file->f_flags | OVL_OPEN_FLAGS;
++	int acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flags);
++	int err;
++
++	if (flags & O_APPEND)
++		acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
+ 
+ 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+-	realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
+-				       current_cred());
++	err = inode_permission(realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
++	if (err) {
++		realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
++	} else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(realinode)) {
++		realfile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++	} else {
++		realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
++					       current_cred());
++	}
+ 	revert_creds(old_cred);
+ 
+ 	pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n",

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/501-ovl-switch-to-mounter-creds-in-readdir.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 48bd024b8a40d73ad6b086de2615738da0c7004f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:25 +0200
+Subject: ovl: switch to mounter creds in readdir
+
+In preparation for more permission checking, override credentials for
+directory operations on the underlying filesystems.
+
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+---
+ fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+Index: linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
+@@ -732,8 +732,10 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file
+ 	struct ovl_dir_file *od = file->private_data;
+ 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ 	struct ovl_cache_entry *p;
++	const struct cred *old_cred;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ 	if (!ctx->pos)
+ 		ovl_dir_reset(file);
+ 
+@@ -747,17 +749,20 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file
+ 		    (ovl_same_sb(dentry->d_sb) &&
+ 		     (ovl_is_impure_dir(file) ||
+ 		      OVL_TYPE_MERGE(ovl_path_type(dentry->d_parent))))) {
+-			return ovl_iterate_real(file, ctx);
++			err = ovl_iterate_real(file, ctx);
++		} else {
++			err = iterate_dir(od->realfile, ctx);
+ 		}
+-		return iterate_dir(od->realfile, ctx);
++		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (!od->cache) {
+ 		struct ovl_dir_cache *cache;
+ 
+ 		cache = ovl_cache_get(dentry);
++		err = PTR_ERR(cache);
+ 		if (IS_ERR(cache))
+-			return PTR_ERR(cache);
++			goto out;
+ 
+ 		od->cache = cache;
+ 		ovl_seek_cursor(od, ctx->pos);
+@@ -769,7 +774,7 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file
+ 			if (!p->ino) {
+ 				err = ovl_cache_update_ino(&file->f_path, p);
+ 				if (err)
+-					return err;
++					goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			if (!dir_emit(ctx, p->name, p->len, p->ino, p->type))
+ 				break;
+@@ -777,7 +782,10 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file
+ 		od->cursor = p->l_node.next;
+ 		ctx->pos++;
+ 	}
+-	return 0;
++	err = 0;
++out:
++	revert_creds(old_cred);
++	return err;
+ }
+ 
+ static loff_t ovl_dir_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int origin)

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/502-ovl-verify-permissions-in-ovl_path_open.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 56230d956739b9cb1cbde439d76227d77979a04d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
+Subject: ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
+
+Check permission before opening a real file.
+
+ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
+
+ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
+doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
+
+For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
+underlying layer.  Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
+topmost one as well.  Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
+
+Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
+complex and hence more bug prone.  The result is less precise permissions
+returned in access(2).  If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
+this bug.
+
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+---
+ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/fs/overlayfs/util.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+@@ -475,7 +475,29 @@ bool ovl_is_whiteout(struct dentry *dent
+ 
+ struct file *ovl_path_open(struct path *path, int flags)
+ {
+-	return dentry_open(path, flags | O_NOATIME, current_cred());
++	struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
++	int err, acc_mode;
++
++	switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
++	case O_RDONLY:
++		acc_mode = MAY_READ;
++		break;
++	case O_WRONLY:
++		acc_mode = MAY_WRITE;
++		break;
++	default:
++		BUG();
++	}
++
++	err = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN);
++	if (err)
++		return ERR_PTR(err);
++
++	/* O_NOATIME is an optimization, don't fail if not permitted */
++	if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
++		flags |= O_NOATIME;
++
++	return dentry_open(path, flags, current_cred());
+ }
+ 
+ /* Caller should hold ovl_inode->lock */

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/503-ovl-do-not-fail-because-of_O_NOACTIME.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From b6650dab404c701d7fe08a108b746542a934da84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 15:26:14 +0100
+Subject: ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME
+
+In case the file cannot be opened with O_NOATIME because of lack of
+capabilities, then clear O_NOATIME instead of failing.
+
+Remove WARN_ON(), since it would now trigger if O_NOATIME was cleared.
+Noticed by Amir Goldstein.
+
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+---
+ fs/overlayfs/file.c | 11 +++--------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+Index: linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.147.orig/fs/overlayfs/file.c
++++ linux-5.4.147/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+@@ -44,9 +44,10 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(co
+ 	err = inode_permission(realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
+-	} else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(realinode)) {
+-		realfile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ 	} else {
++		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(realinode))
++			flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
++
+ 		realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
+ 					       current_cred());
+ 	}
+@@ -66,12 +67,6 @@ static int ovl_change_flags(struct file
+ 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ 	int err;
+ 
+-	flags |= OVL_OPEN_FLAGS;
+-
+-	/* If some flag changed that cannot be changed then something's amiss */
+-	if (WARN_ON((file->f_flags ^ flags) & ~OVL_SETFL_MASK))
+-		return -EIO;
+-
+ 	flags &= OVL_SETFL_MASK;
+ 
+ 	if (((flags ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND) && IS_APPEND(inode))

root/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/700-ignore-pppoe-when-dst-does-not-match-dev-address.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: linux-5.4.124/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+===================================================================
+--- linux-5.4.124.orig/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
++++ linux-5.4.124/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+@@ -502,6 +502,12 @@ static int pppoe_disc_rcv(struct sk_buff
+ 	if (ph->code != PADT_CODE)
+ 		goto abort;
+ 
++	// compare the dst addr to the current net device addr and ignore packet if not matching
++	// otherwise it will terminate the connection
++	if(!ether_addr_equal(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, dev->dev_addr)) {
++		goto abort;
++	}
++
+ 	pn = pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev));
+ 	po = get_item(pn, ph->sid, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, dev->ifindex);
+ 	if (po)